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L Introduction
Academic literature on Latin American politics almost com-
pletely ignores the political role of the judiciary, and never offers a
detailed analysis of the political influence of the judiciary in individual
Latin American countries. Moreover, the little work that has been
done generally focuses on Latin America as a whole, and carries the
implicit assumption not only that the political role of the judiciary is
limited today, but that it has always been limited.1 This assumption
may well be true for many Latin American countries, buat some Latin
American countries had important periods of political competition
among members of the oligarchy before they entered twentieth cen-
tury cycles of alternating military governments and populist politics.2
Given that these countries developed sophisticated institutional struc-
tures based on the U.S. Constitution, it seems odd that scholars write-
off the judiciary so quickly. This Article focuses on Argentina, and in
Argentina at least, the courts had a very important influence on polit-
ical developments.
Any analysis of Argentine politics that ignores the courts is sim-
ply incomplete. For seven decades, the 1860's through the 1920's, the
Argentine Supreme Court acted as a stabilizing political influence and
a soother of political passions in a way that even the U.S. Supreme
Court probably did not. Certainly The Federalist theorized that the
U.S. federal courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, would play
1. Keith S. Rosenn, The Protection of Judicial Independence in Latin America, 19 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 1, 2-3, 32 (1987) (noting lack of judicial independence as a
chronic problem throughout Latin America) [hereinafter Rosenn, Protection of Judicial
Independence]; Keith S. Rosenn, Judicial Review in Latin America, 35 CHuO ST. L.J. 785,
819 (1974) (noting that while a few courageous judges have occasionally made a contribu-
tion in the case of governments of doubtful legitimacy, judicial review generally has been
fragile given a lack of societal commitment to the constitutions being defended) [hereinaf-
ter Rosenn, Judicial Review]; Tom J. Farer, Reinforcing Democracy in Latin America: Notes
Toward an Appropriate Legal Framework, 11 HuM. RTS. Q. 434, 445 (1989) (noting the
general weakness of Latin American courts in engaging in judicial review); Howard J.
Wiarda & Harvey F. Kline, The Latin American Tradition and Process of Development, in
LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT 3, 42, 44 (Howard J. Wiarda & Harvey F.
Kline eds., 4th ed. 1996) (noting the judges lack the respect enjoyed by their U.S. counter-
parts, and face serious practical limitations in challenging the government)- Carlos S. Nino,
On the Exercise of Judicial Review in Argentina, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN
AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 309, 321-22, 325, 332-33 (Irwin P. Stotzky cd.,
1993) (describing the Argentine judiciary as a failure in protecting both democracy and
individual liberty).
2. Larry Diamond & Juan J. Linz, Introduction: Politics, Society, aad Democracy in
Latin America, in DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING CouNTRms: LATIN AMERICA 1, 7-9 (Larry
Diamond et al. eds., 1989).
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an important role in maintaining social peace. James Madison argued
that judicial review by the Supreme Court was "clearly essential to
prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact,"
3
while Alexander Hamilton noted the "benefits of the integrity and
moderation of the judiciary" in the States and that the absence of a
strong judiciary would "sap the foundations of public and private con-
fidence" and "introduce in its stead universal distrust and distress."4
Alexis de Tocqueville validated their position in the 1830's, describing
the U.S. Supreme Court as playing a vital role in maintaining "the
peace, the prosperity and the very existence of the Union."'
But there have also been plenty of doubters. Judge Learned
Hand, for example, questioned the utility of judicial review, noting
that "a society so riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no court
can save."6 Certainly historic mistakes like Dred Scott7 and the confir-
mation of the imprisonment of Eugene Debss show the Supreme
Court as anything but a moderating force.
Argentina in the late nineteenth century offers many instances
where the Argentine Supreme Court unequivocally acted as a moder-
ating political influence. While there were serious political crises, it is
possible to identify a long period of Argentine history during which
the courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, played an important
role in moderating government repression of political opponents, and
3. THE FEDERA LsT No. 39 (James Madison).
4. Tr FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). See also CAP.RLEs L BLAcy: Jr,,
Tim PEOPLE AND THE CoURT- JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DE.,OCRACy 158 (1960).
5. 1 ALEMS DE TOcQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY iN AummcA 156 (Henry Reeve trans.,
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1945) (1835,1840). His observations on the federal courts echo The
Federalist papers:
The executive appeals to them for assistance against the encroachments of the
legislative power; the legislature demands their protection against the assaults of
the executive; they defend the Union from the disobedience of the states, the
states from the exaggerated claims of the Union, the public interest against pri-
vate interests, and the conservative spirit of stability against the fickleness of the
democracy.
a d at 156-57.
6. Learned Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Cvilization, in
THE SPmrr OF LIBERTY 172, 181 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1952). Henry Hart replied to this
statement that the judiciary contributes to the forces of moderation. Henry M. Hart, Com-
ment-Henry M. Hart, Jr., in GoNFMIMENT UNDER LAW 139, 140-41 (Arthur E. Suther-
land ed., 1956), discussed in Rosenn, Judicial Review, supra note 1, at 813.
7. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
8. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (confirming Eugene Debs's conviction
under the Espionage Act of 1917 for inferences in his speeches approving of resistance to
the World War I draft).
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by doing so, helped instill a "spirit of moderation" among important
political actors.
Argentina in the late nineteenth century offers surprising con-
trasts. On the one hand, in addition to disruption provoked by an
unpopular war against Paraguay,9 Argentina endured countless small
provincial revolts in the 1860s and 1870s and national revolts in 1874,
1880, 1890, 1893 and 1905.10 On the other hand, Argentina also en-
joyed one of the highest rates of economic growth in the world.' By
the 1920s, Argentina was among the wealthiest countries in the world,
at least on a par with the wealthier nations of Western Europe.12 The
economy averaged growth of at least five percent per year from 1865
to 1914, and grew at even faster levels from 1919 through 1929.13 Im-
migrants came at an extraordinary rate, with a net gain of 638,000
immigrants in the decade of the 1880s alone,'4 and social indicators,
such as the literacy rate, improved dramatically.'"
One reason political unrest and economic growth could exist to-
gether was that the unrest was comparatively confined and controlled.
The Constitution, finally accepted in 1860 by all of Argentina's prov-
inces, was never respected in its entirety. Although the Constitution
provided for a representative form of government,' 6 most elections
before 1916 were fraudulent. 7 While the Constitution provided for a
9. This war allied Argentina with Brazil and Uruguay against Paraguay, then an im-
portant regional power, and lasted for five years (1865-1870) before Paraguay was finally
defeated.
10. These revolts involved small but significant battles, with 3000 battlefield deaths in
the 1880 revolt. 2 Lus H. SOMMARIVA, HISTORIA DE LAS INTERVENCIONES FEDERALES
EN LAS PROVINCIAS 88-89 (1931); DAVID RocK, ARGENTINA, 1516-1987, at 131 (1987).
The revolts also involved several days of street battles and shelling within the city of Bue-
nos Aires in 1890. See generally JUAN BALESTRA, EL NoVENrA: UNA -VOLUCI6N POLIT-
ICA ARGENTINA 153-92 (2d ed. 1935); ENRIQUE GERMAN HERZ, LA REVOLUCI6N DEL 90,
at 191-234 (1991).
11. CARLOS F. DIAZ ALEJANDRO, ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE AR-
GENTINE REPUBLIC 3 (1970).
12. CARLOS H. WAIsMAN, REVERSAL OF DEVELOPMENT IN ARGENTINA 7 (1987).
13. DIAZ ALEJANDRO, supra note 11, at 3, 52-53.
14. Id. at 424 (table). Total immigration without subtracting emigration was 841,000
from 1881-1890. 1& Immigration dropped to only a 320,000 net gain from 1891-1900 due
to the economic depression and perhaps due to the political instability, but then hit a peak
net gain of 1,120,000 for the decade from 1901-1910. Id.
15. Id. at 56-57 (illiteracy dropped from 77% in the 1869 census to around 25% in
1929).
16. CONS1TTUCION ARGENTINA [CONsT. ARG.] arts. 1, 5, 37, 81 (1860).
17. The classic analysis of the system of electoral fraud is Jost NICOLAS MATIENZO,
EL GOBIERNO REPRESENTATIVO FEDERAL EN LA REPOBLICA ARGENTINA 196-200, 214,
221-38 (2d ed. 1917); see also NATALiO R. BOTANA, EL ORDEN CONSERVADOR: LA POLIT-
ICA ARGENTINA ENTRE 1880 Y 1916, at 178-84 (1977).
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federal system with substantial provincial autonomy, in practice much
of what happened in provincial politics was controlled by the Presi-
dent. 8 But those limitations do not change the fact that the Constitu-
tion successfully established many rules that moderated the
government's behavior-rules that created a sense in both the govern-
ment and in the opposition that certain types of repression were off
limits. The existence of almost constant electoral fraud in the nine-
teenth century makes it easy to take a jaundiced view of Argentine
constitutionalism. However, the Argentine elite that produced its
1853 Constitution had little interest in clean elections, merely in indi-
vidual liberty. Moreover, that emphasis on individual liberty was
probably sufficient to gradually establish a sense in both those in gov-
ernment and the opposition that certain types of repression would not
occur. The acceptance over time by both the government and the op-
position of rules protecting individual liberties helped create the confi-
dence necessary to convince the governing party to permit free,
competitive elections. The Supreme Court and the federal judiciary in
general, were key to this process. The federal courts protected even
revolutionaries from any form of repression not explicitly provided for
by law. Not surprisingly, given the trust that the courts must have
enjoyed, when a clean electoral system was finally established, it was
established with the judiciary as the guarantor of the electoral
process.19
Several key features marked the Supreme Court's treatment of
political instability between the 1860's and 1929. First, not only did
the Supreme Court successfully maintain its independence during a
period of frequent political violence, but it managed to arbitrate rules
that restrained the level of repression. The Court accomplished this
by: (a) developing what later became known as de facto doctrine, to
govern the legal consequences of a province or the entire nation fall-
ing under the control of a revolutionary force; (b) limiting the repres-
sion of rebels after unsuccessful revolts by protecting their due
process rights, keeping their sentences light, keeping military jurisdic-
tion in check and giving liberal scope to amnesties; and (c) offering
some protection from detention to opposition political figures even
during a state of siege.
There were limits on what the Court could accomplish as a pro-
moter of peaceful political change. Free elections were simply not
18. MArmrNzo, supra note 17, at 199-200,209, 211,285-91; BOTANA, supra note 17, at
127, 131.
19. BOTANA, supra note 17, at 129-31.
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part of the constitutional bargain accepted by the Argentine elite and
the Constitution itself gave the Executive substantial latitude during
states of siege. But the Court successfully placed restraints on polit-
ical repression and sometimes directly challenged the Executive.
Understanding why the Argentine Supreme Court was successful
is quite complex, however, and involves variables very different from
those underlying U.S. judicial review. The key lies not so much in the
fact that Argentina adopted judicial review as prescribed in Marbury
v. Madison, but in the Argentine Court's underlying sociopolitical
sources of authority and legitimacy.20 That authority came from three
principal sources. First, the Argentine elite stood firmly behind the
use of the United States as a constitutional model, and the authority
of the U.S. model was such that any Argentine court decision that
could definitively invoke U.S. law and practice enjoyed instant sup-
port. As this author has developed in other work, U.S. constitutional
practice often acted as a talisman, providing a solidifying, though
often irrational, ingredient to Argentine constitutionalism.2' Second,
because of Argentine perceptions of the importance of judicial review
in the United States, the individuals chosen to serve on the Court
tended to be persons who would be perceived as neutral arbiters be-
cause of their political stature and independence from the person ap-
pointing them. Third, particularly as Continental European influences
increased with Argentina's adoption of a Civil Code in 1869,1 the Ar-
gentine judiciary became increasingly wedded to the rational interpre-
tation of the constitutional text.23 Rationalism -and rational
interpretation are referred to here as methods of interpretation that
present themselves as offering a definitive interpretation of the Con-
stitution that may be obtained from the constitutional text or its legis-
lative history, as opposed to methods that focus on contemporary
social needs and leave the interpreter with greater freedom from tex-
20. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
21. Jonathan M. Miller, The Constitutional Authority of a Foreign Talisman: A Study of
U.S. Practice as Authority in 19th Century Argentine Constitutionalism and the Argentine
Elite's Leap of Faith, 116 AM. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 1997)).
22. Law No. 340, Sept. 29, 1869, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 505.
23. Many Argentine legal historians have noted that adoption of the Civil Code led to
a gradual change in the legal mentality of judges, and the profession generally, toward
mechanical interpretations of the law isolated from its social context. See, e.g., VICTOR
TAU ANZOATEGUI, LA CODIFICACI6N EN LA ARGENTINA 29-30 (1977); Bernardino Brava
Lira, Arbitrio judicialy legalismo, Juez y Derecho en Europa Continental), en Iberoamdrica
antes y despuds de la codificaci6n, 28 REviSTA DE HISTORIA DEL DER13CHO "RICARDO
LEvENE" 7,14-17 (1991); 2 ABEL CHANETON, HIsToRIA DE VELEZ SARSFIELD 412-16,418
(1937).
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tual restraints. In the period examined in this Article, rational inter-
pretation generally benefited judicial independence, as when the
Executive violated a clear constitutional or statutory provision the
Supreme Court had little choice but to stand its ground.
Copying the United States and adopting rationalism did come
with a cost, however, as with limited exceptions, the Court's emphasis
on rationalism and on following U.S. practice also prevented it from
assuming a leadership role in pointing Argentine society in new direc-
tions. The clearest opportunity came in 1893, when an assertive
Supreme Court might have helped end electoral fraud and unneces-
sary federal interventions in the provinces and hence improved the
mechanisms for the peaceful transfer of political power. Instead,
when given the opportunity, the Argentine Supreme Court refused to
move beyond the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court, which largely
treated such matters as nonjusticiable political questions. The Argen-
tine Supreme Court only rarely demonstrated the ability of a common
law court to develop rules not established in the constitutional text,
and decreasingly so as rationalism strengthened.
Most of this Article will progress in chronological order, examin-
ing discrete events in Argentina's political history and the Supreme
Court's participation in them. Section II will offer necessary back-
ground on the history of the Argentine Constitution, and the impor-
tance placed on judicial review and appointments to the Supreme
Court. Section III will offer a brief introduction to the legal issues
that this Article focuses on habeas corpus during states of siege, the
trial of rebels, and de facto doctrine. Section IV focuses on the Rebel-
lions of 1866-1867 in the Argentine Northwest, the first time the
Supreme Court had to deal with the aftermath of a failed rebellion,
and Section V examines the doctrine developed by the Supreme
Court in various isolated cases involving rebellions and military juris-
diction during the 1870s and 1880s. Section VI, the bulk of this Arti-
cle, examines the intervention of the Supreme Court during the period
from 1890 through 1893, a unique time of strong pressures for reform
of Argentina's political system, where the Court played a central role
in limiting repression of individuals seeking changes through revolu-
tion, but only a limited role in pushing for reform. Section VII offers
an analysis of what was and was not accomplished by the federal judi-
ciary as an agent of moderation and an agent for ending electoral
fraud. Section VIII seeks to explain how the Court's important polit-
ical role during the 1863-1930 period was nevertheless consistent with
the Court's acceptance of a de facto government in 1930. The Article
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supports the conclusion that the Argentine Supreme Court played a
central role in limiting the level of government repression in Argen-
tina during a long period of time, and hence acted as an important
moderating influence. Because of its limited view of its own role,
however, it failed to use its influence to move beyond the intentions of
the Framers of the Argentine Constitution to also usher in political
reform.
H. The Origins of the Argentine Supreme Court
When the Argentine Supreme Court began to hear cases in 1863,
it did so after fifty years of civil wars and disregard for basic human
rights. However, the Court assumed its functions amid extremely high
expectations. The Argentine elite saw judicial review as central to the
U.S. constitutional model that it had decided to adopt and was there-
fore willing to show the Supreme Court extraordinary respect as an
institution. Moreover, through the 1930s the membership of the
Court came from the highest ranks of the political elite, and the earli-
est appointments in particular are noteworthy because the President
did not name political allies.
The fifty years that followed Argentina's declaration of indepen-
dence from Spain in 1812 were so violent that constitutional consoli-
dation was only a dream. Even during the War for Independence, the
country fractured among different caudillos-local warlords who mus-
tered militias of peons and gauchos who worked on their ranches and
those of allies. The consequence was continuous battles among caudi-
ilos, as different caudillos sought to expand their influence, and be-
tween the Province of Buenos Aires, which through the City of
Buenos Aires controlled most international commerce, and different
alliances of provinces led by their caudillos.24 For most of the period
from 1829 through 1852, General Juan Manuel de Rosas exercised
such absolute control over the City and Province of Buenos Aires that
he was able to dominate most events in the interior of the country as
well. However, Rosas also represented perhaps the greatest extreme
in caudillo government. Rosas received a formal grant of "the entire
sum of public power" from the Legislature of the Province of Buenos
Aires. 25 He used terror as a weapon, acted as his own judiciary, and
24. See generally RocK, supra note 10, at 84-123 (offering an overview of Argentine
history from 1812-1861).
25. JoHN LYNCH, ARGENTINE DICTATOR, JUAN MANUEL DE ROSAS, 1829-1852, at
162-63 (1981).
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intimidated his political adversaries through a murder squad known as
the Mazorca, a group that openly brandished long knives that it used
to cut the throats of opponents.26 Foreign visitors described his re-
gime as one of the most rigorous tyrannies in the world.27
The situation began to improve in 1852, with the defeat of Rosas
by General Justo Jos6 de Urquiza, the caudillo of the Province of En-
tre Rfos, who led a coalition of caudillos and exiles with support from
Brazil. Urquiza, who looked to George Washington as his model,2
sought to establish a national constitution, and along with much of the
Argentine elite was attracted to a vision of Argentina put forward by
Juan Bautista Alberdi in 1852 in a book entitled Bases y puntos de
partida para la organizaci6n polftica de la RepTlblica Argentina29 [Ba-
ses and Points of Departure for the Political Organization of the Ar-
gentine Republic].3 0 In its essence, the Alberdian vision called for
protection of civil liberties as the key to encouraging immigration and
foreign investment along the lines of that received by the United
States,3 ' but showing little interest in political rights.32 The Constitu-
tional Convention of 1853 implemented Alberdi's ideas, in a Constitu-
tion that largely followed that of the United States.3 The Province of
Buenos Aires boycotted the 1853 Convention and refused to join the
Argentine Confederation, the entity that the Convention produced.
However, after battlefield reverses and various constitutional amend-
ments made at the Province's request, the Province finally accepted
the Constitution at a new Constitutional Convention in 1860. Lasting
stability, however, only began in 1861, when a battlefield victory by
26. See generally id. at 166-83, 216-19 (describing Rosas's absolute authority and vari-
ous terror tactics).
27. John Pendleton, Dispatch No. 1 to the Secretary of State, Buenos Aires, Sept. 22,
1851, microformed on Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Argentina, 1817-
1906, microcopy No. 69, reel 9 (National Archives Microfilm Publications) (characterizing
the Rosas regime as "the most simple and rigorous despotism in the entire world").
28. See BEATRiz BoscH, PRESENCIA DE URQUIzA 286 (1953) [hereinafter BoscH,
PRESENCIA DE URQUIzA]; BEAT=IZ BoscH, URaUizA Y su Trv.spo 205,246,254,367, 433,
673, 463 (1971) [hereinafter BoscH, URQUIZA Y SU TIEMTPO].
29. JuAN BAuTISTA ALBERDI, BAsEs Y PUNTOS DE PARTDA PARA LA ORGANIZAC16N
POLITCA DE LA REPBLICA ARGENTINA (1852), reprinted in 3 OBRAS CO.PLTAS DE
JuAN BAUTISTA ALBERDI 371 (La Tribuna Nacional, 1886) [hereinafter ALBEPMII.
30. BoscH, URoUizA Y su TIFMpo, supra note 28, at 259; 1 JORGE M. MAYIER, A.
BERDI Y SU TIEMPO 531, 541 (1973).
31. 3 ALBERI, supra note 29, at 429-32, 449-51, 454-55 (on the need to offer civil
liberties to attract immigrants and investment).
32. 3 id. at 523 (on the utopian nature of political liberties given Argentina's state of
development); Miller, supra note 21.
33. ALBERTO PADILLA, LA CONS=TrUCI6N DE EsTADos UNMOS COMO PPESIDENTE
ARGENTI NO 96-101 (1921).
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General Bartolom6 Mitre, the Governor of the Province of Buenos
Aires, over federal forces placed Mitre in control of the federal gov-
ernment and ushered in a period of continuous constitutional govern-
ment that lasted until 1930.
Aside from having military training, Bartolom6 Mitre was one of
the most important Argentine intellectuals of his day, and had played
an important role in 1860 in drafting changes to Argentina's Constitu-
tion of 1853 to make it acceptable to the Province of Buenos Aires.34
Almost all of those changes brought a Constitution already modeled
after that of the United States even closer to its model.35 In 1862,
Mitre became the first President chosen on the basis of a national
election that included all of Argentina's provinces, and while he had
to deal with many national emergencies during his Presidency, partic-
ularly revolts by caudillos in the interior of the country and a long war
against Paraguay, he was remarkably respectful of Congress and the
Supreme Court as independent political institutions. A Supreme
Court consisting of five justices (a number that would remain un-
changed until 1960) was appointed in 1862 and started hearing cases
the following year, once Congress passed legislation governing its
jurisdiction.
Argentina's Constitutional Conventions of 1853 and 1860 shed
little light on Argentine judicial review. The Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1853 adopted provisions almost identical to Article III of the
U.S. Constitution with little discussion,3 6 and the debates do not indi-
cate whether in adopting the U.S. constitutional text the delegates
planned to allow judges to review the constitutionality of executive
and legislative action. (Article III of the U.S. Constitution does not
explicitly address judicial review, but merely notes that federal court
jurisdiction extends to all cases "arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States and Treaties. '37) A Convention held by the
Province of Buenos Aires in 1860 to propose constitutional changes to
the national Constitutional Convention held later that year eliminated
most of the few differences between the Argentine and U.S. provi-
sions on the judiciary, but likewise never discussed jud);cial review.
35
34. JAMES R. SCOBIE, LA LucHA POR LA CONSOLIDACION DE LA NATIONALIDAD AR-
GENTINA, 1852-62, at 262-64, 273-75 (2d ed. 1964).
35. Miller, supra note 21.
36. Constitutional Convention of 1853, Session of Apr. 20, 1853, in 4 ASAMBLEAS CON.
sTrruYENTEs ARGErNTrAs 535 (Emilio Ravignani ed., 1937).
37. U.S. CONST. art. Im, § 2.
38. The Convention called for eliminating the requirement that the Supreme Court
reside in the Capital, so that Supreme Court judges could ride a circuit as in the United
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The only reference to judicial review at the Buenos Aires Convention
comes in a passing comment by a future President, Domingo
Sarmiento, that "having adopted the organization of the federal
Supreme Court of the United States we must adopt its attributions
and its case law."
'39
However, the Argentine elite was well aware of what judicial re-
view involved. In the period from 1853 through 1860, when all of the
country except for the Province of Buenos Aires was part of the Ar-
gentine Confederation, the Confederation's Congress held an exten-
sive debate on judicial review when it debated and passed a law
establishing a federal court system.40 Moreover, both this law and the
law that ultimately came into effect in 1862, explicitly provided for
judicial review.4' The 1862 law, parts of which remain in force today,
entrusts the judiciary with "the observance of the national Constitu-
tion, avoiding applying in its decisions any disposition of any of the
other branches of the national [government] which might be in oppo-
sition with it."'42
Congress and the Executive were well aware that judicial review
was a new endeavor for Argentina and did their best to copy the
United States correctly. Prior to drafting the laws governing the juris-
diction of the federal courts, the Argentine government sent an attor-
ney to the United States to study its procedural system first hand 3
Then, in 1863 Congress underwrote publication of a translation of
Story's Commentaries through an advance purchase;" in 1864 it did
the same in the case of James Kent's Commentaries on American
Law,45 and in 1869 President Sarmiento, in a decree later approved by
Congress as a law, authorized translations of William Whiting, War
Power under the Constitution of the United States, John Norton Pome-
States (which never occurred in practice). Constitutional Convention of 1860, Session of
May 7, 1860, in 4 AsA.AS CONSTnUYENTE AROENTINAS, supra note 36. at 870-71.
The Convention also eliminated Supreme Court jurisdiction over disputes between
branches of a provincial government and over ecclesiastical matters. Id. at 871-74.
39. Id. at 870.
40. The debate is recorded in CONGnESO NAciONAL AcrAs DE LAS SESION.S DE LA
CAmARA DE Di'urADos, 1857-1858, Sessions of July 12 & 14, 1858, 504-29.
41. Law No. 182 art. 2 (of the Argentine Confederation), Sept. 6, 1853, [1852-1880]
A.D.L.A. 175, 175; Law No. 27 art. 3, Oct. 16, 1862, [1852-1880] A.D.LA. 354, 354.
42. Law No. 27 art. 3, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A at 354.
43. Justicia Federal, LA NAcz6N ARGEmnNA, Feb. 6, 1863, at 2.
44. Law of Sept. 16, 1863, 5 REorr=o OnciAL DE Lk REtPOucA ARGOENnNA 73
(1884).
45. Law of Oct. 1, 1864, 5 REGISrRO OnicIAL DE LA REPUBUtCA ARGENTINA 160
(1884)
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roy, An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of the United States
(1868), George Paschal's annotated The Constitution of the United
States, Luther S. Cushing, Rules of Proceeding and Debate in Delibera-
tive Assemblies (1868), and Francis Lieber, Civil Liberty and Self-Gov-
ernment (1859).46
Even though it was alien to Argentine tradition, judicial review
was seen as a panacea to conflict. La Naci6n Argentina, the leading
morning newspaper, welcomed the naming of judges to the Supreme
Court with abundant quotes from de Tocqueville on the importance of
the judiciary in the United States, and described the Court as "a force
of equilibrium for the power of Congress, the National Executive, and
those same branches of Provincial government," reducing- disputes be-
tween government authorities "to the conditions of a common law-
suit," and offering "the primordial guarantee for the Constitution. 47
La Tribuna, its rival, responded a few years later to a federal court
decision validating a federal property tax in the City of Buenos Aires
by publishing six different editorials tearing the decision apart and
calling it extraordinarily "sophist."'4 But the loss in court was soft-
ened with the boast that "we cannot refrain from congratulating our-
selves upon seeing how the theories and principles of the institutions
that have raised the United States to its present heights have started
to be practiced among us," and the paper concludes that "[o]nce the
Supreme Court decides that the law establishing a direct tax has been
properly established by Congress, there is nothing to do but to submit
to the decision, even if it conflicts with our opinions. 49
President Mitre responded to Argentine expectations when he
appointed the first Supreme Court in 1862, appointing very well
known, intellectually talented, political figures. President Mitre did
have one individual reject a place on the Court. The Presidency of the
46. Decree of Mar. 2, 1869, 5 RFGIsTRO OFICIAL DE LA REPOBLIMA ARGENTINA 449
(1884); Ley 375, 3 LEYES NACIONA.LES 120, sanctioned on June 17, 1870; see also Alberto
F. Garay, Federalism, the Judiciary, and Constitutional Adjudication in Argentina: A Com-
parison with the U.S. Constitutional Model, 22 U. MiAMi INTER-AM. L. RE.v. 161, 175 n.100
(1991).
47. La corte federal, LA NAc16N ARGENnNA, Oct. 24, 1862, at 1.
48. Sentencia importante, LA TIBUNA, Mar. 4, 1865, at 2; La sentencia del Dr.
Ocantos, LA TRmuNA, Mar. 5, 1865 at 2 (calling the decision "sophist"); La sentencla del
juez nacional, sobre la ley de contribuci6n directa, LA TRMUNA, Mar. 7, 1865, at 2 (calling
the decision "sophist"); La sentencia del juez naciona4 sobre la ley de contribuci6n directa,
LA TR IUNA, Mar. 8, 1865, at 2; La sentencia del juez nacional sobre la ley de contribucl6n
directa, LA TRiBUNA, Mar. 9, 1865, at 2; Jurisdicci6n y soberanta, LA Tr'IBUNA, Mar. 10,
1865, at 2.
49. Sentencia importante, supra note 48, at 2.
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Court was offered to Valentfin Alsina, Mitre's most powerful political
competitor in the Province of Buenos Aires,50 and was declined.-"
However, the individuals who accepted places were almost as impor-
tant. The post of President of the Court was then given to Salvador
Marfa del Carril-a former Vice-President of the Argentine Confed-
eration during the period when Buenos Aires stood apart, and a for-
mer Governor of the Province of San Juan.52 Two judges came from
the Province of Buenos Aires, but neither owed their prominence to
Mitre. One, Francisco de las Carreras, had served as Chief Prosecutor
of the Province of Buenos Aires during six months in 1852 and as
Provincial Minister of Finance in 1852-1853, long before Mitre became
governor 5 3 The other, Jos6 Barros Pazos, had served as Buenos Aires
Minister of Government (the most important position in the provin-
cial Cabinet) and as Minister of Foreign Relations, when Valentfn Al-
sina was Governor of the Province.- The other justices, like del
Carril, both came from the Argentine Confederation that Mitre and
the Province had just defeated. The first, Francisco Delgado, had
served as a Senator from the Province of Mendoza during the Argen-
50. Valentin Alsina was the leader of Buenos Aires political interests seeking to main-
tain the autonomy of the Province of Buenos Aires. and had earlier been known for his
confrontational attitude toward Urquiza and the Confederation. See 10 VzcE,.-M D. SI-
ERRA, HISTORIA DE LA ARGENTINA 33, 55-56, 232, 298, 409 (19S0); 2 ConLras ALtErTo
FLORIA & CI5AR A. GARCIA BELSUNcE. HiSTORIA DE LOS ARGENTINOS 75, S9 (1942).
He served as Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires in 1852 and from 1857 to 159 and
headed a political faction that had often successfully competed in the Pro ince v, ith Mitre's
more nationalistic faction. 10 SiRRA, supra, at 232-33.
51. CLODOMIIRO ZAVALtA, HISTORIA DE LA CORTE SUPREiA DE JUSTICIA DE LA
REP.BLICA ARGENTINA 59 (1920).
52. Salvador Maria del Carril had been known as a supporter of a strong national
government since the 1820s, when he served as Governor of the Province of San Juan and
as Minister of Finance in President Bernardino Rivadavia's failed attempt at unitarian gov-
ernment. Id. Further, after a long exile during the Rosas years. he served as vice.president
of the Confederation during Urquiza's presidency (1354-1360), Id. His past marks him as
a supporter of provincial, not Buenos Aires interests, but in the context of a strong central
government. See generally 7 SiERRA, supra note 50, at 428,492; ZVAtfA, supra note 51. at
66-68 (describing del Carril's career). As a supporter of a strong central government, he
was the diametric opposite of Valentin Alsina. but unlike Mitre, came from the interior and
therefore would not have seen the central government as a tool of the interests of the
Province of Buenos Aires. Cf. RocK, supra note 10, at 122 (describing Mitre's concept of
national unity as seeking the supremacy of Buenos Aires).
53. Francisco de las Carreras's first important post was appointment in March 1852 as
chief prosecutor for the Province of Buenos Aires, but he was dismissed after only five
months for taking an excessively independent stand in his briefs. ZAUtA, supra note 51,
at 64; 2 VIcENTE OsVALDo CUTOLO, NUEVO DICCIONARIO BIOGRAFICO ARGENTINO 159
(1978). Shortly thereafter he served as Buenos Aires Minister of Finance from 1352 to
1853. Id. Mitre only became Governor of the Province in 1360.
54. 1 CuroLo, supra note 53, at 343.
1997]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
tine Confederation,55 and Jos6 Benjamfn Gorostiaga, ,he judge who
was later selected to the seat Valentfn Alsina declined, had been one
of the two key draftsmen of the Constitution of 1853 and subsequently
served as the Confederation's Minister of the Interior. 6 Incredibly,
none of the persons selected could be described as Mitre allies. Given
that Mitre's two potential sources of political opposition were politi-
cians associated with the old Argentine Confederation and Valentfn
Alsina's forces in Buenos Aires politics, Mitre appears to have se-
lected individuals who would satisfy these groups as figures who
would, if anything, tend to oppose the government.
Mitre got what he probably expected: a very independent Court,
whose decisions on the most politically provocative issues-problems
of habeas corpus, fair trials for revolutionaries, and de facto doc-
trine-were frequently against the Government. Moreover, the Court
would continue to act as an important moderator on these issues at
least through the 1930s.
I. The Issues: Habeas Corpus, Fair Trials, and
De Facto Doctrine
Courts are rarely in a position to reorder a political system. One
may criticize the nineteenth century Argentine Supreme Court for op-
erating within a political system that regularly used electoral fraud to
deny most of the population a political voice, but it is hardly clear
55. Francisco Delgado, like del Carril, came from Mitre's old Corfederation opposi-
tion. He had served in the Confederation Senate representing Mendoza and been selected
to serve in the never established Supreme Court of the Confederation. 2 id. at 511-12.
56. As a draftsman of the Constitution of 1853, Jos6 Benjamin Gorostiaga was a natu-
ral choice for the Supreme Court, but he had also served as Urquiza's chief legal advisor
and had assisted him as Minister of Finance of the Province of Buenos Aires during a short
period of domination by Urquiza after his defeat of Rosas in 1852, and as the Confedera-
tion's Minister of the Interior in 1854. He left Parani in late 1854 to practice law in Bue-
nos Aires and remained apolitical until after Mitre's victory over the Confederation in
1862. Afterwards, he returned to politics, but never jumped on the Mitre bandwagon,
Gorostiaga served in the House of Deputies between 1862 and 1864 as the representative
of his home province of Santiago del Estero, and his voting record shows that he remained
independent of the government on important issues. See generally Eduardo Martirc,
Gorostiaga y la Constituci6n de 1853, 11 REVISTA HISTORICA DEL INSTITUTO HISTORICO
DE LA ORGANIZACION NACIONAL 3 (1982); JORGE REINALDO VANOSSI, LA INFLUENCIA
DE Jost BENJAMIN GOROSTIAGA EN LA CONSTTUCI61N ARGENTINA Y EN SU JURIS5
PRUDENCIA 16-19, 51-54 (1970) (describing Gorostiaga's political career with Urquiza),
Gorostiaga voted against a bill presented by the Mitre Administration to federalize the
entire Province of Buenos Aires. Id. at 69-70. Gorostiaga also insisted on Congressional
authority to issue resolutions criticizing the Executive's conduct of foreign policy. Id. at 76.
See generally id. at 63-96 (describing Gorostiaga's activity in Congress).
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what the Supreme Court could have done. The Supreme Court heard
a handful of cases prosecuting electoral fraud, and consistently de-
cided these cases in favor of cleaning up the system.5 However, the
occasional criminal case cannot clean up a political system by itself.
Ending electoral fraud depends on a political consensus that such
fraud should not occur and that when it does occur it shall be brought
to the courts' attention. It also requires legislation designed to limit
the possibilities for fraud in the system, neutral officials to run elec-
tions, and a public unwilling to tolerate irregularities. The occasional
prosecution is meaningless when the fraud is massive in scale-just as
the occasional prosecution is usually meaningless to enforce compli-
ance with laws whose violation is accepted by important parts of the
population. Courts were relevant in halting electoral fraud mainly at
times and places where Argentine society was likewise mobilized to
halt it.'5
However, certain types of political issues do regularly appear in
the courts in situations where the courts find it easier to assert their
authority. Political unrest inevitably produces questions of who may
be detained by the government, and accordingly produces petitions
for writs of habeas corpus. Armed rebellions and their aftermath pro-
duce questions of who should try the rebels, the fairness of the tribu-
nal trying them, and the grounds on which rebels and their
collaborators may be tried. These are areas where Argentine society
did look to the judiciary for answers.
The issue of the legality of detentions usually appeared in the
context of declarations of a state of siege. Article 23 of the Argentine
Constitution provides:
57. The Supreme Court's decisions were fairly assertive in the limited context of the
cases before it. "Ortiz," 9 Fallos 211 (1870) (allowing prosecution of persons casting bal-
lots in the name of others even though the relevant criminal statute does not specifically
address such conduct); "Lagrafla," 9 Fallos 314 (1870) (affirming convictions for improper
conduct by election officials, even though in this case the conduct consisted of failure to
appear at the voting site on election day, which made it impossible to open the site, and not
directly tampering with the voting); "Montiel," 21 Fallos 211 (1879) (affirming conviction
of defendant for voter intimidation); "Sandes," 31 Fallos 218 (1887) (affirming federal ju-
risdiction to prosecute a local police chief who detained 31 citizens in a corral on election
day to prevent them from voting). "Montiel" was a particularly significant case, as the
defendant was an important local political boss. ZAVALIA, supra note 51, at 225-26 (1920).
58. The best example is Judge Tedfn's role combating electoral fraud in the City of
Buenos Aires in 1892, which helped lead to clean elections under President Luis Senz
Pefia and frequent clean elections thereafter. See infra Part VLC. Given its wealth and
large professional class, the City of Buenos Aires inevitably had the most politically sophis-
ticated electorate in the country and hence was the first part of the country to successfully
combat electoral fraud.
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In the event of internal disturbance or foreign attack which place in
danger the exercise of this Constitution and the authorities created
by it, the province or territory in which the disturbance of order
exists will be declared in state of siege, suspending all constitutional
guarantees there. But during that suspension, the President of the
Republic may not sentence [an individual] on his own or apply a
penalty. His power with respect to persons is limited to arresting
them or transferring them from one part of the Nation to another,
provided that they do not prefer to leave Argentine teritory.
59
Thus, constitutional guarantees may be suspended through a state
of siege in the event of internal disturbances or foreign attack, but
anyone detained by the Executive during unrest may leave the coun-
try, and presumably the Executive may not exile an Argentine citizen
if he prefers detention in Argentina. Further, when the subject of the
detention is an opposition member of Congress, issues of congres-
sional immunities also appear.6° These are questions on which Argen-
tine courts could clearly act without exceeding their authority,
particularly since habeas corpus is a traditional area of judicial inter-
vention under the U.S. model.
The issue of trying rebels after an unsuccessful rebellion is an-
other traditional judicial function. Here, while the federal courts by
the nature of their function enforce the law against rebels, they may
nevertheless develop a reputation for independence from the Execu-
tive and offer better prospects for rebels than a military tribunal.
They are also able to enforce pardons and amnesties that may have
been part of an agreement for ending a rebellion, and in the Argen-
tine case, avoid application of penalties going beyond the compara-
tively light penalties for rebellion provided for under federal law.
Perhaps most important of all, courts, and particularly the Supreme
Court, offer the opportunity for publicizing a cause. While lower Ar-
gentine courts followed the Continental European system of extended
trials dependent on the collection of evidence in a dossier rather than
a continuous oral proceeding, the Press often prominently published
the full text of both attorneys' briefs and court decisions,6 and the
59. CONsr. ARo. art. 23 (1860).
60. Id. art. 61.
61. For example, La Prensa published the entire case record of Leandro Alem's deten-
tion, including all attorneys' briefs and interlocutory orders. Dr. Leandro Alem, LA
PRENSA, Apr. 3, 1893, at 3 and articles that follow (giving the text of Leandro Alem's
habeas corpus petition, a letter by Leandro Alem to the federal court, Judge Tedfn's orders
to the police to respond, and the response of the police); Los sucesos de actualldad, LA
PRENSA, Apr. 8, 1892, at 3 and articles that follow (text of Judge Tedfn's decision ordering
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Supreme Court in the 19th century regularly permitted public oral ar-
gument in addition to written briefs.6'
Perhaps the trickiest area for the Supreme Court, however, was
de facto doctrine. This doctrine has arisen in four basic contexts in
Argentina: (1) de facto public officers or entities acting under color of
legal authority; (2) de facto national governments resulting from suc-
cessful national revolutions; (3) de facto provincial governments re-
sulting from successful provincial revolutions; and (4) revolutions
seeking to overthrow the national government that, while unsuccess-
ful, nevertheless managed to hold and govern a portion of Argentine
territory for a period of time. The four situations vary enormously
from each other, but all four involve the common question for courts
of whether to give legal effect to illegal conduct.
The first of the situations, involving de facto officers or entities,
occurs even in the most stable of political systems. An office holder's
election may be ruled invalid by the courts after he has already taken
office, or some other event may occur leading an individual to create
the impression that he legally holds office when in fact he does not.
Supposing that the individual's lack of credentials to hold the relevant
government office is later discovered, a doctrine is required to deter-
mine how the acts performed by the "phony" official during his period
in office should be treated.63 Given that citizens are not expected to
constantly inquire into the validity of the title of public officials, many
legal systems, including the Argentine, have permitted citizens to rely
on the actions of persons who act under color of authority.64 The final
that Alem be freed and the Minister of War's response); Ante eljuzgado del Dr. Tedin, LA
PRENSA, Apr. 10, 1892, at 4 (request by Alem's attorneys that the case record be for-warded
to Congress for possible impeachment proceedings against the President). Likewise, La
Nacidn published all briefs in the dispute before the Supreme Court over who had jurisdic-
tion to try Colonel Mariano Espina for rebellion in 1893, the military courts or the federal
courts, as well as the full text of Arist6bulo del Valle's two-day oral argument before the
Supreme Court. See infra note 345.
62. The "Tribunales" section of La Naci6n Argentina in the 1860s regularly listed the
cases scheduled for argument. See eg., LA NAC16N ARGENTINA, Oct. 8,1864, at 3, Oct. 7,
1864, at 2, and Oct. 11, 1864, at 2. The cases were all listed under the headline La Come
Suprema de Justicia; Cuestin Calvete, LA NAcidN ARGErmNNA, Oct. 11, 1864, at 2. The
most famous oral argument in the Supreme Court's history was that presented by Aris-
t6bulo del Valle in 1893 in Coronel Espina, discussed infra at notes 345-59.
63. See generally ALBERT CONSTA r TEAU, PuB uc OmcEns AND Trm DE FAcro
DoCTRiNE 3-4 (1910) (describing the situation where de facto doctrine comes into play in
similar terms, but distinguishing between de facto public or private corporate bodies and
de facto officials).
64. See generally ida at 8-20 (sketching de facto doctrine through the early 20th century
in England, the United States and Canada). The Argentine Supreme Court recognized the
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three situations place much greater stress on the legal system. When
an entire government, national or provincial, has been taken over by
rebels, the issue is no longer one of actions under color of authority.
In such a situation, the issue becomes one of expectations or non-ex-
pectations of resistance by citizens, the right of citizens to rely on de
facto authorities in the absence of constitutional authority, and the
authority of public acts and laws of de facto rulers once there is a
regime change to constitutional government or provincial rebellions.
The Argentine Supreme Court would come to deal with all of
these issues, though the problem of de facto national governments
would not become a significant issue until the coup of 1930.65 The
Court almost immediately found itself dealing with localized rebel-
lions, however, placing limits on government suppression of rebels
and protecting those who passively cooperated with de facto govern-
ments in rebel-held territory.
validity of decisions of such officials. "Moreno Postigo," 148 Fallos 303 (1927) (giving ef-
fect to a decision of a provincial judge in San Juan handed down after tho Province's judici-
ary had already been removed from office during a federal intervention). In the United
States, the leading 19th century case was Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 441-49
(1886) (extensively describing the situations under which the U.S. courts would give effect
to the acts of de facto officers, though in this case holding that it would not give effect to
the acts of persons holding a new office where the office itself was void). Recently, the U.S.
Supreme Court, while not denying the existence of the doctrine, appear; inclined to inter-
pret de facto doctrine narrowly, so as to avoid creating a disincentive to the challenge of
illegal appointments. See Ryder v. United States, 115 S.Ct. 2031, 2034-35 (1995). See gen-
erally NOEL HENRY, LEs GOUVRNEMENTS DE FAIr DEVANT LE JUGE (1927) (offering an
overview of de facto doctrine under domestic and international law from a French
perspective).
65. The only case prior to 1930 in which the Supreme Court applied de facto doctrine
at the level of a takeover of the national government was "Baldomero Martfnez," 2 Fallos
127 (1865). In that case, the Supreme Court recognized the authority of measures taken by
General Bartolom6 Mitre between December 1861, when he took over the national gov-
ernment after the Battle of Pav6n, until October 1862 when he formally assumed the presi-
dency after elections held under the 1853 Constitution. Otero, a Spanish merchant,
initially paid customs duties owed to the Confederation with a transferable letter of credit.
The letter of credit was lost during the final days of the Confederation and General Mitre
therefore declared the letter of credit void and required Otero to pay th2 amount owed to
the government. Id. at 142. When Baldomero Martfnez, a subsequent holder of the note,
sought payment from Otero, the Argentine Court held that General Mitre was the compe-
tent authority to declare the note void because "he provisionally exercised all national
authority after the Battle of Pav6n, with the right of the triumphant revolution consented
to by the people, and by virtue of the grave responsibilities that the victory imposed on
him." Id.
[Vol. 20:231
Courts and the Creation of a "Spirit of Moderation"
IV. The Rebellions of 1866-1867
One of the remarkable features of Argentine politics until 1930
was that the penalty for rebellion was so light. The penalty for pro-
moting or leading a rebellion was not jail or death but ten years exile,
with an additional fine of 2000 to 6000 pesos in the event of combat or
usurpation of public funds.66 Moreover, in 1875, 1877, 1880, 1895, and
1906, Congress passed general amnesties for everyone who had partic-
ipated in prior revolts,67 and an agreement between Governor Tejedor
of Buenos Aires and the federal government avoided prosecutions af-
ter the revolt of 188 0 .6S This light treatment was possible in part be-
cause the rebels were led by members of the Argentine elite who
shared the basic economic and social interests of those in power. With
the exception of the last gasps of provincial caudillos in the 1860s and
1870s, who wished to maximize provincial autonomy, a successful re-
bellion would have meant little more than a change in leadership, with
somewhat greater political participation by the middle class.69 Given
the lack of free elections, armed rebellion by disgruntled elements of
the elite appears to have been an accepted element in the political
system. However, even with shared economic interests a split in an
elite that leads to a rebellion may lead to harsh repression and repri-
sals if the members of the elite do not share rules on treatment of the
loser and the party out of power. Such rules existed and the Argen-
tine Supreme Court arbitrated their application.
The Supreme Court's first important encounter with political in-
stability involved the consequences of a series of provincial revolts in
1866 and 1867 in the Argentine Northeast. In November 1866, local
police and militia toppled the provincial government of the Province
of Mendoza, and in the following months the rebellion spread to
66. Law No. 49 art. 15, Sept. 14, 1863, [1852-1850] A.D.L.A. 385, 386. Article 16 pro-
vides that lower ranking leaders shall be subject to exile of four to six years or a 1000 to
3000 peso fine, and Article 17 provides that common soldiers shall be subject to two to four
years' military service on the frontier or a 300 to 600 peso fine. Id. arts. 16 & 17.
67. Law No. 714, July 26, 1875, [1852-1SO] A.D.LA. 996; Law No. 843, June 29, 1S77,
[1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 1144; Law No. 2310, Sept. 1, 1SSS. [1SS1-ISSS] A.D.L.A. 43S; Law
No. 2713, Sept. 1, 1890, [1889-1919] A.D.L.A. 207, 20S; Law No. 3223, Jan. 25, 1895, [1839-
1919] A.D.LA. 336, 337; Law No. 4939, June 13, 1906, [1889-1919] A.D.LA. 703.
68. BARTOLOMP GALUNDEZ, HISTORIA POLITICA ARGENTINA: Lk REVOLUCx6N DEL
80 321-22, 322 n.1 (1945). The agreement that ended the Revolution of 18S0 never re-
ceived Congressional approval, but was enforced in practice given that it had the approval
of both President Avellaneda and President-elect Roca. Id. at 321-22, 32325.
69. See DAvro RocK, PoLrrics iN ARGENTINA, 1S90-1930: Tiff RISE AND FALL OF
RADiCALsM 42-43 (1975); PErER H. SMrr, ARGENTINA AND THE FAURE OF DaMoc.
Acy. CONFLiCr AMONG PoL.rrxcA. ELus 9-10 (1974).
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neighboring provinces and took on the character of a rebellion against
the national government.70 The first province to follow Mendoza was
San Juan. Then Felipe Varela, a former follower of Urquiza in his
battles with Buenos Aires, independently invaded the Province of La
Rioja from Chile and gave the uprisings the character of a revolt
against the hegemony of Buenos Aires.7 ' The revolt occurred in the
middle of the war against Paraguay and required Pres:ident Mitre to
withdraw soldiers from the front to put it down.72 Moreover, in Feb-
ruary 1867 President Mitre himself was forced to give up command of
the combined Argentine-Brazilian army to return to Buenos Aires to
manage the political situation.73 The rebels were thoroughly defeated
by the regular army troops during March and April 1867, 71 but at ob-
vious cost to prosecution of the war. Revolts later thai: same year in
the provinces of C6rdoba, Salta, and Jujuy likewise had to be put
down by federal troops.75
Among their acts in power, the rebel provincial governments
took over the national customs houses in their province; and required
merchants to pay the de facto authorities the amounts normally owed
as customs duties to the federal government. Once the federal gov-
ernment reasserted control, however, it sought payment of the duties
from groups of merchants in Mendoza and San Juan. When the
merchants resisted payment, the federal district court in San Juan de-
cided against the merchants in that province, while the federal court in
Mendoza decided in favor of the merchants there, and both cases
ended up in the Supreme Court.76
As summarized by the Supreme Court's secretary, the principal
argument of the merchants was that the Court needed to apply the
derecho de gentes,7 which may be roughly translated as "the law of
70. See 1 SoMM IAvA, supra note 10, at 251-55 (on the initial Mendoza revolt); see
generally id. at 251-79 (describing the revolts in Mendoza and neighboring provinces and
their repression. The revolt ultimately included Catamarca, La Rioja, San Juan, and San
Luis in addition to Mendoza).
71. 1d. at 265-66.
72. Id. at 272-73.
73. See iL
74. Id at 272-78.
75. 1d. at 284-89.
76. "Fisco Nacional c/Varios comerciantes de Mendoza," 5 Fallos 74 (1868) [hereinaf-
ter "Mendoza"]; "Fisco Nacional clVarios comerciantes de San Juan," 5 Fallos 155 (1868)
[hereinafter "San Juan"]; see also "Procurador Fiscal c/Carraffa," 5 Fallos 257, 268 (1868)
(identical to the first two cases, so the Supreme Court simply refers to its earlier
precedents).
77. "Mendoza," 5 Fallos at 76-77; "San Juan," 5 Fallos at 162.
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nations," but in the sense of natural law principles said to govern in-
ternational law.78 Under derecho de gentes, individuals accept govern-
ment for their own protection and welfare 7 -- a social contract theory
that scholars in this field used to then explain the authority by which
nations could speak in the name of their citizens in their interaction
with each other.80 (The applicability of derecho de genres is debatable,
since as the Federal Judge in San Juan would note in his decision, this
body of law applied primarily to relations between states.s) The
merchants argued that citizens only owe a government obedience as a
sovereign when it is able to assert its authority, and the federal judge
in Mendoza took this a step further, arguing that:
[W]hile it is true that the import [tariffs] form part of the national
treasury, it is also true that there is a tacit fundamental pact be-
tween a society and the Government, under which the latter is obli-
gated to protect the property of each and every one of its citizens, in
return for which they contribute a portion of their wealth to pay
national expenditures
8 3
If the government was not in control of the province and was
unable to blockade the border crossings, then the merchants had the
right to obey the instructions of the authorities actually in power.t?
The merchants also argued that the victorious Union forces in the re-
cent U.S. Civil War implicitly recognized the validity of their position,
78. See ANrmis BE-LLO, PRINCIPIOS DE DERECHO INTErNACiO;.NL 11-12 (3d ed.
1873); EMmRCH DE VATrEI, LE DROrT DE GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATUrELLE
APLIOLUS A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS Er DES sOUVERAINS § 6 (M.P.
Pradier-Fod~re ed., Guillaumin et Cie., Libraires 1S63). (Bello and Nattel are the two au-
thors cited by the plaintiffs. See "San Juan," 5 Fallos at 162. The very title of Vattel's work
makes his point on the natural law foundations of international law). See also A-TONIO
SAENZ, INSITUCIONES ELEMENTALES SOBRE EL DERECHO NATUPRAL VtY DE GETEs 55-57
(Instituto de Historia del Derecho Argentino, Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Susciale3,
Univ. de Buenos Aires 1939) (originally used in a course taught at the University of Bue-
nos Aires in 1823). During the first half of the 19th century, "derecho de genres" was
taught in Argentina as a single course together with natural law principles of public order.
AUGUSTnN PESTALARDO, HITORIA DE LAS ENSEANZA DE LA CuiEciAs .tURIDICAS V
SOCIALES EN LA UrnERSmAD DE BuENos AIpxs 36, 38, 39-44 (1914).
79. VATrEL, supra note 78, §§ 1, 15.
80. See BELLo, supra note 78, at 23-24 (nations exist for the well being and prserva-
tion of their citizens and interact with each other as polities constituting a singe entity); see
also SAENz, supra note 78, at 66 (societies exist for the welfare and protection of their
members and depend on the consent of their members).
81. "San Juan," 5 Fallos at 162.
82. "Mendoza," 5 Fallos at 76-77; see also VATrEL, supra note 78, § 26 (describing the
means to make others obey as one of the necessary elements of public authority).
83. "Mendoza," 5 Fallos at 80-81.
84. Id. at 76-77.
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since the Union never made a similar claim for duties from Confeder-
ate merchants who ran the Union blockade.15
The government in the Mendoza case admitted the relevance of
derecho de gentes8 6 but offered a different view of its content. Accord-
ing to the government, derecho de gentes recognized a right to rebel
against an oppressive government that violates the nation's own laws
and institutions, and that in the event of a rebellion against an oppres-
sive government, the population must obey the new de facto authori-
ties provided that "they respect at the very least the basic needs of
humanity, recognized as such by Christian and civilized peoples. ' 87 In
such circumstances even when the uprising is put down, actions by
ordinary citizens in simple obedience of the rebel authorities may not
be penalized. But the government argued that apart from any ques-
tion of whether the citizens of Mendoza had a right to rebel, the per-
sons who took power were mere bandits who looted, robbed, and
murdered, and therefore were not worthy of any respect.88 The exam-
ple of the Confederacy during the U.S. Civil War was irrelevant, be-
cause that rebel government did respect the rights of society.8 9
The government's position is not surprising, but is unsatisfactory
from the point of view of individual security and lowering levels of
violence. The obvious temptation of any government facing a rebel-
lion in which rebels seize a portion of its territory is to call upon the
inhabitants of that territory to defy the rebels. Paying itaxes to rebels
or accepting service under their military draft obviously strengthens
them. By demanding resistance by citizens in occupied areas, a gov-
ernment can maximize its pressure on rebels, particularly when citi-
zens expect that the government will retake their area and take action
against collaborators. However, requiring defiance places ordinary
citizens in a difficult situation, since they are forced to choose sides.
This raises the intensity of the conflict, since if the population is forced
to choose sides, a larger proportion of the population will of necessity
participate. A rule that bars a government from requiring defiance of
rebels by ordinary citizens will therefore serve as a rule to lower the
costs of conflict, allowing citizens to continue their lives as normally as
possible.
85. Id. at 77.
86. See id. at 77-78.
87. Id. at 77.
88. Id. at 77-78.
89. I& at 78.
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The Supreme Court decided the Mendoza and San Juan cases in
almost identical opinions. As was typical of the Supreme Court in the
1860s, when it showed weaker ties to rationalism than it would in later
decades, the Court affirmed at the start of each decision that since no
legislative provisions bear on the case, it needed to decide the case on
the basis of "justice and equity."90 Then, looking at the case from an
equitable perspective, the Court made two principal points. First, with
the government itself calling the de facto provincial rulers bandits, the
government could hardly expect the merchants to have placed the se-
curity of themselves and their families in danger by resisting their in-
structions. The merchants acted as they did because the government
was unable to protect them.91 Second, the rebels did not rob the
merchants as mere bandits, but took the place of the legitimate gov-
ernment and collected the customs duties in the manner of a govern-
ment.9 Since the government could not perform its obligation to
protect the merchants, and would not have offered the merchants
compensation for injuries incurred in useless resistance, it could not
demand that they offer resistance.93 "[C]ompliance by [the govern-
ment] with its obligation to guarantee life and property is the condi-
tion that legitimates the exaction of taxes."94 In the San Juan case, the
Court was particularly forceful about the lack of obligation of citizens
to a government unable to protect them, replying to the lower court
that:
It is not true that... citizens who inhabit a town involuntarily aban-
doned by its legitimate government, that have not been able to re-
sist the usurpation, and therefore surrendered in fact to the power
of the enemy, remain bound by the same ties, and subject to the
same obligations as when protected by the public force of the gov-
ernment; [in such circumstances] the obligations become impossible,
and the citizens, who are unable to either receive or fulfill orders,
recover their primitive liberty and have the right to seek their secur-
ity and protection through all the means within their reach.9s
The Court essentially applied the natural law concept of individu-
als accepting government so that it may provide them with protection
and security, but casts it under the label of "justice and equity."
90. Id. at 85; "San Juan," 5 Fallos at 165.
91. "Mendoza" 5 Fallos at 85; "San Juan," 5 Fallos at 165.
92. "Mendoza," 5 Fallos at 85-S6; "San Juan," 5 Fallos at 165-66.
93. "Mendoza," 5 Fallos at 85-86; "San Juan," 5 Fallos at 165-66.
94. "Mendoza," 5 Fallos at 85-S6.
95. "San Juan," 5 Fallos at 166.
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The Mendoza and San Juan customs cases offer a ;triking exam-
ple of the Court's willingness to challenge the Executive on the basis
of a rule that the Court itself established. The Court did not directly
cite derecho de gentes, perhaps because it agreed with the Federal
Judge in San Juan that its doctrines were designed for relations be-
tween nations, not between a citizen and the state,96 but let the same
natural law concepts come into play to support it in its equity function.
The willingness to resort to equity disappears in later decades, proba-
bly as a consequence of the adoption of the Civil Code in 1869, and
with it of more restrictive approaches toward judicial reasoning. In
the 1860s, however, the Court did not see itself as bound by the limits
of the written constitutional order, but was willing to look at what it
perceived as underlying principles of order.97
The Supreme Court also handed down a series of decisions exon-
erating individuals charged with rebellion for collaborating with the
revolutionary authorities. In one case, the Court held that the individ-
ual who administered the Mendoza customs house for the rebels did
not need to compensate the federal government for the duties he col-
lected on the rebels' behalf because he acted under pressure from the
rebels. 98 In another case, an individual who acted as justice of the
peace and police chief, and later treasurer for the San Juan rebels, was
found not guilty of rebellion because he presented credible evidence
that he acted out of fear for his life and tried to moderate the cruelties
of the rebellion.99 This was likewise the case for various individuals
who accepted judicial offices from the San Juan rebels, since they ac-
ted out of fear.10 Even an aide to one of the principal rebel leaders
was found not guilty, on grounds that he attached himself to the
leader to protect himself from other rebel leaders who were even
more menacing.' 0 ' Given that the "fear" defense often depended ex-
clusively on the defendants' testimony, the Court was very liberal in
96. 1& at 162.
97. Another example of the Supreme Court deciding a case on the basis of "justice"
and "equity" is "Mendoza y Hermano," 3 Fallos 131, 134-35 (1865) (the Supreme Court
refused to award damages to a trading house that had paid a provincial export tax that it
held unconstitutional, because while the provincial government had acted illegally, it was a
poor province and the trading house had passed the cost of the tax back to its suppliers).
98. "Hoyos," 7 Fallos 143, 149-50 (1869).
99. "Iturgay," 5 Fallos 101, 109-10 (1868); see also "Flores," 8 Fallos 354, 369-70 (1870)
(a person who served a short period as de facto Governor was found to have done so to
maintain order and avert greater atrocities by the rebels).
100. "Garcfa," 6 Fallos 241, 249 (1868).
101. "Castillo," 5 Fallos 149, 154 (1868); see also "Morales," 5 Fallos 88, 96-97 (1868);
"Cardozo," 5 Fallos 311, 314-15 (1868); "Flores," 7 Fallos at 455-56; "Baca," 8 Fallos 330,
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applying it.l"a The decisions could be described as falling under a gen-
eral rule of abrogation of responsibility in situations where an individ-
ual acts under pressure and has lost his freedom of choice; however
the line between such cases and de facto doctrine generally legitimat-
ing cooperation with a de facto government is very thin, if existent at
all, as individuals may always be said to accept the authority of a de
facto government because only the de facto government is able to pro-
vide for their security. In one case truly on the border between "pres-
sure" and de facto doctrine, the Supreme Court reversed a verdict by
the San Juan federal judge finding an individual guilty of rebellion for
accepting salaried employment assisting the rebel authorities copy
draft rolls.103 The Supreme Court held that individuals had the right
to continue earning a living during a de facto government and the
defendant needed the salary.1°4
Perhaps even more striking than the Supreme Court's de facto
doctrine decisions, which generally involved civilians and minor rebel
officials, were the Court's decisions in favor of rebel military person-
nel. In one important line of cases, the Court held that a defendant
accused only of rebellion had to be released on bail while his case was
pending, since rebellion was not a crime that could result in a jail sen-
tence; 05 and in a second line of cases the Court released large num-
bers of defendants because the "sumario" (investigation/indictment)
stage of their cases was initially handled by a provincial judge, and as
a federal crime only federal courts enjoyed jurisdiction over
rebellion.1°6
The Supreme Court's decisions in the Mendoza and San Juan re-
bellions were not motivated by hostility toward the government.
Leaders and middle ranking participants in the rebellions were sen-
334 (1870) (all exonerating lower ranking soldiers in the rebel ranks on grounds that they
joined the rebels out of fear).
102. See, eg., "Castillo," 5 Fallos at 150, 152; "Iturgay," 5 Fallos at 106 (in both cases
the lower court found that only the defendants' own testimony, unsupported by other eli-
dence, supported their defenses that their actions were provoked by fear, and found the
defendants guilty, but the Supreme Court reversed).
103. "Pensado," 5 Fallos 64, 69-70 (1868).
104. Id. at 69.
105. "Urruti," 5 Fallos 384,385 (1868); "Alvarez," 5 Fallos 3S6, 387 (1869); "Ferreira," 6
Fallos 24, 25 (1868).
106. "Avila," 5 Fallos 167, 169 (186S); "Robledo," 5 Fallos 171, 175-76 (186s); "Ri-
quelme," 5 Fallos 215,219 (1868); "Calder6n," 5 Fallos 268, 272 (186); see also "Varela," 5
Fallos 211, 214-15 (1868) (reversing a death sentence for attempted murder of a Chilean
diplomat because of the improper intervention of the provincial judge, but ordered new
proceedings given the seriousness of the crime).
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tenced to extensive periods in exile and fined,107 as provided for under
federal law. Individuals guilty of looting, robbery, and murder during
the rebellion were sentenced for those crimes in addition to the crime
of rebellion.'08 Further, minor participants who did not provide credi-
ble defenses that they acted under pressure were sentenced to pay a
fine and/or serve a period of military service on the frontier.1' 9 In
fact, in the case of a rebellion that occurred in C6rdoba shortly after
the Mendoza and San Juan rebellions were repressed, the Court in-
sisted that the federal judge investigating the rebellion return to his
investigation when his initial findings acquitted everyone initially de-
tained for participating in the rebellion."10 However, the Court was
obviously not an arm of the government for the aggressive persecu-
tion of rebels.
The preceding cases show that the Argentine Supreme Court ac-
tively moderated the consequences of the rebellions of 1866-1867, try-
ing rebels but often challenging the government as well. At least
some members of the lower judiciary were also quite in-dependent of
the Executive. The federal judge in the Province of Catamarca in-
sisted on detaining and trying two individuals for their conduct during
the rebellion in spite of an "order" from the Ministry of the Interior
that they be released so that they could participate in a provisional
provincial government."' The federal judge in Mendoza who heard
the rebellion cases in that Province was seen as a rebel sympathizer
107. "Lloveras," 5 Fallos 285, 295, 296 (1868) (affirming the maximum sentence of 10
years' exile and a 2000 peso fine on one of the leaders of the San Juan revolt); "Castro
Boedo," 6 Fallos 302, 309-10 (1868) (affirming sentence finding the defendant guilty as a
middle ranking officer and that sentenced him to four years exile and a 1000 peso fine);
"Quiroga," 6 Fallos 444, 451 (1868) (revoking a death sentence against one defendant on
grounds that there was insufficient evidence that the defendant was guilty of murder, but
finding that the two defendants in the case participated in the rebellion as middle ranking
officers and sentenced them to six years' exile and a 1000 peso fine); "Nieva," 8 Fallos 142,
150, 151 (1869) (affirming sentence of ten years' exile and a 2000 peso fine against one of
the leaders of the rebellion in Catamarca and absolving a second defendant on grounds
that he participated out of fear).
108. "Pimentel," 5 Fallos 297, 302 (1868) (sentenced for robbery and murder);
"Aracena" 6 Fallos 39, 56 (1868) (sentenced for looting); "Zalazar," 7 Fallos 356, 367
(1869) (found guilty of murder in addition to helping lead the revolt in La Rioja).
109. "Gil," 5 Fallos 43 (1868); "Recabarren," 5 Fallos 116 (1868); "Le6n," 6 Fallos 139
(1868); "Bravo," 6 Fallos 143 (1868); "L6pez," 6 Fallos 410 (1868).
110. "Autores del movimiento sedicioso del 16 de agosto de 1867 en la ciudad de C6r-
doba," 5 Fallos 181, 192 (1868).
111. La justicia y el Gobierno, LA NACI6N ARGENTINA, Oct. 17, 1867, at 2 (giving the
text of a letter by Pr6spero Garcia, the federal judge in Catamarca, to General Antonio
Taboada, commander of the Army of the North, refusing to comply with his request-
which General Taboada indicated originated with the Minister of the Interior-that two
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and unwilling to try the rebels. 112 The House of Deputies unani-
mously impeached the judge on grounds that he supported the
rebels,'13 but the government was unsuccessful at getting the Senate
to suspend him,1 4 there was a yearlong delay until the Senate finally
tried him,"-' and ultimately the Senate voted for acquittal.
11 6
The benefits in terms of stability of the Supreme Court's ap-
proach toward provincial de facto governments are obvious, since or-
dinary citizens could in a sense opt out of politics. However, by
individuals be released, insisting that the Executive is constitutionally barred from interfer-
ing in judicial functions).
112. Correspondencia del Interior, LA NACi6N ARGENTINA, Oct. 20, 1867, at 2 (letter
from the newspaper's regular Mendoza correspondent asking about the status of the im-
peachment proceedings against Judge Palma and complaining that he would never put the
rebels on trial).
113. CONGRESO NACIONAL, CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS, DIARIO DE SESIONES DE 1867,
Session of July 3, 1867, at 112-13 (unanimous vote impeaching Judge Juan Palma). The
first count against Judge Palma was for writing to the military leader of the rebels that -[i
the District Court Judge is needed to load a rifle, I am at your service, as a citizen who
loves my country and for my good name." Id. The second count charges him with continu-
ing to function as a federal judge until mid-January, 1867, even after hostilities between the
rebels and the federal government had begun. Id. at 110. See also Juiclo Politico, Lx NA.
C16N ARGmNA, July 1, 1867, at 1-2 (giving the text of the impeachment charges and
noting that this was Argentina's first impeachment).
114. Secci6n Oficial, LA NACi6N ARGENTINA, July 30, 1867, at 1 (giving text of a note
from Vice President Marcos Paz-acting as President while President Mitre commanded
the allied forces against Paraguay-and Minister of Justice Eduardo Costa, nominating a
replacement for Judge Palma during the impeachment trial). Judge Palma was never sus-
pended in his duties, however. Correspondencia del Interior, supra note 112, at 2 (com-
plaining that Judge Palma continued to act as Federal Judge during the proceedings against
him).
115. While the House of Deputies voted for impeachment on July 3, 1867, supra note
113, the Senate was under the impression that the articles of impeachment it received from
the House of Deputies did not constitute its formal accusation. See CoRnoso NACIONAL.,
CAMARA DE SE-NADOREs, Drmuo DE SESIONES DE 1867, Session of Aug. 13, 186% at 305
(statement of Madariaga). After a six-week delay during which the House of Deputies
considered evidence submitted by Judge Patma's attorney, Co\,oruso NAOoNAL,
CAmARA DE Dn'urADos, Dxuxo DE SESioN s nE 1867, Session of Aug. 26, 1867, at 225-
32; id. Session of Sept. 13, 1867, at 321-22; id. Session of Sept. 20, 1867, at 353-55, the
House of Deputies then responded to the Senate that its earlier charges constituted the
formal accusation. Id. Session of Sept. 23, 1867, at 361. Because regular sessions of Con-
gress only ran from May 1 through September 30, Co\sr. ARo. art. 55 (1860), the final
Senate vote only took place on July 18, 186S. CoNFoso NACIONAL, CAtAPA DE
SENADORES, DLAnIo DE SESIONES DE 186S, Session of July 18, 186S, app. at 109-11.
116. CONGRESO NACIONAL, CAMARA DE SENADORES, DiAmO DE SESIONES DE 186S,
Session of July 18, 1868, app. at 109-11. As in the United States, removal of a judge re-
quires impeachment in the House followed by trial in the Senate. Compare U.S. CoNsr.
art. I, §§ 2 & 3 with CONST. ARo. arts. 45 & 51 (1860). The Argentine Constitution re-
quires a two-thirds majority in both the House and the Senate for impeachment and re-
moval from office while the U.S. Constitution only requires a special two-thirds majority in
the Senate. Id.
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allowing citizens to refrain from supporting the constitutional govern-
ment the Court leaves itself open to the charge of accepting political
instability. There is an element of continuity between the Supreme
Court's decisions in accepting the validity of acts of de facto govern-
ments set up during rebellions, political question doctrine when ap-
plied to questions of governmental legitimacy, and the attitude it
displayed in the face of a successful national coup in :1930, when it
would accept the existence of a de facto national government.
1 7
Later, when provincial rebellions sought only to dislodge provincial
authorities without challenging the authority of the national govern-
ment (which sometimes assisted the rebellion), the Supreme Court
simply accepted the force in control of the government as the govern-
ment"11 and accepted the decision of Congress and the Executive as to
whether a federal intervention was appropriate. 119 When the creden-
tials of much of the membership of the National Congress were ques-
tioned in 1880 because Congress was filled with ad hoc replacements
for members who refused to attend sessions during that year's revolt,
the Court likewise put on blinders and responded that each House
was the judge of the qualifications of its members.120 By not inquiring
into constitutional credentials, whether of de facto authorities or Con-
gress, the Court resigned itself to the political instability of Argentine
politics and merely limited its excesses. If the Court's vision of itself
was of a tribunal charged with safeguarding the Alberdian vision of
ample individual rights so that the country could achieve North Amer-
ican prosperity, and of moving beyond that role only when specifically
required to by U.S. case law, then its conduct was certairtly consistent
with its perceived role.
117. The military government was recognized by the Supreme Court in Acordada sobre
reconocimiento del Gobierno Provisional de la Naci6n, 158 Fallos 290 (1930).
118. See "Chanfreau y Cia," 10 Fallos 59, 71-72 (1871) (refusing to enforce a contract
entered into by an illegally deposed governor on behalf of his province and refusing to
accept the argument that a resignation by a governor submitted under force lacks validity).
119. "Cullen," 53 Fallos 420,431-34 (1893) (holding that the question of whether condi-
tions in a province require federal intervention to guarantee it a "republican form of gov-
ernment" is a political question for Congress and the Executive to decide).
120. "Varela," 23 Fallos at 266-67 (challenging the validity of a state of siege invoked to
suspend publication of the plaintiff's newspaper, since the state of siege was approved by
the Congress that met in Belgrano during the Revolt of 1880, with many quick substitu-
tions made for legislators who supported the Revolt and refused to mcke the move to
Belgrano).
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V. The Established Doctrine of the 1870s and 1880s
Issues of the authority of and service under rebel governments
was not discussed by the Court after 1870, probably because of amnes-
ties' 2' (which the Court consistently interpreted broadly),"2 the clar-
ity of the Court's case law after the Mendoza and San Juan
revolutions, and a change in the nature of Argentine rebellions after
the early 1870s. By the mid-1870s provincial caudillos were clearly
subservient to the national government and could no longer use a re-
bellion to try to reassume the functions of the national government in
their provinces. The Court did, however, continue to develop a
number of additional rules in the context of revolutions that were im-
portant for the protection of individual rights and for limiting govern-
ment repression. The two most important were limits on military
jurisdiction over civilians and the Court's insistence on bail for per-
sons arrested for rebellion.
The Argentine Supreme Court consistently opposed military ju-
risdiction over civilians while almost always providing for exclusive
military jurisdiction over military personnel. With regard to military
personnel, the Supreme Court frequently applied the rule that crimes
committed by military personnel on the march, in a military installa-
tion or during an act of service were subject to exclusive military juris-
diction. 3 It was the truly exceptional case, such as where the crime
121. The last case to come before the Supreme Court involving assumption of national
authority by a rebel government was "Saldafla," 15 Fallos 484 (1S74). regarding an indisid-
ual who ran the federal customs house in Entre Rios during the 1S73 uprising led by Lpaz
Jordan, but whom the Supreme Court held could enjoy the benefits of an amnesty gi% en to
the leaders of the rebellion.
122. The Supreme Court established that amnesty for leading or participating in a re-
bellion included amnesty of all common crimes committed in furtherance of the rebellion.
"Chumbita," 17 Fallos 22, 37-38 (1875) (though refusing to apply the amnesty to common
crimes committed in earlier rebellions, prior to the rebellions that w~ere the subject of the
amnesty); "Villaruel," 43 Fallos 204,210 (1891). The Court did not, however, exempt the
beneficiaries from liability in civil actions. "Chumbita," 17 Fallos at 3S; -Ar~valo," 17 Fal-
los 184, 186 (1876). In other cases, the Supreme Court blocked a federal judge from hear-
ing cases in spite of an amnesty. "Andrade," 11 Fallos 405, 415-16 (112) (in which the
promise of amnesty was in fact used to negotiate an end to a revolt in La Rioja). The
Supreme Court also insisted that "fairness" required treating an amnesty of the leaders of
the rebellion as also including lower ranking participants. "Saldafla," 15 Fallos at 4S7
(adopting the Procurador General's opinion that "since all of the primary authors of the
rebellion have received an amnesty, it is unfair to proceed with a criminal case against an
old man who did not commit any act of violence ... who only accepted the post of customs
agent.").
123. E.g., "Sosa," 9 Fallos 474, 484 (1870) (stating the rule and holding that wounding
two soldiers after deserting from the army did not fall within military jurisdiction); "Guai-
tima 6 Torres," 27 Fallos 110,111 (1834) (stating the rule and finding military jurisdiction in
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was committed prior to entry into military service, that the Supreme
Court provided for civilian jurisdiction.1 24 What is striking, is how
firm the Supreme Court was in barring military jurisdiction over per-
sons not in the military, given Argentina's constant attempted rebel-
lions. The ban included cases of bands of rebels,125 provincial
militia, 26 and persons acting under military orders to raise troops to
put down a rebellion. 27 Further, the federal courts frequently exer-
the case of a soldier on guard duty who shot a minor); see also "Teniente Roberts," 25
Fallos 479, 487 (1883) (finding military jurisdiction in the case of an officer who wounded a
prisoner in a civilian jail with his sword while supervising guard duty at tie jail, on grounds
that the conduct occurred while in performance of an act of service); "Lagraila," 4 Fallos at
228-29 (criminal slander action fell within military jurisdiction because it occurred on a
military base, in front of troops, and during an act of military service); "Arredondo," 16
Fallos 197, 199 (1875) (federal court lacks jurisdiction to prosecute military officers for
aiding the escape of General Jos6 Arredondo from military custody since the escaped pris-
oner was subject to military justice at the time).
124. "Candia," 9 Fallos 533, 536 (1870) (ruling that a provincial court could try a mili-
tary officer for crimes committed before he entered army service without seeking permis-
sion of his superiors); "Farfas," 14 Fallos 453, 464 (1874) (providing for federal jurisdiction
in the case of several soldiers who participated in an uprising at a jail). "Farfas" was subse-
quently distinguished and effectively overruled by the Supreme Court in "Teniente Rob-
erts," 25 Fallos at 488. This was not an area where there is a record of Argentina focusing
on U.S. practice, and military jurisdiction and military justice generally was a surprisingly
neglected area of Argentine law. Until Congress finally passed a Code of Military Justice
in 1894, Law No. 3190, Jan. 1, 1895, [1889-1919] A.D.L.A. 302, the Argentine military con-
tinued to apply Spanish military ordinances inherited from the colonial period. See, e.g.,
"Coronel Espina," 54 Fallos 577,591-97 (1893); Joaqufn V. Gonzalez, Menual de la Constl-
tuci6n Argentina (1907) in 3 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE JOAQUIN V. GONZA.LEZ § 644 (1897).
Law No. 48 art. 7, Sept. 14, 1863, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 364, 366, provided that the estab-
lishment of federal criminal jurisdiction did not change established rules on military juris-
diction, and that meant application of the old Spanish military ordinance;. U.S. practice in
the late 19th and early 20th centuries allowed civilian jurisdiction over ,*rimes committed
by military personnel, but removal of the individual from military service for trial required
the consent of the military authorities. Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 513-15 (1878);
WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, TH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THil UNITED STATES
§ 1013, at 1546 (2d ed. 1929).
125. "Competencia entre el Juez Nacional de Salta y el General en Jefe del Ejdrcito del
Norte D. Ignacio Rivas," 7 Fallos 205, 217-18 (1869) (involving a dispute between the mili-
tary and the federal judge in Salta over who had jurisdiction to judge a group of Felipe
Varela's followers captured in Salta, with the Army taking a very broad view of military
jurisdiction and arguing that sometimes even battlefield executions of rebel prisoners are
legal and appropriate).
126. "Sosa," 9 Fallos at 484 (holding that a sergeant in the provincial militia of San Luis
who deserted while the militia was on duty with the Army could not be subjected to mili-
tary jurisdiction if the militia had already been detached from national service); see also
"Coronel Rodrfguez," 10 Fallos 55, 56 (1871) (granting a habeas corpus petition presented
by a Colonel in the Santa Fd militia detained by the military, on grounds that there was no
basis for the detention).
127. "Contienda de Competencia Entre el Juez del Crimen de Sac Juan y el Com-
mandante en Jefe Ejdrcito del Interior Sarmiento," 16 Fallos 61, 63 (1.375) (insisting on
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cised jurisdiction to require the release from military service of indi-
viduals improperly forced into the army.' 3 This is not to say that
rules established by the Supreme Court always governed. Jos6 Her-
ndndez began his 1872 gaucho epic Martin Fierro describing Martin
Fierro's impressment into army service on the Indian frontier because
he failed to show up on election day to vote for the governing party. z'9
Rule of law established itself quickly, but not overnight.
Perhaps even more striking than the Supreme Court's refusal to
allow military courts to assert authority over civilians was its insis-
tence that release on bail was available for persons charged with re-
bellion, meaning at least in theory that rebels could leave custody
almost as soon as they were disarmed. While the rule was first applied
after the Mendoza and San Juan revolutions, -0 it became particularly
rooted when the Court insisted on pretrial release in numerous cases
after the revolt of 1874.131 Under the colonial procedural rules then
still in effect, bail was always available in the case of crimes that would
not result in "corporal" punishment, which the Court understood as
punishment involving a jail sentence. 3 2 Since rebellion was a crime
only punishable by exile and/or a fine, bail was automatically avail-
able.133 The only exception was the case of Ricardo L6pez Jordin, a
die-hard federalist whose rebellion began in April 1870 with the assas-
sination of former President Urquiza and two of his sons as traitors to
the federalist cause.'34 With Urquiza out of the way, L6pez Jordan
seized control of Urquiza's home Province of Entre Rios and held out
against federal government forces until January 1871, when he was
civilian jurisdiction when an individual named by the Army to recruit troops to stop a
rebellion shot another recruiter for failing to place himself under his command).
128. See "Godoy," 8 Fallos 231 (1869) (federal courts can hear a habeas corpus action
alleging that the petitioner was improperly sent to serve in the federal army by the Gover-
nor of San Juan for having allegedly deserted from a municipal police force); Z3%vAIIA,
supra note 51, at 119-20.
129. Jos HEmRNANDEZ, MARTIN FmIno 1 49-53 (1872).
130. "Urruti," 5 Fallos at 385; "Alvarez," 5 Fallos at 387; "Ferreira," 6 Fallos at 25.
131. "Abeleyra," 16 Fallos 42 (1875); "Santander," 16 Fallos 102 (1875); "Olivar," 16
Fallos 118 (1875); "Gordoniz," 16 Fallos 121 (1875); "Zapata," 16 Fallos 146 (IS75).
132. All the cases cited in the preceding footnote apply this rule, but they assume infor-
mation not obvious to a reader today. For a fuller explanation of the rule, see the decision
of the federal judge in "Lamarque," 54 Fallos 292, 295-96 (1S93) that accompanies the
decision of the Supreme Court affirming his decision.
133. "Mendoza," 5 Fallos at 85-86; "San Juan," 5 Fallos at 165-66.
134. 3 DiEGo ABAD DE SANrrTAN, -rsroRiA ARGENTINA 194-95 (1970); 2 ALBER.TO
FLORIA & GARcIA BELSUNCE, supra note 50, at 144; MARIA A.AUA. DUARTE, URQUIZA
Y LOPEZ JORDAN 199-204 (1974); see generally JORGE NEvro.V, RacARao LOrEz JORIDAN:
ULTMIO CAUDILLO EN ARMAS 100-70 (2d ed. 1974) (describing the murders and the various
L6pez Jordan rebellions in detail).
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finally defeated-though he himself escaped to Uruguay and at-
tempted additional revolts in 1873 and 1876.135 The Supreme Court
held that L6pez Jorddn did not qualify for bail because his alleged
crimes went beyond the conduct included within the scope of a rebel-
lion, such as raising an army and engaging the government in battle,
but included executions, whippings, and lootings. 136 A purely political
rebellion without aberrant acts received protection from the Court,
while rebellion combined with banditry did not. This approach would
become key in the early 1890s, when the Court's involvement in
problems of revolution and civil unrest reached its peak.
VI. The Supreme Court and the Turbulent 1890s
The early 1890s were a uniquely unstable period for the Argen-
tine elite. On the economic front, the Argentine economy and its fi-
nancial markets soared and overheated in the 1880s. The financial
crash came in late 1889 and the four years that followed brought seri-
ous depression. On the political front, the ever increasing presiden-
tialism of the previous three decades finally faced a serious public
reaction in 1890, leaving the governing Partido Autononmista Nacional
(PAN) uniquely vulnerable until the public reaction began to fade in
1894 and 1895. The setbacks were only temporary. By the mid-1890s
the economy was booming once again, and the PAN's dominance con-
tinued until 1916.
Scholarship on Argentine politics in the 1890s ignores the courts
almost completely. Substantial work has been done on the economic
crisis of the 1890s, 137 and numerous histories have been written on the
revolts of 1890 and 1893 and the rise of the Radical Party.138 How-
ever, at least if newspaper coverage is any guide, courts played a very
135. "L6pez Jordan," 21 Fallos 121,129 (1879); 3 ABAD DE SANTILLAN, supra note 134,
at 196.
136. "L6pez Jordan," 21 Fallos at 129-30.
137. See generally, e.g., DOUGLAS R. RicHiMOND, CARLOS PELLEGRINI AND THE CRISIS
OF THE ARGENnNE ELrrs, 1880-1916 (1989); John E. Hodge, Carlos Pellegrini and the
Financial Crisis of 1890, 50 HISPANIC AM. HIST. REv. 499 (1970).
138. See generally BALsA, supra note 10 (on the Revolution of 1890); ROBER-ro
ETCHEPAREBORDA, TRES REVOLUCIONES 17-240 (1868) (offering a straightforward ac-
count of events in the 1890 and 1893 revolutions); HoRAcio J. GUIDO, SECUELAS DEL
UNICATO: 1890-1896, at 107-64, 191-225, 249-305 (1977) (offering a good overview of the
entire period); Jost NicOLAs MATENZO, LA REVOLUCI6N DE 1890 EN LA HISTORIA CON-
STrrUCIONAL ARGENTINA (1926) (on the political conflicts behind the Revolution of 1890);
1 GABRIEL DEL MAZO, EL RADICALISMO 58-90 (1955) (describing the origins of the Radi-
cal Party and the Radical revolts of 1893); Ezequiel Gallo, Un quinquenio dificil: Las pre.
sidencias de Carlos Pellegrini y Luis Sdenz Pefla (1890-1895), in GUSTAVO FERRARI &
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significant role.139 While no single decision was the key to maintain-
ing stability, the Supreme Court clearly acted as an independent arbi-
ter, insisted on maintaining rules that worked against escalation of the
crisis, and handed down decisions with important political conse-
quences. In order to understand the issues faced by the Argentine
Court and its responses, it is necessary to first develop some of the
political history of the period.
A. Historical Background
Argentine politics in the 1880s and 1890s was a politics of person-
alities as much as parties, and the dominant politician of the period,
even when out of power, was General Julio Argentino Roca.14 9 Gen-
eral Roca began his military career in the armed forces of the Confed-
eration at the age of fourteen, and in 1859, at age sixteen, was
promoted to second lieutenant for his performance at the Battle of
Cepeda, in which Urquiza defeated the forces of Buenos Aires. In the
years that followed he was present at countless military engagements
against rebels, indians, and the Paraguayan army, becoming one of
Argentina's leading military figures. President Avellaneda appointed
Roca Minister of War in 1878 and as Minister he led the campaign
known as the "Conquest of the Desert" that defeated the last milita-
rily significant bands of indians, on the Argentine prairie and opened
up the entire frontier to settlement. That success made him President
Avellaneda's natural choice to succeed him as President. In the pro-
cess of running for President, Roca defeated the forces of Buenos
Aires that rebelled in the revolt of 1880. He also enjoyed the support
of a League of Governors organized with the help of Miguel Ju'irez
Celman, his wife's sister's husband and the governor of C6rdoba. The
PAN was created as his formal electoral vehicle, and the party united
both Buenos Aires and provincial politicians. Roca's first period as
President was free of any revolts or external conflicts, and in 1886 he
installed Miguel Ju6.rez Celman as his successor and probably hoped
to continue to exercise power behind the scenes.
Judrez Celman did not act as Roca's puppet, however, and sought
to concentrate political power in his own hands even more thoroughly
EZEQUIEL GALLO, LA ARGENTINA DEL OCHENTA AL CENTHENARIO 215 (offering a goozi
political overview of the years 1890-1895).
139. See, e.g., supra note 61; infra note 345.
140. See generally 1 Jost ARcE, RocA: SU VIDA-SU OBRA 17-96 (1960) (describing
Roca's life until he assumed the presidency); FAL- LUNA, Soy RoCA (19S9) (offering a
high quality, popular biography of Roca written in first person from Roca's perspectivaj.
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than Roca had.14' This accentuation of one-man rule did not run into
significant problems while the economy boomed, but Jiuarez Celman
also ran up a huge national debt, failed to control land speculation,
and allowed a flood of unbacked paper money from both national and
provincial banks.142 When Argentine financial markets crashed in
1889 and 1890 because of a drop in the inflow of foreign capital, Jua-
rez Celman failed to seek new political allies and continued the per-
sonal nature of his rule. The result was a strengthened and mobilized
opposition and a revolt known as the "Revolution of 1890" in July of
that year.
Three main political groups joined together to produce the
Revolution of 1890, forming a grouping that called itself the Uni6n
Cfvica. 43 First, devout Catholics had long been at odds with the PAN
for its emphasis on secular public education, 44 and were disturbed by
passage of a civil marriage law in 1888 that ended the authority of
clergy to perform marriages with legal effect 45 and that required a
civil marriage before any religious marriage ceremony could legally
take place. 46 Second, former President Mitre, having supported the
revolts of 1874 and 1880, continued to lead a party that espoused
political reform but was concerned primarily with increasing the influ-
ence of the City and Province of Buenos Aires and its commercial
interests. Third, and most important as a political force, was a new
group of political reformers led by Leandro Alem, a Senator from the
Federal Capital with substantial popular support. This group de-
manded clean elections and began to acquire coherence during a se-
ries of public meetings starting in September 1889. Even this third
141. See GUSTAVO FERRARI, APOGEO Y CRISIS DEL LIBERALISMO 49-87 (1988)
(describing Judrez Celman's concentration of power in his own hands).
142. md at 183-212.
143. See ROCK, supra note 69, at 42-43 (describing the principal groups making up the
Uni6n Civica).
144. See Law No. 1420 art. 8, July 8, 1884, [1881-1888] A.D.L.A. 126, 127 (only permit-
ting religious instruction in the public schools outside of class hours, and only to children of
the faith of the religious instructor).
145. See Law No. 2393 art. 44, Nov. 11, 1888, [1881-1888] A.D.L.A. 497, 500.
146. See id. art. 118 (imposing criminal penalties on clergy who perform a marriage
ceremony without a civil marriage taking place first). See generally 12 CAYETANO BRUNO,
HISTORIA DE LA IGLESIA EN LA ARGENTINA 87-95 (1981) (discussing Law No. 1420 on
secular public education and the Catholic reaction); id. at 149-58 (discussing the Civil Mar-
riage Law and the Catholic reaction); id. at 114-34 (on expulsion of the Papal Nuncio from
Argentina in 1884 for his protests against the secularization of public education); Guil-
lermo Furlong, El catolicismo argentino entre 1860 y 1930, in 2(1) ACADEMIA NACIONAL
DE HISTORIA, HIsToIuA ARGENTINA CONTEMPORANEA 251,266-73 (1964) (on the secular-
ization of the Argentine State in the 1880s and the reaction of the Church).
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group, however, while rejecting the corrupt politics of the past, was
dominated by members of the traditional elite, including members of
some of Argentina's wealthiest families.
The actual revolt came on July 26, 1890, and enjoyed the support
of army units commanded by General Manuel Campos and naval
units in the harbor, in addition to groups of armed civilians.147 The
revolutionaries seized the City's munitions depot and set up small out-
posts at many points around the depot, but the Government proved
stronger. After three days of fighting in the City, which left approxi-
mately 1,000 dead and in which rebel naval units shelled government
positions, the revolutionaries signed an agreement with the Govern-
ment in which they surrendered in return for an amnesty and a prom-
ise of no reprisals. Even more important than the revolt was its
aftermath. To put down the revolt, President Juirez Celman found
himself dependent on his predecessor, Roca, who commanded the
loyal army forces, and on his Vice President, Carlos Pellegrini, who
ran the government while Judrez Celman was forced to seek refuge
outside the City, and who used his own political base among the Bue-
nos Aires elite to build support. Roca and Pellegrini became the true
arbiters of the situation, while Judrez Celman was held responsible for
the disorder generated by the revolt and was forced to resign a week
after the revolt ended.
As President, Carlos Pellegrini, with the assistance of Roca as his
Minister of the Interior, was able to maintain control, but not the ab-
solute dominance that the PAN had enjoyed over the previous ten
years.148 Civilian and military unrest required various periods of
states of siege. Moreover, financial circles were uneasy as Argentina
went through a difficult period of negotiating a moratorium on pay-
ment of its foreign debt, and briefly went into default shortly after the
Revolution of 1890. However, Peliegrini and Roca were able to reach
out to enough sectors of the elite to retain control, most notably
reaching an agreement with Mitre that drew his forces into a political
coalition with the PAN. This agreement also caused the Uni6n Civica
to split in July 1891, with Alem and his followers establishing the
Uni6n Cfvica Radical (the "Radical Party") to continue the revolu-
tionary struggle.
147. For a discussion of the Revolution of 1890, see generally BALEsTPA, supra note 10,
at 131-92; Guimo, supra note 138, at 107-34.
148. See generally Gumo, supra note 13S, at 147-64, 191-225; S JosC MARIA ROS.%,
HSTORA ARGEN1iNA 297-335 (1973) (offering overviews of the Pallegrini presidency).
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Alem and his party led a series of unsuccessful provincial revolts
through September 1893, with revolts in July 1893 enjoying the great-
est success and, through a strange twist of events, even received some
early support from within the government. 149 Luis Sgenz Pefia, the
presidential candidate for both the PAN and Mitre's forces in the
April 1892 elections, was a compromise candidate who lacked strong
support in any political party. He was sitting on the Supreme Court at
the time he was nominated and presented himself as a non-partisan
figure. Further, once he assumed office he adopted a role much more
like that of a constitutional monarch than of a hands-on administrator.
However, his lack of a political base forced him into a constant search
for allies, and once an alliance was made he gave his allies carte
blanche in the formation of a cabinet. His need for allies and lack of
sufficient support from the PAN or Mitre led him to choose a promi-
nent Radical Party sympathizer, Arist6bulo del Valle, as his Minister
of War on July 5, 1893, and to allow del Valle to select the rest of the
cabinet. Del Valle, with President Sienz Pefia's initial support, sought
to advance the aims of the Radical Party by disarming provincial gov-
ernments and thereby increasing their vulnerability to local revolu-
tions. The Radicals promptly responded with revolts in the Provinces
of Buenos Aires, Santa F6 and San Luis, and del Valle in turn sought
federal intervention in the three provinces in order to install Radical
sympathizers as governors. The House of Deputies rejected his re-
quest, but the Radical forces were in any case successful in taking over
the three provinces, with del Valle busy disarming the Buenos Aires
provincial government as Radical forces advanced on La Plata, the
provincial capital. The story ends, however, with Carlos Pellegrini
taking advantage of del Valle's absence in La Plata to resubmit legisla-
tion seeking federal intervention in the three provinces, obtaining its
approval (in spite of a constitutional ban on resubmitting rejected leg-
islation during the same session of Congress), 15° convincing President
Sdenz Pefia to appoint federal intervenors favorable to the PAN, and
ultimately leaving del Valle with no choice but to resign. The Radicals
lost the provinces, and a final series of uprisings in September cen-
tered in Santa F6 were even less successful.
149. See generally DEL MAzo, supra note 138, at 81-90; GUIDO, supra note 138, at 256-
95; 8 MARiA ROSA, supra note 148, at 352-70; Andrds R. Allende, La Presidencia de LuIs
Sdenz Pefila, in 1(1) ACADEMIA NACIONAL DE HISTORIA, HISTORIA AROENTINA CON-
TEMPORANEA 1862-1930, 402-12 (1963); Gallo, supra note 138, at 226-,0 (all treating del
Valle's period as Minister of War and the Radical Party's revolts).
150. CONST. ARG. art. 71 (1860).
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The Supreme Court played an indirect role in political events
throughout the 1890-1893 period, but reached its peak in 1893.
B. 1890-1891: Active, But on the Sidelines
While 1890 and 1891 were politically turbulent years, they did not
produce politically transcendent cases as would be true in the two
years that followed. The agreement that the government negotiated
with the rebels after the Revolution of 1890 prevented the govern-
ment from arresting Leandro Alem and his allies at that time, and
President Pellegrini probably lacked the political strength to actively
repress Alem until after the PAN entered into a coalition with Mitre
in mid-1891. There were three cases that should be noted, however,
because they all involved the Supreme Court granting habeas corpus
petitions in a politicized atmosphere. The Court sent a clear message
to all political participants that it would insist on deciding habeas
corpus cases in a manner consistent with its prior case law and the
constitutional text.
First, in January 1891 the Court required the provincial authori-
ties of the Province of Mendoza to release General Rufino Ortega,
who was arrested for sedition and for shielding two political support-
ers found with him in his home who had allegedly made death threats
against the Governor. 5 1 Ortega, an ally of Roca and Pellegrini, -
was a national Senator for Mendoza, 53 and sought to destabilize a
Mendoza government that had entered into a coalition with the Uni6n
Civica. 154 Under Article 61 of the Constitution, no member of Con-
gress could be arrested, from the day of his election through the end
of his term, "except in the case that he is surprised in flagranti in the
execution of a crime punishable by death [or some other] ignominious
or shameful punishment," with the further requirement that the rele-
vant House of Congress be provided the facts of the case. -'s The fed-
eral district court in this case ruled in favor of Ortega's release,
holding that the crimes he was accused of were not sufficiently serious
so as to overcome his immunity,'156 but the Court took an easier path,
151. "Ortega," 41 Fallos 405, 406-03, 413 (1S91).
152. 5 CtU1OLO, supra note 53, at 201; see also PEDRO SAN'Mos MARTINEZ, HISToPIa DE
MENDozA 131 (1979) (describing Ortega as an ally of Pellegrini but not of Roca during
this period; however, with Roca and Pellegrini acting together, the difference is
insignificant).
153. "Ortega," 41 Fallos at 408.
154. See id. at 406; SANTos MARTiNEZ, supra note 152, at 130-31.
155. CONsT. ARG. art. 61 (1860).
156. "Ortega," 41 Fallos at 410-12.
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finding that since over a month had passed without the Mendoza au-
thorities notifying the Senate of the facts of the case the detention
could not continue. 57 This approach had the advantage of not requir-
ing an inquiry into the propriety of the original detention.
In a second case, resulting from a Uni6n Cfvica revolt in the
Province of Catamarca, the Supreme Court gave the Radicals a minor
victory.158 Radical elements of the Uni6n Cfvica mounted a revolt in
Catamarca in June 1891, that was promptly repressed by President
Pellegrini with a federal intervention and a division of army troops.'59
In the aftermath of the revolt, the government officials on the scene
gave a number of the lower ranking participants a choice: either "vol-
unteer" for two years of service in the army, or face a p-.nalty of four
years of military service16°-the penalty under federal law for partici-
pation in the lower ranks of a rebellion if unable to pay a 300 to 600
peso fine. 6 ' The lower court decision in the case and the opinion of
the Procurador General, the chief government attorney before the
Court, show an early example of Argentina's Civil Code beginning to
affect thinking on public law issues. The lower court and Procurador
General found that of the ten persons who filed habeas corpus peti-
tions in the case, four were minors, so any contract they signed to
enter the army was automatically null and they had to be released.
However the lower court and the Procurador General both also main-
tained that the other enlistees could not take advantage of the quick
procedures of a habeas corpus action without first bringing an ordi-
nary civil action to annul their contracts, since under the Civil Code
contracts entered into under improper pressure are not null but
merely annullable, and remain in effect until judicially annulled. 162
The Supreme Court, however, rejected these civil law concepts as sim-
ply irrelevant. The testimony that the enlistments were forced was
convincing and uncontradicted, 63 and the constitutional guarantees
against illegal arrest and imprisonment protected individuals against
all restrictions and violence against their personal security.164 The
157. Id. at 417-18.
158. "Aguirre," 46 Fallos 83 (1891).
159. 2 SOMMARiVA, supra note 10, at 171-73.
160. "Aguirre," 46 Fallos at 85,87, 89-90; see also 2 SOMmARIVA, supra note 10, at 173-
74 (noting that the individuals affected were from outside the Province).
161. Law No. 49 art. 18, Sept. 14, 1863, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 385, 386.
162. "Aguirre," 46 Fallos at 85-86, 88 (citing Argentine Civil Code Articles 1045, 1046,
on annullable contracts).
163. Il at 89-90.
164. lId at 89.
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Court had long allowed habeas corpus actions to block illegal
impressment.165
Neither of the above decisions attracted great public attention,
and hence the political stakes were comparatively low. A third case,
however, having to do with revolution not in Argentina, but in Chile,
caused substantial discomfort for the Executive. The Chilean revolu-
tion occurred because of a confrontation between the Chilean Presi-
dent, Jos6 Manuel Balmaceda, a proponent of strong presidentialism,
and the Chilean Congress.166 The revolution broke out in January
1891, with most of the Chilean Navy supporting the Congress, but
with the Army remaining loyal to Balmaceda 6 7 With each side mus-
tering large forces, the outcome remained unclear until late August,
when Balmaceda's army lost a series of battles, and Balmaceda him-
self took refuge in the Argentine Embassy where he committed sui-
cide.' 68 The Argentine government clearly favored Balmaceda (and
not surprisingly, Alern and his allies favored the rebels).169 Argentina
was the only country that sold arms to Balmaceda-including a cruiser
from its navy-, 70 blocked arms sales to the rebels,"" and allowed
unarmed government troops to cross Argentine territory on at least
two occasions.172 The Argentine government also had no objection to
165. See e.g., "Godoy," 8 Fallos at 231; ZAVALIA, supra note 51, at 119-20. The
Supreme Court also granted a habeas corpus petition in favor of improperly drafted
soldiers several years later in "Descalzo," 76 Fallos 209 (1898).
166. See Lus GADAMEs, A HmsToRY OF CHIuE 34546 (Issac Joslin Cox trans. & ed.
1941).
167. Id. at 346.
168. Id. at 347-48.
169. The split between the Pellegrini Administration and Alem and others over its sup-
port for Balmaceda is particularly clear in the Senate's interpolation of the Minister of
Foreign Relations on August 4, 1891. Many senators, and not just Alem, disapproved of
the Administration's position. See generally CONGRESO NACiONAL, CA.MARA DE
DEuTADos, DIARIO DE SESION.S DE 1891, Session of Aug. 4, 1891, at 442-74 [hereinafter
Senate Chilean Debate].
170. MAmno BARROs, HrTORA DipLOMATICA DE CHUL, 1541-193S, at 478 (1970); see
also Senate Chilean Debate, supra note 169, at 457 (debate between Rocha and the Minis-
ter of Foreign Relations) (the Minister insists that arms sales to a government are entirely
legal under international law because Argentina did not recognize the Chilean rebels as
belligerents).
171. MUISMo DE RELAcioNts ExTERtORs, MNmoRIA DE RELACION=ES ExrEJ-
ORES PRESENTADA AL HONORABLE CONGREso NACiONAL EN 1891, at 164 (1891) [herein-
after MEMORA] (letter by the Minister of Foreign Relations Eduardo Costa to the Chilean
government indicating that Argentina would block arms for the rebels from crossing the
Argentine border); BARRos, supra note 170, at 478.
172. See Senate Chilean Debate, supra note 169, at 448 (statement of Rocha), 456,461,
462 (statements of Minister of Foreign Relations Eduardo Costa); MEOMRIA, supra note
171, at 191-95 (Chilean request and Argentine grant of permission to allow unarmed Chil-
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the Chileans docking the Pilcomayo in Buenos Aires, a slow naval
ship that Balmaceda sent to Buenos Aires for safekeeping after retak-
ing the ship in Punta Arenas, near the Strait of Magellan.173
The crew of the Pilcomayo mutinied, however. 'The ship's of-
ficers successfully put down the mutiny, but they found themselves
unable to care for wounded prisoners and unable to securely guard
the rest. They turned to the Argentine government for help, and the
Argentine government agreed to treat the wounded and temporarily
guard the healthy mutineers in Argentine facilities. 174 The sailors re-
sponded by bringing a habeas corpus action before Judge Virgilio
Tedfn, one of the two federal judges for the City of Buenos Aires..
Judge Tedfn held in the sailors' favor. The Government tried to
argue that the prisoners were not really in Argentine custody, but
Chilean custody with Argentine assistance. Judge Tedfn, however, in-
sisted that the Chilean government lacked authority in Argentine ter-
ritory, and that no detention could occur in Argentina without a court
order and in accordance with due process of law.17 5 Further, he re-
fused to treat the matter as an extradition proceeding, since no extra-
dition request had been filed. 76 The Supreme Court upheld Judge
Tedfn's decision. Although Chile had entrusted the sailors to the Ar-
gentine government, the Chilean sailors enjoyed the full benefit of Ar-
gentine jurisdiction from the moment they left their ship and entered
Argentine territory. 77 No one could be detained without a written
order issued by a competent authority, and the President did not en-
joy a special authority to engage in detentions by virtue of his author-
ity to conduct foreign relations.7 8 Moreover, even if the Chilean
ean troops to pass through Argentine territory from Bolivia); Paso de tropas chilenas, LA
NACiON, Apr. 9, 1891, at 1 (Chilean troops soon to enter Argentina); Asuntos de Chile, LA
NACl6N, Apr. 10, 1891, at 1 (Chilean troops soon to enter Argentina); Asuntos de Chile,
LA NAClON, Apr. 11, 1891, at 2 (giving text of diplomatic correspondence regarding troop
passage); Revista General, LA NAClON, Apr. 16, 1891, at 1 (noting that a Chilean unit had
entered Argentina from Bolivia and others would soon pass through from Chile). La Na-
ci6n also reported the presence of agents of the Chilean government in Buenos Aires to try
to raise troops to form a regiment. Los asuntos de Chile, LA NAC16N, Apr. 7, 1891, at 1.
173. 20 FRANcIsco A. ENCINA, HISTORIA DE CHILE 80-81, 115 (1952).
174. "Tripulantes sublevados del buque de guerra La Pilcomayo," 43 Fallos 321, 322,
327 (1891) [hereinafter La Pilcomayo]; Letter from Gabriel Vidal, Chilean Ambassador to
Argentina, to Eduardo Costa, Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations (Apr. 24, 1891), in
MEMORIA, supra note 171, at 182-84 [hereinafter Vidal Letter].
175. "La Pilcomayo," 43 Fallos at 322-23.
176. Id. at 323-24.
177. l at 329.
178. Id. at 330-31. At one point, the Procurador General argued that the detention of
the sailors was based on the President's authority during a state of siege, id., at 325-26,
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government were to seek extradition of the sailors, it could not obtain
them since their alleged crime was of a political nature and therefore
not subject to extradition. 17 9  The Executive complied with the
Supreme Court's ruling the day after it issued its decision, as soon as
an order was communicated by the District Court,180 and in spite of a
letter from the Chilean Ambassador insisting that the sailors be re-
turned to the Chilean government.21 1 While the Argentine govern-
ment continued to support Balmaceda, the issue was not worth
defying the Court.
C. 1892: Judge Tedin
The start of 1892 brought increasing tensions, with Congressional
elections on February 7, presidential elections on April 10, and in-
creasingly prominent judicial intervention not so much by the
Supreme Court as by Judge Virgilio Tedfn, the federal judge who de-
cided The Pilcomayo mutineers case. Judge Tedfn ranks among the
most resolute judicial figures in Argentine history, sitting on the fed-
eral bench for eleven years until he passed away prematurely in June
1893 at age forty-two.182 He was clearly allied with the progressive
forces in the City of Buenos Aires, and was sufficiently well consid-
ered by the Radicals to receive their nomination for the Senate for the
1892 elections, which he rejected to remain on the Bench.1 83 Judge
Tedfn made forceful efforts to halt electoral fraud, using the jurisdic-
tion of the federal district courts to hear appeals from local voter re-
however, this was not invoked by the Executive as authority for the detentions when the
Court asked the Executive if such was the case. ME-MOmA, supra note 171, at 176-77. This
is hardly surprising, as the state of siege, initiated two months before because of an alleged
risk of violent demonstrations, Acuerdo declarando en estado de sitio la Capital de la
Replblica, decree of Feb. 20, 1891, 39 Rnozs'rRo NACIONAL DE LA REPUBLXCA ArGEr-
TINA 124 (1891), was terminated in the Federal Capital on April 17, the day before the
Executive responded to the Court's inquiry. Acuerdo levantando el estado de sitio en la
Capital de la Repziblica, decree of Apr. 17, 1891, 39 Id at 319.
179. "La Pilconayo," 43 Fallos at 328-29.
180. Los marineros de la Pilcomayo en libertad, LA PREKSA, Apr. 25, 1891, at S.
181. Vidal Letter, supra note 174, at 182-84.
182. See 7 CuToLo, supra note 53, at 286; see generally Jost Luis AmsmiEo, EL JUtz
TED-,, LA POLtricA Y uN ntmz (1972) (a brief biography of Judge Tedfn, mainly through
quotations from his decisions and contemporary documents).
183. See 8 MARfA RoSA, supra note 148, at 328 (noting Tedfn's nomination by the Radi-
cals); CARLOs R. MELO, Los PARTDOS POLIrICOS ARGEN'INOS 32-33 (1970) (describing
Tedfn's activity in the Uni6n Cfvica); see also AmADEo, supra note 182, at 23-26 (describ-
ing Tedfn's support for Bernardo de Yrigoyen for the presidency in 1886 and concern %ith
electoral fraud).
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gistration boards provided that the appeal was first heard by the local
board itself.'"
In 1886 Judge Tedin made the first significant attempt by a fed-
eral judge to remove names improperly included on the voter rolls,185
and in early 1892 he went even further, deciding 3615 cases and re-
moving 2874 names from the voter rolls of the Federal Capital.18 6 His
conduct was unorthodox. First, in many cases the local electoral
boards refused to meet to review complaints, so he heard "appeals"
without a decision by the tribunal of first instance.'87 Second, rather
than using traditional methods of personal service by a court official
or attorney, Judge Tedfn used the ordinary mail system for service on
individuals listed on the rolls, instructing them to appear before him.
With the simple existence and residence of these persons being the
true issue in most cases, he instructed the mail carriers to indicate on
the letter the reason for failure in delivery if the letter could not be
delivered. When the mail carrier indicated that the person sought
could not be found, he then treated the failure of the named individ-
ual to appear before him on the date of their appearance as sufficient
to strike the name from the voter rolls.' 8  Judge Tedfn's 1892 deci-
sions were not followed by the individuals who actually ran the voting
tables on election day, apparently on the grounds that they never re-
ceived instructions from the local registration boards to remove the
names.'8 9 The PAN argued that Judge Tedfn acting in an appellate
capacity lacked authority to strike a name from the rolls himself, but
merely could order the local registration boards to strike a name. 190
However, even though disobeyed, Judge Tedin's decisions made the
fraud of the 1892 elections much more evident than usual, led to ex-
184. See Law No. 893 art. 8, Oct. 16, 1877, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 1154, 1155.
185. AMADEO, supra note 182, at 16-23.
186. CONGRESO NACIONAL, CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS, DIARIO DE SESIONES DE 1892,
Session of June 3, 1892, at 88 (statement of Beracochea); see also Los hombres y las leyes,
LA PRENSA, June 8, 1892, at 4 (stating that Judge Tedfn likely struck ovctr 3000 names from
the voter rolls); Elfraude electoral, LA PRENsA, Mar. 31, 1892, at 4-5 (Judge Tedfn was the
only judge to attack the fraud in the election rolls in 1886, suffering threats of impeachment
as a result, and is once again doing the same and uncovering massive fraud).
187. CONGRESO NACIONAL, CAMARA DE DIPUTADos, DIARIO DE SESIONES DE 1892,
Session of June 6, 1892, at 94 (statement of Beracochea).
188. See Los hombres y las leyes, supra note 186, at 4.
189. lt
190. This is the position generally taken by deputies who supported the government
during the debate over whether to accept the credentials of the newly elected Deputies
from the Federal Capital. E.g., CONGRESO NACIONAL, CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS, DIARIO
DE SESIONES DE 1892, Session of June 3, 1892, at 78 (statement of Meyer); id. Session of
June 6, 1892, at 102 (statement of Torres).
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tensive debate in the House of Deputies before the election results
from the February 7 elections for National Deputies and Senators
were accepted,' 9 ' and assisted a growing movement toward clean elec-
tions in the Federal Capital. In 1895 Congress in a sense "ratified"
Judge Tedfn's conduct by providing that if the local registration boards
are dissolved or refuse to give effect to the resolutions of the federal
judge, the judge may name a notary public to carry out his orders and
make the necessary changes to the voter rolls.' 9
However, Judge Tedin's most suspenseful decision came in a case
involving the detention of Leandro Alem himself. On April 2, 1892,
President Pellegrini declared a state of siege and arrested Leandro
Alem and much of the Radical Party leadership, placing them on
board the Argentine warship La Argentina, anchored ten miles from
shore. 93 In declaring the state of siege and later defending it in Con-
gress, President Pellegrini declared that Alem and his allies were plot-
ting an imminent, violent revolt, storing explosives to commit
anarchist attacks against the homes of government figures'Y4 No
proof was ever submitted to the public to back up these charges and
no Radical Party leader was even indicted for rebellion in 1892, let
alone for anarchist activities; 195 but the state of siege did serve to
block Radical demonstrations leading up to the Presidential elections
scheduled for April 10. The very weakness of the PAN in the after-
math of the Revolution of 1890 required it to resort to repressive
measures it generally had not needed in the past.
191. The debate occupied almost the entire sessions on June 3, 6, and 8, 1892, with the
House finally voting to accept the Deputies on June S. CoNGRE So NACIONAL, CAMr.A
DE DIpurA.Dos, DxUUo DE S.SIOtNS DE 1892, Session of June 8, 1892, at 143.
192. Law No. 3289 art. 10, Oct. 2, 1895, [1889-1919] A.D.L.A. 343, 34S. Judge Tedin's
successor refused to intervene in the absence of a resolution of the local electoral boards
and was severely criticized for it in La Prensa. El Juicio de tachas, LA PPE-sA, Jan. 31,
1893, at 4.
193. Otras noticias de "La Argentina," LA PRFNSA, Apr. 6, 1S92, at 4.
194. Acuerdo declarando en estado de sito el territorio de la Reptiblica, decree issued
Apr. 2, 1892, 41 REGISTRO NAcIONAL DE LA REPUBLICA ARGENnNA 4S1 1892) (giving
the preamble and declaration of the state of siege) (also found in Declaraci6n del estado de
sitio, LA PRENSA, Apr. 3, 1892, at 3); CONGREso NACIONAL, CAM..ARA DE DwFrnu'os,
DIARIo DE SESIONES DE 1892, Session of May 27, 1892, at 42-47 (text of bill submitted by
President Pellegrini to Congress seeking approval of the state of siege, giving the reasons
vhy it was declared, and including some intercepted correspondence between Radical
Party leaders that allegedly demonstrated their violent plans, though in fact it shows noth-
ing but vague scheming to plan a revolt in the future).
195. See La impresi5n pziblica, LA PRENSA, May 29, 1892, at 4; La Constintciun Argen-
tina, LA PRENSA, May 30, 1892, at 4; El estado de sitio ante el juicio del Congreso, LA
PRENSA, May 31, 1892, at 4; Los presos polticos and El estado de sitio en el Consreso, Lt
PRENSA, June 10, 1892, at 4. See infra text accompanying note 229.
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Lawyers for the detainees promptly filed habeas corpus petitions,
with the petitions falling into two groups. One group of petitions were
presented by Radical Party leaders who did not hold seats in Con-
gress, and these were quickly rejected by Judge Tedfn on grounds that
Article 23 of the Constitution gave the Executive authority to detain
individuals during a state of siege, unless they opted to leave the coun-
try.196 The situation was different, however, for Leandro Alem, who
at that time was still a Senator for the Federal Capital (his term ending
on April 30) and Victor Molina, a Deputy from the Federal Capital.
Their attorneys argued that the Executive had the obligation to re-
spect their parliamentary immunities even during a state of siege,
since they had not been "surprised in flagrant! in the execution of a
crime punishable by death [or some other] ignominious or shameful
punishment," as required under Article 61 of the Constitution, and
Congress had not stripped them of their immunities, the constitutional
option available to the government under Article 62.197 Judge Tedfn
acted with typical speed. Alem and Molina's petitions were filed at
4:00 p.m. on April 2,198 and Judge Tedfn gave the Chief of Police until
8:00 p.m. to bring Alem and Molina before the Court and to provide
an explanation for the detentions. 199 The Chief of Police responded
that he acted under orders from the President and no longer had cus-
tody over the prisoners.2° Judge Tedfn, however, took that response
as evasive and ordered the Chief of Police to provide a fuller explana-
tion by 10:00 a.m. the next morning or face arrest.201 When the Chief
of Police then responded that it was public knowledge that the prison-
196. "Paez," 48 Fallos 17, 17-19 (1892); "Leguizamon," 48 Fallos 27, 28-33 (1892) (note
that the attorneys' names, Rodriguez and Demarfa, respectively, nct Paez et al. and
Leguizam6n et al., are used in the case headings provided by the Court).
197. CONsT. ARG. art. 62 (1860). Habeas Corpus Petition at dossier pages 2 (back) - 5,
and Leandro Alem's Letter to the Court, 7-8 (back), Alem, Legajo 1 (1892) [hereinafter
Alem Dossier]; Habeas Corpus Petition at dossier pages 1-1 (back), Molina, Legajo 1
[hereinafter Molina Dossier]. These briefs are on file with the Director of the Archivo
General del Poder Judicial in the basement of Talcahuano 550, Buenos Aires, and may also
be found in full in Dr. Alem ante el juzgado federal and Dr. Molina ante la justicla federal,
LA PRENSA, Apr. 3, 1892, at 4.
198. Alem Dossier, supra note 197, at 5 (back); Molina Dossier, supra note 197, at 1
(back).
199. Alem Dossier, supra note 197, at 6, 9-9 (back); Molina Dossier, supra note 197, at
2.
200. Alem Dossier, supra note 197, at 9 (back); Molina Dossier, supra note 197, at 3
(back).
201. Alem Dossier, supra note 197, at 10-11; Molina Dossier, supra note 197, at 3
(back)-5. Judge Tedfn threatened to apply the C6digo de Procedimiento en lo Criminal
[Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 631, then in effect through Law No. 2372, Oct. 17, 1888,
[1881-1888] A.D.L.A. 444, 485 (giving judges authority to arrest public officials who fail to
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ers were aboard La Argentina,20 2 Judge Tedfn ordered the Com-
mander of La Argentina to respond to the petitions and produce the
prisoners before the Court within twenty-four hours.20 3 This order
was never served, however, because the Navy maintained the vessel
incommunicado and not only did it not allow an order to be served
directly on the Captain of the vessel, but it refused to accept service of
the Court's order at the office of the Navy Chief of Staff for delivery
to the vessel.2° Judge Tedin responded on April 5 by ordering the
release of the prisoners and serving his decision on the Minister of
War.205
Judge Tedfn reasoned that while the Executive had not responded
in the case, the only possible authority for the detentions was the Ex-
ecutive's powers during a state of siege,2 6 and these could not be in-
voked against members of Congress. Article 23 of the Constitution
operates to allow the President to suspend individual rights during a
state of siege, but does not affect the operation of government and the
privileges required by members of Congress to perform their govern-
mental functions.20 7 With citations to Cooley' s and Story2O9 he ar-
gued that U.S. authors had noted the importance of Congressional
immunities for the operation of representative government and of the
use of habeas corpus to protect those immunities when necessary-
even though the U.S. Constitution allows arrest for treason, felonies,
and breaches of the peace not committed in flagranti.21° Further, if
the President could detain members of Congress then he could also
block any attempts to impeach him, and could manipulate Congress
when it votes whether to confirm a Presidential declaration of state of
comply with habeas corpus proceedings and allowing the arrest to continue until the ofui-
cial complies with the court's orders).
202. Alem Dossier, supra note 197, at 13-14; Molina Dossier, supra note 197, at 7-8.
203. Alern Dossier, supra note 197, at 14-14 (back); Molina Dossier, supra note 197, at S
(back).
204. Alem Dossier, supra note 197, at 15-16 (back); Molina Dossier, supra note 197, at
9-9 (back).
205. Alem Dossier, supra note 197, at 19-28 (back) (issuing a single decision with re-
spect to both Alem and Molina).
206. Id. at 19-20. The full text of Judge Tedfn's decision may also be found in Los
sucesos de actualidad, supra note 61, at 4.
207. Akn Dossier, supra note 197, at 20 (back)-22 (back).
208. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATnSnm ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGIsLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE A .1ERXCAN UNION (edition
and precise pages not provided in the opinion, first published in 186S).
209. JOSEPH STORY, COMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrruFnON OF THE UNITED STATES
(edition and page cites not provided in the opinion, first published in 1833).
210. Alem Dossier, supra note 197, at 23-24 (back), 26 (back)-27.
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siege.211 A state of siege does not permit a President dictatorial
powers.' 2
The Executive refused to comply with Judge Tedin's decision. 13
The Minister of War, Nicolds Levalle, replied that the President had
instructed him to respond that the Court's order infringed on the Pres-
ident's constitutional powers during a state of siege.214 According to
the Minister, Congressional immunities could not be invoked when
members of Congress conspire against constitutional authorities. If
members of Congress enjoyed immunity from detention during a state
of siege, then they could work to overthrow the government.2 15 He
also argued that British, U.S., and Chilean practice all supported the
President's position, with the U.S. Constitution even ailowing arrest of
members of Congress in the case of a "breach of he peace. '2 16
Habeas corpus was inappropriate because it applied only to deten-
tions made without authority. The President, however, had constitu-
tional authority to order a detention during a state of siege. 17
This response by the Executive effectively ended the legal pro-
ceedings. Neither Alem nor Molina appealed their cases to the
Supreme Court. Having won below, there was nothing to appeal, and
the Supreme Court had long held that enforcement of judicial deci-
sions was a matter for the court of first instance. 1 8 Alem and Molina
continued in detention until June 9, by which time the .Executive had
relaxed most of the rigors of the state of siege .2 9 Alem and Molina's
attorneys requested Judge Tedin to send the case dossiers to Congress
to request the President's impeachment, °0 but no impeachment pro-
ceedings were ever initiated. Given that President Pellegrini's term
ended on October 12,1892, the Executive's opponents in the House of
Deputies saw little point in pushing for impeachment, 2 and settled
211. Id. at 24 (back)-26.
212. Id
213. Id at 30. The full text of the Executive's response may also be found in Los
sucesos de actualidad, supra note 61, at 4.
214. Alem Dossier, supra note 197, at 30-30 (back).
215. Id at 31-31 (back).
216. 1d at 32-34 (back).
217. 1d at 36-36 (back).
218. "Cdceres," 1 Fallos 228, 257 (1864); see also "Sojo," 32 Fallos 120, 128-36 (1887)
(issuing an order requiring the release of an individual is a function ol a tribunal of first
instance, not of the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is lim-
ited to the situations indicated in the Constitution).
219. Los presos polfticos, LA PRENSA, June 10, 1892, at 4.
220. Alem Dossier, supra note 197, at 39-40.
221. CONGRESO NACIONAL, CAMARA tlE DIPUTADOS, DIARIO DE SESIONES DE 1892,
Session of Aug. 31, 1892, at 763-64 (statement of Olmedo).
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for a resolution simply stating that detention of Molina had violated
the House's parliamentary privileges."
Judge Tedfn's efforts were not entirely in vain, however. First, the
day after Alem and Molina's habeas corpus petitions appeared in the
Press, the government used its powers under the state of siege to pre-
vent any comment in the Press on the state of siege or on any related
habeas corpus petitions 23 Judge Tedfn's decision in the case was the
only statement reflecting negatively on the state of siege that the Bue-
nos Aires Press was permitted to publish, 4 and even the pro-govern-
ment Press felt obliged to publish the decision or at least offer some
comment on the case.225 Second, defying Judge Tedfn carried a polit-
ical cost. For example, La Prensa, the largest Buenos Aires newspa-
per from the 1890s through the 1940s, initially supported President
Pellegrini's decision to declare a state of siege, in light of the govern-
ment's claim of a violent Radical plot.? 6 Since La Prensa was not tied
to any political party and had earlier been extremely critical of Pel-
222. CONGRESO NACIONAL, CAMARA DE DntrrADos, DIARIO DE SESIONES DE 1892,
Session of Oct. 19, 1892, at 29 (approving the resolution regarding the detention of Molinas
and also disapproving of Deputy Rafael Castillo's detention by provincial authorities in
Catamarca); see also id, Session of Oct. 17,1892, at 17-18 (giving the text of the resolution
and the committee report, which found not only that the Executive lacked authority to
detain a member of Congress when the arrest does not occur in flagranti, but finding that
there were never even any specific allegations or proof offered by the Executive indicating
that Molina participated in subversive activities).
223. A nuestros lectores, LA PRENSA, Apr. 4, 1892, at 4. The habeas corpus petitions
and Judge Tedin's initial orders in Alem and Molina appear in La Prensa, Apr. 3, 1892, at
3-4, under assorted headlines.
224. See Los sucesos de actualidad, supra note 61, at 4 (noting that by special order of
the President the Press was permitted to publish Judge Tedfn's decision in the Alem and
Molina cases with the Secretary of War's reply, and publishing the decisions, but com-
plaining that it was not permitted to offer comment). The restriction on comments on the
state of siege was only lifted at the end of May, and only informally. La impresi6n pablica,
supra note 195, at 4.
225. La Naci6n, which took a vociferous progovernment position at this time because
former President Mvfitre, its owner, had entered into a coalition with the PAN, published the
full text of Judge Tedfn's decisions in Alem as well as the government's reply. Habeas
Corpus, LA NACIN, Apr. 8, 1892, at 1. Even the Buenos Aires Herald, which strongly
supported the state of siege, published an extensive summary of Judge Tedfn's decision and
the Minister of War's response, The Political Prisoners, BuENos AjREs HERALD, Apr. 9,
1892, at 2-3 as well as short articles supporting the government's position, Notes, BuENos
AsF-s HERALD, Apr. 10, 1892, at 1; Notes, BuENos AmEs HEALD, Apr. 12, 1892, at 1. El
Argentino, a newspaper that favored the Radical Party, was closed by the government dur-
ing the state of siege, but published one issue on April 10, when the state of siege was
suspended for one day for the presidential elections, and used the opportunity to publish
Judge Tedin's decision in Alem, La sentencia del Dr. Tedin, EL ARGE. NTIo, Apr. 10, 1892,
at 3-4.
226. Estado de sitio, LA PRENSA, Apr. 3, 1892, at 4.
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legrini's presidency,2 27 this counted as significant support. However,
during the state of siege La Prensa published not just the decisions in
the Alem and Molina cases, but the attorneys' briefs, arid complained
of the fact that it was not permitted to comment on the cases.22 s Once
the restrictions on publications were lifted, it used its voice to com-
plain about the lack of proof offered by the government against Alem
and the government's usurpation of judicial functions. 229 La Prensa's
principal complaint was not so much the government's failure to com-
ply with Judge Tedfn's orders, as the government's conduct in making
the unsubstantiated charges that Alem planned bombing and other
violent acts and then violated his parliamentary immunities. Judge
Tedfn's decision was an important reinforcement for La Prensa's argu-
ments.230 In October 1892, when President Pellegrini left office, he
was very unpopular for what was generally perceived as authoritarian
conduct, and for his handling of the state of siege was the most serious
example of such conduct.231 Detention of Alem was Pellegrini's most
significant step during the state of siege, and Judge Teldfn's decision
legitimized complaints on Alem's detention.
While the Supreme Court did not get directly involved with Judge
Tedfn's confrontation with the Executive, the Supreme Court also dis-
played some activity. The Court heard two identical cases involving
groups of Radical Party leaders who were deported to Uruguay, alleg-
edly without being asked by the Executive whether they wished to
invoke their right to leave the country as an alternative to deten-
227. El balance general, LA PRENSA, Jan. 1, 1893, at 4 (presenting a harsh round-up of
the government's conduct over the previous year); La elecci6n de hoy, LA PRENSA, Feb. 7,
1892, at 3 (condemning the government's fraudulent electoral practices).
228. See supra notes 225-26.
229. See supra note 195.
230. See id.
231. Pellegrini's unpopularity on leaving office is patent. He himself publicly offered to
resign several weeks early, and probably would have had no choice but to go through with
his offer if there had been general agreement as to who would succeed 'lim, the President-
elect or the President of the Senate. He was subject to sharp attack in Congress, in part
during the debates on the state of siege, and in part because as relations with Congress
worsened he refused to comply with a request by the House of Deputies that Nicols
Levalle, the Minister of War, present himself for an interpolation, an opportunity for Con-
gress to question the President's Ministers provided for in the Constitution of 1860, art. 63.
1 HoRAcio JUAN CUCCORESE, EN TIEMPO HIST6RICO DE CARLOS PELLEGRINI 15-25
(1985); see also 8 MARIA ROSA, supra note 148, at 334-35 (noting that iH contrast to Presi-
dent Pellegrini's popularity when he assumed office, he asked Bartolomd Mitre to accom-
pany him as he left the presidential offices for protection from angry citizens). Some of
Pellegrini's unpopularity was also due to the economic depression, and his political reputa-
tion recuperated with the passage of time.
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tion. 2 2 These individuals did not enjoy parliamentary immunities and
Judge Tedfn had already ruled on April 4th that the Executive had the
authority to detain them during a state of siege,3 3 but on April 12th,
many of the prisoners were transferred to a ship that took them to
Montevideo.3 Their appeals from Judge TedIn's decision were al-
ready pending before the Supreme Court, but with their deportation
they modified their arguments to insist that they had the right to re-
main with their fellow political prisoners in Argentina.?5s The
Procurador General argued the government's case by taking a very
limited view of the judiciary's authority during a state of siege. The
Procurador General insisted not only that the Court recognize the Ex-
ecutive's authority to engage in a detention, but that it hold that the
very action of habeas corpus is unavailable during a state of siege.?
Alternatively, he also suggested that even if habeas corpus were avail-
able during a state of siege, Law 48 provided for habeas corpus only
when an individual is "detained or imprisoned,"' -" not in a case where
the appellants were free in Uruguay.ys
The Supreme Court clearly was not attracted to the Procurador
General's arguments. Far from holding that it lacked the authority to
take any action during a state of siege, the Court took the initiative to
ask the President to state the basis on which the appellants had been
deported, 9 an indication that it planned to rule against the deporta-
tions if they were involuntary. The Executive then decided to avoid a
fight. The President replied to the Court that while he had been told
by an individual sent to interview the appellants on board La Argen-
tina that they preferred to leave the country, if that information was
mistaken they could return to the country and surrender themselves
to the custody of the Chief of Staff of the Navy.2 40 The Supreme
Court then held that in light of the President's response there was no
232. "Paez," 48 Fallos at 17; "Leguizamon," 4S Fallos at 27.
233. "Paez," 48 Fallos at 17-19; "Leguizamon," 48 Fallos at 28-33.
234. Actualidad politica, LA PRENSA, Apr. 12, 1892, at 4; Los presos politicos, supra
note 219, at 1.
235. Los deportados politicos, LA PRENSA, Apr. 27, 1892, at 4. Significantly, this %%as
the position of the deportees from the very moment that they arrived in Uruguay, Los
presos politicos, supra note 219, at 4 (comments to reporters upon arrival in Uruguay).
236. "Paez," 48 Fallos at 21; "Leguizamon," 48 Falios at 35.
237. Law No. 48 art. 20, Sept. 14, 1863, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 364, 369.
238. "Paez," 48 Fallos at 22; "Leguizamon," 48 Fallos at 35-36.
239. See "Paez," 48 Fallos at 22 (noted in the Government's response).
240. Id. at 22-23; "Leguizamon," 48 Fallos at 36 (referring back to "Paez").
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dispute on the issue of the deportation and if the appellants wished to
return they could do so.
241
This decision does not show the Supreme Court dramatically
challenging the Executive like Judge Tedfn, but it does have political
significance. The fact that the Supreme Court issued an order asking
the Executive to indicate whether the appellants had stated that they
wished to leave the country shows that the Court wa! unwilling to
accept the Executive's position that the existence of a state of siege
suspended all actions in habeas corpus. Not only had this been the
position of the Procurador General, but in the lower court the Chief
of Police, on orders from the President, had refused to bring one of
the detainees before Judge Tedfn on grounds that declaration of a
state of siege suspended habeas corpus jurisdiction;242 not surprisingly,
Judge Tedfn took issue with this position, but he did not press the
point given that the detention itself was constitutional. 43 Moreover,
the fact that President Pellegrini responded to the Court's request for
information meant that regardless of his response to Judge Tedfn, he
implicitly recognized that the courts continue to exercise at least some
authority when an individual is detained during a state of siege.
Even if the Supreme Court had not wished to accept the Execu-
tive's position that a state of siege suspends habeas corpus, it had
other options available for avoiding a dispute with the Executive had
it wished to use them. The Supreme Court could have refrained from
requesting information from the Executive by adopting the
Procurador General's position that habeas corpus does not apply to
persons in exile and not in detention. Such an argument would have
been in accord with the literal language of Law 48, which only refers
to habeas corpus jurisdiction for persons "detained or imprisoned
'244
and would have meant that the appellants would have had to refile
their case as an ordinary civil proceeding. Similarly, since the depor-
tation occurred after the case was heard by the court of first instance,
the Supreme Court could also have taken the position that it was un-
prepared to decide an issue that had not been heard by the District
Court, and required the case to be sent back to Judge Tedin's court for
a hearing on the legality of the deportation. While the case did not
produce a sharp clash between Executive and judicial authority, the
Supreme Court clearly asserted its authority to rule in habeas corpus
241. "Paez," 48 Fallos at 24; "Leguizamon," 48 Fallos at 36 (referring back to "Paez").
242. "Leguizamon," 48 Fallos at 28.
243. l at 31-33.
244. Law No. 48 art. 20, Sept. 14, 1863, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 364, 369.
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matters during a state of siege, and the President seems to have been
obliged to adopt a posture of compromise. The individuals deported
all returned to Buenos Aires on May 26, 1892245 and none were rear-
rested, probably because the state of siege was already beginning to
wind down.
D. 1893: The Supreme Court Enters the Fray
If there was ever a year that could be said to be the peak of judi-
cial influence in nineteenth century Argentina, it was 1893. In 1893
the PAN still lacked the grip on political power that it enjoyed prior to
1890 and that it would regain by mid-decade. The increased political
competition of the moment made political disputes that would find
their way into the courts inevitable. But even more importantly, the
President's political credibility depended on his constitutional creden-
tials. Luifs Sdenz Pefia was chosen as the presidential candidate by
Roca and Pellegrini for the PAN, and by Mitre for the Uni6n Civica
Nacional specifically because his reputation for political neutrality
made him palatable to both parties' followers, and because anyone
presented to the public after the public's reaction against Judrez
Celman and Pellegrini's authoritarianism needed a reputation for up-
holding the rule of law?46 (Another factor was probably a desire by
Roca and Pellegrini to end the candidacy of Lufs Sdenz Pefia's son,
Roque Sdenz Pefia, who unlike his father, had an important political
base among a reform-minded wing of the PAN? 47 The son naturally
refused to run against his father). Sienz Pefia actively campaigned
from a rule of law platform and the reputation for upholding the law
that he enjoyed from having sat on the Supreme Court. At the heart
of his acceptance speech at the Uni6n Cfvica Nacional convention he
invoked this reputation, saying:
When a country convulsed by anarchic passions and party divisions
turns to a civil magistrate, removing him from his seat on the na-
tional Supreme Court of Justice to raise him to the high rank of
President, it is logical to believe that opinion seeks a government
that will repair distributive justice, that will see to it that the law, the
Constitution and individual rights are respected, that will concern
itself to make honor and administrative morality the norm in all of
245. Llegada de los desterrados, LA PRENSA, May 26, 1892, at 4.
246. See La soluci6n propuesta, LA PRENSA, Feb. 27, 1592, at 4 (describing Sienz
Pefia's candidacy as a vise tactical solution given his reputation for neutrality and lack of
party obligations); Allende, supra note 149, at 395-96, 396 n2.
247. 2 ALBERTO FLORIA & GARCfA BELSUNcE, supra note 50, at 219-20.
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its branches, since this hope is the determining cause of the sympa-
thies of [public] opinion.24
Moreover, Sienz Pefia emphasized that his conception of consti-
tutional rule included free elections and an end to arbitrary federal
interventions. 249 Whether his political backers would allow him to ac-
complish his goals was another matter, but given his platform, it was
no coincidence that he also incorporated two Supreme Court judges
into his cabinet.50 If the Supreme Court was to ever seek to expand
its role and adopt more activist postures, it would seem that this was
the President to do it under.
In practice, the Supreme Court's performance during 1893 was
mixed. The Court decided several very important habeas corpus cases
in favor of Radical detainees, one of which once again involved Lean-
dro Alem.25' It also provided an important forum for the Radicals
when Arist6bulo del Valle defended a military officer accused of mu-
tiny.252 Further, the Court held 3-2 in favor of the constitutionality of
the civil marriage law, 3 one of the most divisive social issues of the
period.254 However, the Court also missed an opportunity. In what
may have been the best chance the Court would ever receive to re-
248. Acta poltica de ayer, LA PRENSA, Mar. 7, 1892, at 4 (giving the full text of S6enz
Pefia's acceptance speech the day before). La Prensa actively supported Sdienz Pefila's can-
didacy and repeatedly uses the terms "honored," "just," "impartial," and "moral" to de-
scribe him and his future government. La nueva soluci6n, LA PRENSA, Feb. 22, 1892, at 3;
Momento de espectativa, LA PRENSA, Feb. 23, 1892, at 3; La duda como enfermedad, LA
PRENSA, Feb. 24, 1892, at 4. La Prensa argued that Saenz Pefia would "rigorously apply
the Constitution," Presidencia sin partido, LA PRENSA, Feb. 28, 1892, at 3, 4; and would be
"strong in the severe application of the law." Las cosas y los hombres, LA PRENSA, Feb.
29, 1892, at 3,4. Significantly, in its later analysis of Sdenz Pefia's speech. La Prensa quotes
exactly the portion quoted in the text above as the central theme. El prograna del
candidato, LA PRENSA, Mar. 8, 1892, at 4.
249. Acta polftica de ayer, supra note 248, at 4,5 (giving the text of Senz Pefia's accept-
ance speech); see also Polftica militante, LA PRENSA, Feb. 20, 1892, at 4 (giving the text of a
public letter Luis Sdenz Pefia sent to his son, Roque Sienz Pefla, when his son announced
that he would support his father's candidacy, emphasizing that he would never govern on
behalf of a political party and would push electoral reform as his highest priority).
250. Benjamfn Victorica served as Minister of War and Calixto de a Torre served as
Minister of Justice and Public Instruction.
251. "Alurralde," 54 Fallos 264 (1893); "Lamarque," 54 Fallos at 292; "Alem," 54 Fallos
432 (1893).
252. "Coronel Espina," 54 Fallos at 577.
253. "Correa," 53 Fallos 188 (1893).
254. The Court's decision, which is politically striking given that the President, Lufs
Sa6nz Pefia, was a strong supporter of the Church, gave the Court's blessing to Argentine
secularization. The battle over secularization had led to the expulsion of the Papal Nuncio
in 1884 for his opposition to the end of religious education in the public schools. See gener-
ally 4 ABAD DE SANTILLAN, supra note 134, at 343-48 (describing the baltle over the elimi-
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form the Argentine political system, the Court relied on U.S. case law
to decline jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a key federal
intervention, arguing that the case presented political questions that
could not be heard in a court of law.-- When the time came to inno-
vate along lines that varied from those already traced by the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Argentine Supreme Court, either from political
preference or timidity, refused to move in a new direction.
1. Cullen c Llerena
As noted earlier, President Luis Sdenz Pefia came to power
through the support of Roca, Pellegrini, and Mitre, but lacked his own
political base. Once in office, none of these figures gave him the full
political support that he required, so in July 1893 he turned to a Radi-
cal sympathizer, Arist6bulo del Valle, to organize the CabinetY' Del
Valle only lasted thirty-six days. His first step, which the PAN could
not publicly oppose, was to guarantee a clean election in the Federal
Capital on July 23 in an interim election to fill a vacant Senate seat.
The elections were won by Leandro Alem and subsequently ratified
by the Senate.- 7 The next step-Radical revolts to take over unpopu-
lar provincial governments in the provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa
F6, and San Luis-were less successful. Under Article 6 of the Argen-
tine Constitution, federal intervention of a provincial government,
which involved the temporary appointment of a presidential trustee to
govern the province, was permitted to "guarantee the republican form
of government or repel foreign invasion, and at the request of [the
province's] constitutional authorities to maintain them or reestablish
them, if they have been deposed by sedition or invasion by another
province." 5 Once the Buenos Aires, Santa F6, and San Lufs revolts
successfully installed Radical provisional governments, President
Sdenz Pefia gave in to pressures from Carlos Pellegrini and asked
nation of religious education from the public schools); id. at 370 (discussing the Civil
Marriage Law).
255. "Cullen," 53 Fallos at 420 (1893).
256. See generally 1 DEL MAZO, supra note 138, at 81-90; Guvoo, supra note 13., at 256-
95; 8 LAA ROSA, supra note 148, at 352-70; Allende, supra note 149. at 402-12; GALL.
supra note 138, at 226-30 (all treating del Valle's period as Minister of War and the Radical
Party's revolts).
257. The Senate approved Leandro Alem's election as Senator on August 31, 1893.
CONGRESO NACIONAL, C..ARA DE SENADORES, Dmmio DE SESIONES DE 1S92, S-ssion of
Aug. 31, 1893, at 356. The timing is significant, since it is while "Cullen" was pending and
before the Radical revolts in Tucumdn (Sept. 17) and Santa F6 (Sept. 24).
258. CONST. ArO,. art. 6 (1860) (also incorporated into the present Argentine Constitu-
tion as Article 6).
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Congress to declare a federal intervention of those provinces. The
move was not designed to reinstall the deposed authorities, however,
and occurred even though the House of Deputies had rejected a bill
seeking federal interventions only two weeks earlier, when del Valle
had asked for federal interventions in order to install Radical Party
sympathizers as intervenors. 5 9
Once Congress declared the federal intervention of the Province
of Santa F6, with passage rushed through both the House and Senate
on August 15, the revolutionary authorities in Santa F6 used the few
days that remained before arrival of the federal intervenor to begin a
legal challenge to the intervention. Joaqufn Cullen was chosen by the
revolutionary government to represent it, and it instructed him to op-
pose the federal intervention through all possible administrative and
judicial channels.2 ° Cullen sought a quick resolution by bringing an
action against Baldomero Llerena, the federal intervenor, before the
Supreme Court. He invoked the Court's original jurisdiction on
grounds that he represented the Province and the case therefore in-
volved the Province as a party.261 To further speed the case, his com-
plaint, filed on August 22, 1893 and published in the Press,
262
challenged the Court to hand down a quick decision, professing con-
cern at (unidentified) opinions that the Court would delay deciding
the case until political events had run their course and the case lost
importance. 263 On this point, he certainly got his way. The Court's
decision was handed down only sixteen days later, on September 7th.
Cullen's case offered the Supreme Court the chance to take a big
step towards free elections and limiting federal interventions, the two
key areas where Argentina's constitutional practices fell short, yet
with a decision that could have been written in a narrow fashion to
apply to the fairly unique facts of a federal intervention that had been
first rejected by Congress before it was finally approved. While the
Court dismissed the action on grounds that it involved political ques-
tions outside its authority, the situation was not one where the Court
felt compelled to protect its political capital. Had the Court decided
the action in favor of Cullen, the Executive would have had little
259. See Gumo, supra note 138, at 270-71.
260. Case dossier titled "Gobierno Provisorio de Santa F6 Baldomero Chillevena" at 1-
2 (back), stored in the Archivo de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [hereinafter
Cullen Dossier].
261. Itd at 49-49 (back).
262. Recurso de inconstitucionalidad, LA PRENSA, Aug. 24, 1893, at 4 (publishing the
complaint in full).
263. Cullen Dossier, supra note 260, at 43.
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political choice but to comply, and the Argentine elite would almost
certainly have accepted the decision. In institutional terms, the Court
would probably have gained political space at the expense of the Ex-
ecutive Branch. Legal arguments in favor of the revolutionaries were
clearly satisfactory to support a decision, provided that the Supreme
Court was willing to move beyond U.S. case law or, as was true of the
dissent, to distort U.S. case law. However, the Court would have been
required to take responsibility for establishing its own constitutional
model, as opposed to the intentions of Framers who looked to the
United States.
The strongest part of Cullen's case was his substantive argument.
Cullen called for immediate termination of the intervention on
grounds that Congress acted unconstitutionally when it passed the law
intervening in the Province.2" Article 71 of the Argentine Constitu-
tion of 1860 provided that "[n]o proposed law totally rejected by one
of the Houses can be reconsidered during the sessions of that year."2' 65
Since the House of Deputies had considered and rejected federal in-
tervention on August 1st, it could not reconsider the issue and decide
in favor of intervention on August 15th.266 While Cullen does not dis-
cuss it, the origins of Article 71, which comes from the 1812 Constitu-
tion of the Spanish Monarchy -67 and entered the Argentine
Constitution by way of the Argentine Constitution of 1826 -63 (a Con-
stitution that lasted less than a year), would seem to indicate that it
was designed to avoid excessive Executive pressure on Congress once
a government bill had been rejected. This concern could well be pres-
ent in the double submission of a law declaring the federal interven-
tion of a province.269 The government might have responded that
Article 71 only applied to ordinary legislation and not to inherently
fluid situations like federal interventions and states of siege. The cir-
cumstances requiring a federal intervention may obviously change
dramatically over the course of a session of Congress, much more so
264. Id.
265. CONsT. ARG. art. 71 (1860) (presently incorporated in the Argentine Constitution
as Article 81, with some modifications).
266. Cullen Dossier, supra note 260, at 43 (back)-48.
267. CONSTrrUCI6N [C.E.] art. 140 (1812) (Spain).
268. CONST. ARG. art. 62 (1826).
269. Nineteenth century Argentine constitutional doctrine usually required passage of a
law providing for federal intervention if Congress wvas in session. See Gonzilez, supra note
124, at §§ 732, 733, 735; SAMos P. ANLADEO, ARGENTnNE CoNs'rrunovAL LN* 90, 91
(1943).
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than will usually be true of ordinary legislation. As it was, the case
never reached the point where substantive arguments were discussed.
Cullen's most difficult hurdles involved problems of standing to
bring the action and jurisdiction. First, the Procurador General re-
sponded to the complaint insisting that revolutionary authorities could
not represent a province in litigation. Not only did the revolutionary
authorities here lack standing to bring the action in the name of the
Province, but if they did not represent the Province, they also could
not invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on grounds
that the case involved a province as a party.270 Second, the
Procurador General insisted that the case did not present an ordinary
civil action for redress of an injury in which the constitutionality of a
law was at issue, but an attempt to regain political power. Injury in
the form of loss of political authority did not constitute an injury repa-
rable in the courts.271 Third, the Procurador General a:rgued that the
types of issues involved in the case were inappropriate for the courts.
If the Supreme Court were to consider the constitutionality of a fed-
eral intervention, then it would be starting down a path to consider
the legitimacy of other branches of the federal government.2 z In fact
the very issue of whether a law was properly sanctioned, the central
issue in the case, was an issue of political authority and therefore a
political question inappropriate for the courts.273
Cullen did a good job of anticipating and responding to these ar-
guments, particularly the Procurador General's first point, that the
revolutionary authorities could not represent the province. In initially
filing his brief, Cullen included telegrams from Arist6bulo del Valle
when he was still Minister of War and Lucio V. L6pez, del Valle's
Minister of the Interior, congratulating Mariano Candioti, the revolu-
tionary governor, on assuming the governorship of the Province and
restoring order.274 According to Cullen, these telegrams, which indi-
270. "Cullen," 53 Fallos at 420-24.
271. Id at 425-26.
272. Id at 426.
273. Id The second and third points in the text were not fully distinguished from each
other in the Procurador General and the Court's opinions.
274. Telegram from Lucio V. LUpez, Minister of the Interior, to Mariano Candioti,
Governor of Santa F6 (Aug. 8, 1893), Cullen Dossier, supra note 260, at 5 (referring to
Candioti as Governor and sending his best wishes); Telegram from Lucio V. L6pez, Minis-
ter of the Interior, to Mariano Candioti, Governor of Santa Fd (Aug. 8, 1893), Id. at 7
(expressing satisfaction with Governor Candioti's success at pacifying the Province); Tele-
gram from Arist6bulo del Valle to Mariano Candioti, Governor of Santa F6 (Aug. 5, 1893),
id at 6 (referring to Candioti as Governor and sending his best wishes); see also "Cullen,"
53 Fallos at 422-23 (the Procurador General insisted that the telegrams were not enough to
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cated in their headings that they were written in an official capacity,
constituted official recognition by the Executive of the revolutionary
provincial government.275 He probably had the advantage on this
point, given that many de facto regimes in the past had been treated
by the Executive as the legitimate government of a province. 76
Further, it was Cullen and the revolutionary authorities, not the
federal government or the old provincial government, that enjoyed
moral authority on the issue of standing to represent the Province.
The Radical takeover in Santa F6 had substantial popular support,
and the previous government, as Cullen emphasized in his brief, had
only been in power because of fraudulent elections. 77 Even oppo-
nents of the Radicals admitted that the old regimes in Buenos Aires,
Santa F6, and San Luis were corrupt and lacked popular legitimacy. 37
Both Houses of Congress were dominated by the PAN in alliance with
former President Mitre's followers, but there was sufficient discomfort
with the regimes displaced by the Radicals to cause the House of Dep-
uties committee reporting to the floor to advise against intervention,
with its reporting member stating:
If the constitutional authorities of these provinces lack the condi-
tions that their own institutions prescribe, it seems to me that it is
wise politics, prudent politics, the politics of liberty, to leave them to
perish before the attacks of the revolution, because in the final anal-
constitute "recognition"); id. at 428, 434-35 (Supreme Court majority opinion notes the
existence of the telegrams without offering an opinion as to whether the de facto govern-
ment could represent the Province).
275. Cullen Dossier, supra note 260, at 47 (back)-49 (also arguing that the House of
Deputies implicitly recognized the revolutionary government when it first decided not to
intervene). Each of the telegrams begins with the word "Official." LUpez Telegram, supra
note 274, at 7; Cullen Dossier, supra note 260, at 5; Valle Telegram, supra note 274, at 6; see
also "Cullen," 53 Fallos at 422-23, 428, 434-35.
276. "Cullen," 53 Fallos at 469 (dissent); see also Should Revolutionary Governments of
Provinces be Recognized by the National Government?, BuEr~os AmEs HEP,,D, Apr. 24,
1893, at 1 (noting that the federal government had often recognized provincial revolution-
ary governments in the past).
277. Cullen Dossier, supra note 260, at 43 (back)-45; see also Teraa inagotable, LA
PRENSA, Oct. 17, 1893, at 3; El Pueblo Santafecino, LA PRENSA, Nov. 24, 1893, at 3 (both
articles noting that the radical rebellion in Santa F6 enjoyed popular support because of
the corruption of the local oligarchy and its control over the provincial government); The
Right of Revolution, BUENos ArRs HERAL ., Aug. 3, 1893, at 1 (strongly criticizing del
Valle's government for provoking provincial revolutions, but recognizing that political op-
pression and corruption in Buenos Aires and Santa F6 were so bad that the people of thos-e
provinces had the right to revolt).
278. See, e.g., Bearing Fruit, BuENos AmEs HERALD, Apr. 9, 1893, at 1; The Right of
Revolution, supra note 277 at 1.
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ysis the revolution only signifies an appeal to the final, supreme re-
course of peoples oppressed and deprived of their liberty.
2 79
Moreover, the law intervening the Province of Santa F' did not
include a statement that the intervention was necessary to restore the
republican form of government.28 ° This was the first time that a law
providing for a federal intervention did not include such a reference
or a statement that the intervention was to assist or reinstate provin-
cial authorities,28 1 and it was not an accident. Reinstating the corrupt
prior government was out of the question, and the minority committee
report in the House of Deputies, whose draft bill defeated the major-
ity report on the floor, deliberately avoided referring to a threat to the
republican form of government in order to win over undecided Depu-
ties who might feel that the statement could not be made in good con-
science. 282 A de facto government complaining of a federal
intervention might appear incongruous to a reader today, but in Ar-
gentina in 1893 it was generally recognized that it was the new de
facto authorities who had the best democratic credentials.
Cullen had a tougher time with the Procurador General's second
and third points. On the second point, that the alleged injuries were
political only and therefore no judicial redress was possible, Cullen
argued that he had at least one precedent in his favor. Several years
earlier the Supreme Court had decided the case of a boundary dispute
between various provinces. 83 Certainly if boundary issues were ap-
propriate for the Supreme Court-cases involving a province's territo-
rial integrity-the Supreme Court could hear a case involving a
province's political integrity.2 4
On the third issue, that questions such as the deci3ion to inter-
vene in a province were inappropriate for the courts, Cullen conceded
that the question of whether a province should undergo federal inter-
vention was a political question falling within the exclusive considera-
279. CONGRESO NACIONAL, CAMARA DE DnutADos, DIARIO DE SESIONES DE 1893,
Session of Aug. 1, 1893, at 355 (statement of Olmedo).
280. Law No. 2950, Aug. 18, 1893, [1889-1919] A.D.L.A. 258.
281. JUAN VIcENTE SOLA, INTERVENCION FEDERAL EN LAS PROVINCIAS 149 (1982).
282. CONGRESO NACIONAL, CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS, DIARIO DE SISIONES DE 1893,
Session of Aug. 1, 1893, at 356 (statement of Lastra).
283. Cullen Dossier, supra note 260, at 65 (referring to "Las Provincias de Buenos
Aires, C6rdoba y Santa F6," 24 Fallos 62 (1882), reh'g granted, 24 Fallos 199 (1882)). This
example is rather weak, however, since the Court heard this case as an atbitral tribunal by
consent of the legislatures of the provinces involved. 24 Fallos at 62-63.
284. Cullen Dossier, supra note 260, at 67 (back)-68.
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tion of Congress and the Executive. However, Santa F6 was not
complaining of Congress's evaluation of whether the republican form
of government in the Province required federal intervention, but of
the procedure through which Congress sanctioned the intervention2"6
According to Cullen, U.S. Supreme Court cases that dismissed actions
because they concerned political questions involved conduct by a
political branch that was within its constitutional attributions.2 7 The
only point that Justice Taney addressed in Luther v. Borden' 3 was
that the existence of the republican form of government in a State was
a matter for Congress." 9 Cullen, with extensive quotations from Al-
exander Hamilton29 and Thomas Cooley,29 emphasized that the
Supreme Court's power of judicial review was a broad one, with the
Constitution giving the federal courts jurisdiction in "all cases dealing
with points governed by the Constitution."129- Congressional acts were
only valid when they followed the Constitution's mechanisms for pass-
ing a law. In sanctioning the Constitution, the Argentine people and
the provinces established the rule that legislative action rejecting a bill
could not be reconsidered during the same year, and their will had
preference over that of Congress.2 93 Just as the Court presumably
would not apply a law that lacked the sanction of one of the Houses of
Congress, that was passed by a minority vote, or that failed to obtain a
two-thirds majority in each House to overcome a Presidential veto, it
should refuse to allow a federal intervention that had already been
rejected once by the House of Deputies.-94 Of the two acts of the
House of Deputies, the first rejecting federal intervention and the sec-
ond approving it, it was the first that must be given effect under Arti-
cle 71 of the Constitution. 295
The Supreme Court decided against Cullen, however, in a deci-
sion that depended primarily on U.S. precedent. Unlike the approach
285. Id. at 49 (back)-50 (back), 53 (back); "Cullen," 53 Fallos at 431.
286. Cullen Dossier, supra note 260, at 49 (back)-52.
287. Id at 65 (back).
288. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
289. Cullen Dossier, supra note 260, at 55 (back)-56.
290. Id. at 66-67 (back) (quoting from THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)).
291. Cullen Dossier, supra note 260, at 6S-70 (quoting from various portions of chapter
7 of THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL. PRNqCIPLES OF CONsTrrUTIoNAL LAW IN TiiE
UNrTED STATES OF ArmERCA (edition not indicated, but probably the original 1SS0
edition)).
292. CONSr. ARG. art. 100 (1860); Cullen Dossier, supra note 260, at 64 (back).
293. Cullen Dossier, supra note 260, at 67 (back).
294. Id. at 53 (back), 66.
295. Id at 65 (back).
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taken in an important case just six years before,296 the Court did not
cite the U.S. Supreme Court's case law as obligatory; rather, the Court
first stated its position, that the case was foreclosed by political ques-
tion doctrine, and only then stated that this position was supported by
U.S. case law.297 The difference, however, is minimal. It is clear from
even a cursory reading of the case that the Argentine Court needed
the U.S. law it cites to be able to support its conclusions. U.S. cases
were essentially all that the Court presented to support its decision.
The first U.S. case invoked by the Court was Luther v. Borden,
for the general proposition that it was up to the political branches of
government to determine which government is the established gov-
ernment of a State and whether that government is republican in char-
acter.298 Luther v. Borden involved an action by an individual
complaining that during the Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island in 1842,
illegal State authorities forcibly entered his home during a declaration
of martial law.299 For a short time, two competing State governments
existed in Rhode Island, and the plaintiff complained that since the
authorities who detained him did not constitute the State's legal au-
thorities, he was entitled to sue them for damages. 3° Chief Justice
Taney rejected the plaintiff's argument, noting that the President had
recognized the government that had entered the plaintiff's home as
the legitimate government of the State, and that this finding could not
be reviewed by a court.301 The Luther v. Borden decision is probably
a good indicator of how the U.S. Supreme Court would have reacted
generally to issues like those in Cullen c/Llerena in the niaeteenth cen-
tury. However, as Cullen argued in his brief, the case is not directly
on point, since the process by which the President recognized the gov-
ernment of Rhode Island was not questioned, while in Cullen cILler-
ena the Argentine Congress allegedly violated the legislative
procedures established in the Constitution when it passed a law pro-
viding for the intervention of Santa F6. Luther v. Borden by itself did
not provide enough support to decide the action against the Radicals.
296. "Sojo," 32 Fallos 120, 130-34 (1887).
297. "Cullen," 53 Fallos at 431-32. The Court does the same thing with a statement that
political rights do not produce a justiciable controversy and then stating that this is also the
position adopted by the United States. Id. at 433-34.
298. Id at 432.
299. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 34-37.
300. Id at 34-38.
301. Id. at 42-45.
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A second U.S. case cited by the Argentine Court was conclusive,
however. The Court cited the 1867 case of Georgia v. Stantonz2  for
the proposition that courts cannot decide cases of a political nature
that only complain of violation of political rights.2° In Georgia v.
Stanton, the government of Georgia tried to block operation of the
Reconstruction Acts. The Reconstruction legislation began with the
finding that no legal State government existed in the various States
formerly making up the Confederacy, divided those States into five
military districts under military authority, and created a mechanism
for writing new State Constitutions and the establishment of new state
governments.3  The U.S. Supreme Court refused to rule on the mer-
its. The U.S. Court held that the rights in danger must be rights of
persons or property, not political rights, and an action seeking to
block replacement of a State government primarily involves the polit-
ical rights of the State and its people.30 5 The Argentine Court found
that Cullen was seeking the protection of rights exactly the same as
those which the U.S. Supreme Court refused to protect in Georgia n.
Stanton, and therefore it likewise could not hear Cullen's case.-"'
Blocking a federal intervention, regardless of the legal grounds,
was probably too aggressive a move for a majority of the Court when
there was no precedent even in the U.S. system, and given that the
decision would have substantially altered the legal landscape in favor
of the Radicals. However the Press's reaction to the dissent, by Judge
Lufs Varela, proves that had the Court wished to decide the case in
favor of the Santa F6 Radicals it could have done so and probably
carried the support of much of the political elite. The Press generally
considered the dissent superior to the decision of the Court,.2 7 and in
302. Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867).
303. "Cullen," 53 Fallos at 433.
304. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 50-52. The law required state constitutional conven-
tions with delegates elected by all adult male citizens, approval of the new state constitu-
tions by Congress, legislative elections under the new State constitutions, and approval by
the new state legislature of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Reconstruction
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 152,14 Stat. 428 (1867); Reconstruction Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6,
15 Stat. 2 (1867).
305. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 76-77.
306. "Cullen," 53 Fallos at 433-34.
307. La Prensa referred to Varela's dissent as "enlightening," La Ley de las interven-
clones ante la Suprerna Cone, LA PRENSA, Sept. 8, 1893, at 3; and published both the ma-
jority and dissent in full, id. at 3-4; La Lay de las intervenciones, L& PRENSA, Sept. 9, 1893,
at 3-4. The position of the Buenos Aires Herald is particularly striking, since initially it
supported the position of the Procurador General. Good Law, BULENOs Awms HEPUXLD,
Sept. 1, 1893, at 1; Notes, BuENos Amns HERAW, Sept. 1, 1S93, at 1. Howe.ver, once the
Supreme Court's decision is handed down it prefers the dissent and praises Varela as the
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1893 much of the elite, particularly in the City of Buenos Aires, per-
ceived the Radicals as legitimate contenders for power campaigning
against a corrupt political system. The dissent is a unique piece of
legal work. It occupies forty pages in the official collection of Argen-
tine Supreme Court Reports, approximately five times as long as the
opinion of the Court and much longer than any majority opinion or
dissent until that date. Varela's arguments rely heavily on the argu-
ments raised by Cullen himself, but he supports his arguments with
copious citations to U.S. law to show that the majority had misinter-
preted U.S. practice. He is wrong, given that Georgia v. Stanton was
precisely on point against Cullen, but his arguments would have been
very convincing to anyone lacking a collection of U.S. Reports or the
knowledge to use them.
The thrust of the Varela dissent was that political question doc-
trine is only used in a limited fashion in the United States, its precise
outlines are blurry, and it must be understood in the context of Mar-
bury v. Madison's308 broad grant of authority to engage in judicial re-
view. Marbury, according to Varela, established the authority of the
judiciary to always apply the Constitution.0 9 Political question doc-
trine does not undercut this, but only applies to cases where the gov-
ernment has exercised power as the holder of national sovereignty, as
in the recognition of foreign governments, borders, and relations with
Indian tribes.310 According to Varela, Luther v. Borden and Georgia
v. Stanton did not involve political questions, but holdings by the
top constitutional lawyer in the country, Notes, BUENos AIRES HERALD, Sept. 12, 1893, at
1; National Intervention, BUENOS AIRES HERALD, Sept. 10, 1893, at 1; Vad Law, BUENOS
AIRES HERALD, Sept. 13, 1893, at 1. The Buenos Aires Herald translated most of both the
majority opinion and Varela's dissent, a major investment of time given the length of the
opinion. The majority's decision appears in National Intervention, BULNOS AIRES HER-
ALD, Sept. 10, 1893, at 1. For the dissent see The Law of Intervention, BUENOS AIRES
HERALD, Sept. 12, 1893, at 1; Sept. 13, 1893, at 1; Sept. 14, 1893, at 1; Sept. 15, 1893, at 1;
Sept. 16, 1893, at 1; Sept. 17, 1893, at 1. La Naci6n, which was owned by the Mitre family,
strongly supported the positions taken by the Procurador General even before his opinion
appeared. Notas de la Semana, LA NACI6N, Aug. 20, 1893, at 1; Derecho Constitucional, LA
NACI6N, Aug. 21, 1893, at 1; Derecho Constitucional, LA NACI6N, Aug. 29,1893, at 1; Santa
F6, LA NAC16N, Aug. 30, 1893, at 1 (giving the text of the Procurador General's brief and
noting that it agrees with the positions taken by the newspaper) nevertheless, La Nacidn
treats Varela's dissent with respect, calling the majority and dissent in combination an im-
portant work of constitutional law; Intervenci6n nacional en Santa F6, LA NACION, Sept. 8,
1893, at 1; and, publishes both the majority and dissent in full, id.; Intervenci6n Nacional en
Santa F6, LA NACaON, Sept. 9, 1893, at 1 (publishing the second half of Ihe Varela dissent
and calling it "an important juridical-constitutional study").
308. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137.
309. "Cullen," 53 Fallos at 439-41.
310. Id. at 441-43.
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Court that accepted the findings of other branches of government as
to the true government of Rhode Island and whether a government in
fact existed in Georgia.311 Varela is only partly correct, however, and
probably realized it, since the U.S. Court in Georgia v. Stanton specifi-
cally found that the decision of the federal government to replace the
governmental authorities in Georgia during Reconstruction was a
nonjusticiable political question.312
With Georgia v. Stanton directly on point, Varela's only option
was to seek to undercut its authority, which he then did, by distorting
statements made by Chief Justice Chase in Texas v. White,31 3 a case
decided in 1868, the year after Georgia v. Stanton.14 Texas v. White
involved an action by the State of Texas to recover U.S. bonds that
had been endorsed to private individuals during the Civil War.31s The
action was initially brought by successive provisional Texas govern-
ments established upon the defeat of the Confederacy. One of the
issues in the case was the authority of these provisional governments
to bring an action in the name of the State, and the U.S. Supreme
Court held in favor of the plaintiff, since the provisional governments
had been in actual operation and had been recognized by the federal
government 16 These governments were replaced by the President
once the Reconstruction Acts came into effect, but since the govern-
ments established under the Reconstruction Acts continued the origi-
nal action, the Supreme Court, in holding that the provisional
governments had the authority to bring a suit, noted that "[n]othing in
the case before us requires the Court to pronounce judgment upon
any particular provision of [the Reconstruction Acts]. 3 17 Judge
Varela interpreted this statement to mean that the U.S. Supreme
Court would be prepared to evaluate the constitutionality of the Re-
construction Acts in the future regardless of their purely political con-
tent.318 Moreover, since Chief Justice Chase, the author of the
majority opinion in Texas v. White, had declined, without explanation,
311. Id. at 443.
312. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 WalL) 50 at 75.
313. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868).
314. See generally "Cullen." 53 Fallos at 448-50 (analyzing Texas v. White).
315. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 717-18.
316. See id. 726-32 (the issue was the authority of the provisional Texas governments to
bring an action seeking return of the bonds, and the Court holds in favor of the plaintiff,
since the provisional governments had been in actual operation and were recognized by
the federal government).
317. Id. at 731.
318. "Cullen," 53 Fallos at 450.
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to join the opinion of the majority in Georgia v. Stanton,319 Varela
argued that he must have wished to use Texas v. White to turn the
Court around. 20 Varela's argument is absurd. He improperly as-
sumes that the U.S. Supreme Court, by finding that it need not ad-
dress an issue to decide a case, was holding that it had authority to
rule on the issue in the future-even though it was a political ques-
tion. Since the U.S. Court only stated in Texas v. White that the issue
was not relevant, not that it planned to reconsider political question
doctrine, Varela clearly misreads the case. Perhaps because he had no
other option, Varela seriously distorted Texas v. White to reach his
desired end.
321
Since the majority of the Supreme Court decided the case on
political question grounds, it did not find it necessary -to decide the
delicate issue of whether the Federal government had recognized the
Santa F6 provisional government and thus whether the revolutionary
authorities had the authority to issue the decree authorizing Cullen to
bring an action for the Province.322 Varela, however, does deal with
this, and in the process of finding that the federal government had
recognized the revolutionary authorities, also does a good job of fo-
cusing on the government's political weaknesses. In addition to using
Cullen's argument that the telegrams from the former Cabinet Minis-
ters to the provisional governor constituted recognition, 23 and noting
that de facto provincial governments had often been treated as legal
319. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 77-78.
320. See "Cullen," 53 Fallos at 447-50.
321. It is impossible to tell for certain whether Varela realized that lie was distorting
Texas v. White or whether in his enthusiasm for adopting the position that the Court could
hear the case he simply grabbed at any possible authority without looking too hard. He
had very little time to write his 40 page opinion. It is unlikely that he started much work
on his dissent before receiving the brief of the Procurador General, which is dated August
28, 1893, since the Court would probably not have met to discuss the case and the
Procurador General would have had the case dossier. As the Court's decision and Varela's
dissent are dated September 7, 1893, he probably wrote his dissent in .en days or less.
There are other errors in Varela's citations to U.S. cases. For example, at one point he
cites the U.S. case of Scott v. Jones, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 343 (1847), for the proposition that
the precise outlines of political question doctrine have never been marked by the U.S.
Supreme Court, but his citation, to page 371 of the decision, is actually to the arguments of
one of the parties, summarized in the collection of the U.S. Supreme Court's reports
before the text of the Court's decision. See "Cullen," 53 Fallos at 445. In later years, after
leaving the Court, Varela's writing implies that he believes he erred in "Cullen" and that
the majority was right. See 1 Luis V. VARELA, PLAN DE REFORMAS A LA CONSTnTUCION
DE BUENOS AiREs 321 & n,2 (1907).
322. "Cullen," 53 Fallos at 434-35.
323. Id. at 464.
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governments in the past, 24 Varela argues that Congress, by failing to
state in the intervention law that intervention was necessary to restore
the republican form of government, implicitly refused to disavow the
provisional government as an entity that legally represented the Prov-
ince.3' In fact, anticipating what would have been his decision on the
merits, Varela winds up his dissent stating that to be constitutional a
law providing for a federal intervention to restore the republican form
of government must "begin by declaring that [the republican form of
government] does not exist in the State intervened. '3' -26 Of course this
was the very declaration that many Deputies felt that they could not
make in good conscience. Article 6 of the Constitution only provides
for federal intervention "to guarantee the republican form of govern-
ment or repel foreign invasion, and at the request of [the province's]
constitutional authorities to maintain them or reestablish them.""
Since there were no plans to restore the corrupt Santa F6 government
that had provoked the Radical's revolution, the need to guarantee the
republican form of government was the only possible ground for inter-
vention-but a politically unstatable ground!
The Cullen decision can only be partially explained in terms of
the political preferences of the members of the Court. One of the
effects of President Sdenz Pefia's election and the resignation of two
more judges to join his Cabinet was a Supreme Court of relatively
new members, but they generally did not owe political loyalty to the
presidents who appointed them, and in any event, none owed their
appointment to President Sdenz Pefia. To the extent that the mem-
bers of the Court owed political allegiance to any political figure or
party, it was not to the PAN and its leaders Julio Roca and Carlos
Pellegrini, but to former President Mitre. Three judges were ap-
pointed by Carlos Pellegrini at the end of his term, but only the Presi-
dent of the Court, Benjamfn Paz, could be described as a former
active supporter of the PAN, having served as Roca's Minister of the
Interior.3 8 Another, Juan Torrent, was clearly an ally of former Presi-
dent Mitre, having run for vice-president on Mitre's ticket in 1874,
served as President of the Uni6n Cfvica in 1890, and followed Mitre
324. Id. at 469, 471-72.
325. Id. at 461-62, 474.
326. Id. at 474.
327. CoNsr. ARG. art. 6 (1860) (also incorporated in the present Argentine Constitu-
tion as Article 6).
328. 5 CtrroLo, supra note 53, at 338.
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when the Uni6n Civica split.3 2 9 The third Pellegrini appointee,
Octavio Bunge, came from a prominent Buenos Aires family that tra-
ditionally had been concerned primarily with protecting the political
interests of the Province of Buenos Aires, and which had generally
opposed both Roca and Judrez Celman. 3 ° The two remaining judges,
Abel Bazan and Luis Varela, were both appointed by President Juirez
Celman. Abel Bazan, like Torrent, was an ally of forsmer President
Mitre who had strongly opposed Roca's election to the Presidency in
1880,331 and upon Roca's election, ended sixteen years in the Senate
to start a judicial career in the civil courts of the Federal Capital. 32
Luis Varela came from a family that like the Bunge family had long
supported whatever political force most strongly represented the in-
terests of the Province of Buenos Aires-Valentfn Alsina's son,
Adolfo Alsina during the 1860s and 1870s, and Mitre during and after
the Revolution of 1890.333 Certainly nothing in Luis Varela's past in-
dicates a special sympathy toward the Radicals. In fact, in 1891 he
had to deny rumors circulating in the Press that he was the author of
Minister of War Levalle's response to Judge Tedin refusing to give
effect to Tedfn's habeas corpus decision in favor of Alem.334 There is
no obvious political explanation for Varela's stand, other, perhaps,
than that he wanted to see the Court play a more active political role.
While the personal histories of the members of the Court offer
little insight, there is no doubt of the centrality of the 'U.S. model to
the Cullen ciLlerena decision. The dissent is if anything even more
329. 6 id. at 362; ENRIQUE UDAONDO, DICCIONARIO BIOGRAFiCO ARGENTINO 1049
(1938).
330. See 1 EDUARDO Jost CARDENAS & CARLOS MANUEL PAYA, LA FAMILIA DE
OcrAvIo BUNGE 110, 118, 136-37, 141-43 (1995).
331. See ALFREDO DIAZ DE MoLINA, LA OLIGARQUIA ARGENTINA: SU FILIACION Y
RtGIMEN (1840-1898) 159-63 (1972).
332. 1 CUTOLO, supra note 53, at 363. Perhaps even more than a Mitre ally, during his
years in the Senate, Abel Bazan was the Buenos Aires representative of a group of power-
ful La Rioja families. FELIX LUNA, DE COMICIOS v ENTREVERoS 72 (1976). For a time in
1874, he supported Adolfo Alsina instead of Mitre. Id. at 97, 126. In addition, his political
base in La Rioja split that same year due to political infighting. Id. at 199. He does not
appear to have ever supported Roca, however.
333. Luis Varela began his professional career writing in his brother Mariano Varela's
newspaper, La Tribuna, 6 CurOLO, supra note 53, at 502-03, and clerking in Dalmaclo
V6lez Sdrsfield's law office and working under Vdlez Sdrsfield when he was President
Sarmiento's Minister of the Interior. Id. at 503; 2 CHANETON, supra note 23, at 375. La
Tribuna, published from 1853 to 1884, was noted for its support for Adolfo Alsina and
Buenos Aires interests.
334. Carla del Dr. Luis V. Varela, LA PRENSA, Apr. 11, 1892, at 4 (letter to the newspa-
per by Luis Varela denying rumors published in the newspaper Sud-America that he was
the author of the Minister of Defense's reply to Judge Tedfn).
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wedded to U.S. legal sources than the majority. Early in his opinion,
Varela, unlike the majority, offers a statement that one often en-
counters in the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s, that "our government is
adopted from another already existent in the world at the time of our
organization, and [the drafters] on constituting [the Argentine govern-
ment], invoked the case law of this country whose institutions we have
in large part copied. ' 33- He then bases his dissent on the argument
that the majority misinterpreted U.S. doctrine. - 6 While Varela may
have deceived himself into thinking that he could make a reasonable
argument under U.S. law, he must have realized that with Georgia v.
Stanton as support the majority's position under U.S. law was much
stronger. The U.S. model, however, was the basic currency of consti-
tutional debate, so Varela did the best that he could with the U.S.
precedents available. Tricky footwork like Varela's would have per-
mitted the Court to escape the confines of the U.S. model while still
invoking its talismanic authority, but the majority of the Court was
unprepared to be liberated. One can dispute the sincerity of the
Court when it invokes the U.S. model. None of the members of the
Court were Radicals and it is likely that the majority's political prefer-
ences and U.S. case law pointed in the same direction. However,
given the influence of the U.S. model in Argentine constitutional de-
bate generally,337 the centrality of U.S. cases to the majority's opinion,
and important earlier decisions that can only be explained by the fact
that the Court wished to follow U.S. practice, the likelihood is that the
U.S. case law was determinative. If there had been a U.S. Supreme
Court precedent holding that the judiciary could decide who has the
right to govern a State, then the Argentine Court would have had a
hard time avoiding deciding Cullen c/Llerena on the merits. If the
335. "Cullen," 53 Fallos at 441. The strongest version of this statement by the Supreme
Court appears in "de la Torre," 19 Fallos 213, 236 (1877). See also CoxP.ESO NACIONAL,
C.AMRA DE SENADORES, DIAMo DE SESIONES DE 1867, Session of Aug. 13, 1867, at 305
(statement of Madariaga); CONGRESO NACIONAL, CA.RA DE DiPutrAos, DzARxO DE
SESIONES DE 1867, Session of Aug. 26, 1867, at 225-32; id. Session of Sept. 13, 167, at 321-
22; id Session of Sept. 20, 1867, at 353-55; id. Session of Sept. 23, 1867, at 361; CoNGnEso
NACIONAL, CAZ.ARA DE SENADORES, DtAmo DE SEsio S DE 186S, Session of July 18,
1868, app. at 109-11.
336. "Cullen," 53 Fallos at 441.
337. The manner in which U.S. law guided, and sometimes irrationally bound the Ar-
gentine Supreme Court with rules that made little sense outside the U.S. is analyzed in
Miller, supra note 21. The best example of this is "Sojo," 32 Fallos 120 (1S7). In that case
the Argentine Court follows the U.S. rule established in Marbur., 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173-
75, that Congress may not expand the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court beyond
the areas explicitly provided in the Constitution. "Sojo," 32 Fallos at 128-36.
1997]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
U.S. Constitution would have contained an article similar to Article 71
of the Argentine Constitution and that article had been interpreted by
the U.S. courts to bar reconsideration of a rejected federal interven-
tion, that interpretation would have been very difficult to ignore on
the merits.
Decided differently, Cullen ciLlerena could have transformed Ar-
gentine politics. An identical case from the Province of San Luis338
was decided by the Court in identical fashion a few weeks later, and
had Cullen cdLlerena resulted in a victory for the Radicals they proba-
bly would also have brought an identical action against the intervenor
in the Province of Buenos Aires. Buenos Aires was by far Argentina's
politically most important province, and Santa F6, with a vibrant and
growing economy of agricultural exports, was likely the second most
important. Radical control over these provinces, combined with the
strength of the Radicals in the City of Buenos Aires and among some
Army officers, might well have ushered in political reform nationwide.
At best, it would have led to a change in Argentina's political rules to
finally include free elections, and perhaps would have included limita-
tions on federal interventions. At the least, a decision in favor of the
Radicals would have meant a thorough recasting of the political dice
and given a boost to President Sienz Pefia's electoral platform.
Instead, having failed in their provincial revolts, the Radicals
launched a revolt to overthrow the federal government. First a small
revolt began in the Province of Tacumdn, on September 7, 1893, in
response to a fraudulent local election;339 then, on September 24, two
weeks after the Cullen decision, a more significant revolt began in the
Province of Santa F6, and Leandro Alem appeared in the river port of
Rosario to declare himself President of the Republic.340 The revolts
were poorly organized, however, with only limited army support, and
by October 2 the government had regained complete control.341
Alem and his confederates were detained once again, but this time,
unlike 1892, the government filed charges of rebellion and the cases
rapidly made their way to the Supreme Court. The government tried
to present a tough response to the rebellion. After del Valle and his
338. "Gobernador provisorio de la provincia de San Luis," 54 Fallos 180 (1893).
339. La Revoluci6n de Tucumdn, LA PRENSA, Sept. 8, 1893, at 5; see also Obligak6n de
intervenir, LA PRENSA, Sept. 7, 1893, at 3 (complaining of the exceptionally blatant electo-
ral fraud in Tucumin and the need for a federal intervention to stop it).
340. See Allende, supra note 149, at 414; 2 SOMMARIVA, supra note 10, at 228-30; see
generally ETcHEPAREBORDA, supra note 138, at 211-36 (giving a detailed account of the
Tbcumgn and Santa Fd rebellions).
341. See Allende, supra note 149, at 414; 2 SOMmARrvA, supra note 10, at 228-30.
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allies were forced to resign from their ministries on August 12, Carlos
Pellegrini had recommended the appointment of Manuel Quintana as
Minister of the Interior, with the charge of restoring order, and Presi-
dent Sdenz Pefia had accepted the suggestion.- 2 On August 17, to aid
in the federal interventions in Buenos Aires, Santa F6, and San Luis,
Quintana obtained congressional approval of a state of siege that
would not end until early in 1894.3as Quintana was politically commit-
ted to presenting a firm response to the Radical revolts. The only
significant opposition came from the judiciary.
2. The Judiciary and the September Revolts-Alem (Round 2)
During November and December 1893 the Supreme Court was
the only institution in a position to question the Executive's use of an
extended state of siege to stop the Radicals. It is no coincidence that
the newspaper La Prensa, increasingly critical of the government,
published a long editorial on November 30 praising the doctrine of
separation of powers that allows the judiciary to correct injustice and
reminding its readers of the important institutional role played by the
U.S. Supreme Court.'" This time the Supreme Court played its role
well, from the point of view of institutional stability and limiting state
repression, but it was comparatively easy for it to do so compared with
Cullen cILlerena, since the relevant constitutional rules were already
established and it was not required to act inconsistently with its U.S.
model.
Particularly during November and the first week in December,
the Press appears to have been focused on the case of Coronel Espina,
a case that gave the Radicals some of their most important publicity
during the state of siege s45 Colonel Espina, a key rebel military fig-
342. 2 SomMiAR-vA, supra note 10, at 221-22.
343. Id.
344. Solemnidad judicial, LA PRENSA, Nov. 30, 1893, at 4.
345. La Naci6n offered the most detailed coverage of the legal proceedings, %hich is
particularly striking given its general hostility toward the Radicals. Causa del coronet Es-
pina, LA NACO6N, Nov. 1, 1893, at 1 (giving the full text of the Procurador General's first
brief, which argued that Espina vaited too long to question military jurisdiction);
Tribunales, LA NAC16N, Nov. 8, 1S93, at 3 (short note indicating scheduling of oral argu-
ment); Tribunales, LA NACiON, Nov. 15. 1S93, at 3 (short note indicating scheduling of oral
argument); Tribunales, LA NAC16N, Nov. 22, 1893, at 3 (short note indicating selection of
Josd Marfa Gutierrez to act as a substitute judge in the case in place of Luis Varela); Causa
del Coronet Espina, LA NACION, Nov. 29, 1S93, at 1; Causa del coronet Espina, LA NA.
C6N, Nov. 30, 1893, at 1; Causa del coronet Espina, Lx NACtON, Dec. 2, 1893, at 1; Causa
del coronel Espina, LA NAcION, Dec. 3, 1893, at 2 (all four articles giving text of Arist6bulo
del Valle's oral presentation to the Supreme Court); Causa del coronet Espina, LA NA.
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ure in the failed Uni6n Cfvica revolt of 1890, had sought to sway the
Argentine Navy to join the Radicals as soon as he received word of
the Santa F6 revolt.346 He quickly won over the crews of two torpedo
boats, and used these boats to approach the fleet.347 However the
boat he was traveling in, the Murature, was sunk by the cruiser 9th of
July as it approached the fleet and before he could do any talking.3
48
The Executive quickly ordered Espina court-martialed. A one day
trial took place on the day after his capture, with Espina as the only
witness.3 49 He was found guilty of rebellion in violation of military
law and sentenced to death, and the President immediately confirmed
the verdict and sentence.
3 5 0
Espina's sentence was commuted to twenty years' imprisonment
at hard labor after appeals from much of the Argentine elite, includ-
ing former presidents Roca and Mitre,351 but the case then received
even more attention with a debate over whether the military had pos-
sessed jurisdiction to try Espina in the first place. Espina's attorney
was none other than Arist6bulo del Valle, and during a recess in the
one day military trial he quickly filed a complaint before the federal
court in the Federal Capital insisting that the federal court was the
only court with jurisdiction over rebellion. 52 The federal judge
agreed with del Valle,353 and when the military court continued to in-
sist on its own jurisdiction, the federal judge sent the case to the
Supreme Court for a ruling on which court system had jurisdiction to
c1ON, Dec. 8, 1893, at 1 (giving the text of the Supreme Court's decis on that Espina's
motion to block military jurisdiction was timely filed); Causa del coronet Espina, LA NA.
c1ON, Dec. 22, 1893, at 1 (second brief of the Procurador General); Importantes docu-
mentos, Causa del coronel Espina, LA NA6ON, Dec. 31, 1893, at 1. Supr,.me Court's final
decision in favor of military jurisdiction). Most of these briefs and judicial decisions were
presented by La Naci6n with minimal comment, almost certainly because of the restric-
tions of the state of siege. Cf. La corte suprema, LA NACION, Dec. 17, 1893, at 1 (noting
that the Alem decision has received impressive public attention but it is not able to com-
ment on the decision because of the restrictions of the state of siege).
346. See "Coronel Espina," 54 Fallos 334, 335-36, 339 (1893) (report from the fleet and
Espina's testimony to the military court).
347. Id. (Espina argued that the crews had already joined the revolution).
348. Id.
349. See id. at 338-41 (proceedings of the military court); id. at 348 (Espina's petition to
the federal court).
350. Id. at 341-42 (sentence of the military court); id. at 345 (Resolution of the Execu-
tive confirming the sentence).
351. Coronel Mariano Espina-Orden general del Estado Mayor (and article that fol-
lows), LA PRENSA, Sept. 30, 1893, at 5.
352. "Coronel Espina," 54 Fallos at 347-49.
353. Icd at 352-56.
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hear the case. 3  Del Valle, known as one of Argentina's finest ora-
tors, then took advantage of the Supreme Court's custom of permit-
ting oral argument to present a superb defense over the course of two
days, questioning the legal arguments supporting jurisdiction and em-
phasizing the political nature of Espina's crime.3 ' The odds were
against him, given that the Court had traditionally interpreted military
jurisdiction in the case of military personnel quite broadly.- 6 In early
December the Court published a unanimous decision rejecting an ini-
tial argument by the Procurador General that Espina had waived his
jurisdictional defense because he had defended his case in the military
court.3 When the Court issued its final ruling several weeks later,
however, it ruled 3-2 in favor of military jurisdiction 5ss The Supreme
Court's final decision required analysis of very confusing pre-indepen-
dence Spanish ordinances on military jurisdiction and a Province of
Buenos Aires law from 1823 whose validity even the three judges
forming the majority could not agree upon.-5 9 But in any case, by that
354. Id at 357-59. Law No. 48 art. 17, Sept. 14, 1863, [1S52-ISS0] A.D.L.A. 364, 365,
gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction over disputes concerning the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts, disputes that usually required the Supreme Court to determine whether a case
should be heard by federal or provincial courts, but which in this case was applied to a
dispute between the federal court and a military court.
355. La Naci6n printed the full text of del Valle's oral argument in four successive is-
sues. Causa del coronel Espina, LA NAC16N, Nov. 29, 1893, at 1; Causa del coronel Espina,
LA NACl6N, Nov. 30, 1893, at 1; Causa del coronel Espina, LX NACI6N, Dec. 2, 1893, at 1;
Causa del coronel Espina, LA NACa6N, Dec. 3, 1S93, at 2. The argument may also be found
in full in Los consejos de guerra y los delitospolicos, 7 RvisTA DE DEnRCHO PENAL 191
(1951).
356. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24
357. "Coronel Espina," 54 Fallos at 363-70. The Procurador General had argued that
Espina had waived his jurisdictional defense by defending himself before the military
court, had failed to present the jurisdictional defense in a timely fashion, and that the case
was already res judicata. Id at 360-62.
358. Id at 584-633. The decision is dated December 30, 1S93.
359. At risk of oversimplification, Judges Abel Bazan and Juan Torrent argue that re-
bellion is a crime enumerated in the old Spanish Military Ordinances, which remain in
effect in Argentina, and that this is enough for military jurisdiction given that the crime is
of a type that is of importance to military discipline. Id at 587-97. Judge Octavio Bunge,
by contrast, emphasizes the 1823 Law of the Province of Buenos Aires establishing military
jurisdiction not on the basis of the offense committed but because of where it %as commit-
ted, finding that military jurisdiction always exists in the case of crimes committed in the
barracks, on the march, on campaign, or during an act of service, even if the law to be
applied is civilian. Id at 603-07. Benjamfn Paz and Jos6 Marfa Gutierrez in dissent argue
that rebellion was not codified in the Spanish legislation, id. at 619-26, and that the 1.23
Buenos Aires law is inapplicable since while Buenos Aires represented the entire nation in
foreign affairs at that time, it did not constitute a national government, id. at 615, and even
if the law were in effect nationally, it must not be read to create an unconstitutional privi-
leged jurisdiction based on belonging to a special class of persons. Id. at 617-19.
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time public attention was likely focused on a much more striking deci-
sion ordering the release of Leandro Alem. The Radicals benefited
from the Espina case through the enormous publicity it generated,
and the decision against them, coming immediately after the Alem de-
cision in their favor, was less important than the publicity received
from del Valle's oral argument.
Leandro Alem's case actually begins with two cases involving his
followers just after the Radical revolts of September '1893, in which
the Court applied already established precedents in favor of the Radi-
cals. 60 In November 1863, the Supreme Court held in favor of re-
quests for release on bail by groups of Radical leaders of the Tucumn
and Santa F6 rebellions, in one case, reversing a decision of the
Tucumdn federal court denying bail,361 and in a second, affirming a
decision by the federal court in Santa F6 that granted bail .3 2 As
noted earlier, the Supreme Court's case law dating back to the rebel-
lions of 1866 and 1867 granted bail to the leaders of rebellions.3 63
Under the old rules from colonial practice, bail was attomatic when
the crime would not result in a jail sentence, and a rebellion was only
punishable with a maximum penalty of ten years' exile and a fine.
Further, even if exile was considered the equivalent of jail, it would
make little sense to flee justice to avoid exile.364 Recent legislative
changes only strengthened the rebels' argument. Under the 1888
Code of Criminal Procedure, persons prosecuted for a crime whose
maximum penalty did not exceed two years in prison automatically
received release on bail during the proceedings.3 65 Since the Code of
Criminal Procedure was designed to increase the possibilities of ob-
taining bail,366 even the Procurador General, representing the govern-
ment, did not argue that bail was unavailable for the crime of
360. "Alurralde," 54 Fallos at 264; "Lamarque," 54 Fallos at 292. These two decisions
will be treated as though they were a single decision in the references that follow, given
that they present identical issues and the decisions were handed down only 11 days apart,
on November 14 and 25 respectively.
361. "Alurralde," 54 Fallos at 274.
362. "Lamarque," 54 Fallos at 298, 305.
363. Supra note 105 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 130-36 and accompa-
nying text.
364. "Alurralde," 54 Fallos at 272; "Lamarque," 54 Fallos at 295-97 (first instance), 301-
04.
365. C6digo de Procedimientos en lo Criminal art. 376, Oct. 17, 1888, [1881-1888]
A.D.L.A. 441.
366. "Lamarque," 54 Fallos at 297 (first instance).
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rebellion." 7 Rather, the Procurador General argued that bail should
be denied because the defendants were also accused of seduction of
troops to participate in the rebellion.3- s Article 27 of Law 49, the first
federal criminal statute, provided that "[a]nyone who tries to seduce
troops to commit the crime of rebellion will suffer the penalty of
[prison at] hard labor for the period of two to four years."2
- 9
The Court, however, did not accept the argument. The Court fo-
cused on the text of Law 49 and held that the statute surprisingly low-
ers the penalty for seduction of troops if the rebellion actually takes
place.370  Article 28 of Law 49 provided that "[i]f the rebel-
lion.., comes about, the seducers will be regarded as promoters [of a
rebellion] and fall under the corresponding articles," 371 which penalize
the leaders of a rebellion with e.dle and a fine.3r- The Supreme Court
therefore held that the maximum penalty applicable to leaders of a
rebellion who successfully seduce troops to participate was ten years
exile and a fine.373 While the Procurador General argued that this
approach was incongruous, since it penalizes the unsuccessful attempt
to start a rebellion more severely than successful incitement,37 4 the
Supreme Court responded that Congress had reasons of "high poli-
tics" for adopting this approach.37s Although the Court never identi-
fies these reasons of "high politics," a possible explanation is that
Congress wanted the persons who actually led rebellions out of the
country, and not in prison within the country where their presence
might provoke further outbreaks.
In rejecting the Procurador General's approach, the Court also
argued that it owed respect to its own precedents. 76 Aside from the
many cases where the Court required the release of participants in
rebellions on bail, the Court had specifically held in at least one 1860s
case that the penalty for seduction of troops who participate in a re-
bellion was the penalty for rebellion,377 and had held that there is a
367. See "Alurralde," 54 Fallos at 267-70 (opinion of Procurador General). In -Lamar-
que," 54 Fallos at 298-99, the Procurador General simply conceded that bail was required
under the Court's precedent in "Alurralde."
368. "Alurralde," 54 Fallos at 269.
369. Law No. 49 art. 27, Sept. 14, 1863, [1852-1SS0] A.D.L.A. 385, 3S7.
370. "Lamarque," 54 Fallos at 302-03.
371. Law No. 49 art. 28, Sept. 14, 1863, [1852-'SSO] A.D.L.A. 3S5, 3S7.
372. I& arts. 15-17, A.D.L.A. at 3S6.
373. "Alurralde," 54 Fallos at 271-72; "Lanarque," 54 Fallos at 302.
374. "Alurralde," 54 Fallos at 269.
375. "Lamarque," 54 Fallos at 302-03.
376. "Alurralde," 54 Fallos at 272, 273-74; "Lamarque," 54 Fallos at 301-02, 303-04.
377. "Lamarque," 54 Fallos at 301-02 (citing "Hoyos," 7 Fallos at 149).
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constitutional right to bail when the penalty will not result in a jail
sentence.3 78 Moreover, the judges who decided the Court's early
cases on rebellion were the persons who drafted the criminal statute.
Law 49 was submitted to Congress by the members of the first
Supreme Court together with Law 48, the statute on the jurisdiction of
the federal courts.
379
These cases from Tucumdn and Santa F6 were covered exten-
sively in the Press. 3 0 La Naci6n, whose editorials supported the gov-
ernment's crackdown on the Radicals,38 1 nevertheless published not
only the Court's decision, but the text of one of the precedents it re-
lied upon.3 2 Moreover, contrary to its practice of commenting vocif-
378. "Alurralde," 54 Fallos at 273; "Lamarque," 54 Fallos at 303; both citing "Ministerio
Fiscal," 54 Fallos 368, 371 (1869), and "Aguirre," 16 Fallos 88, 89-90 (1875).
379. "Alurralde," 54 Fallos at 272-73; "Lamarque," 54 Fallos at 304. Only one member
of the Court wrote in dissent. Octavio Bunge emphasized the seriousness of the offense of
rebellion given its effects and the contradiction of treating the leaders of a rebellion more
leniently than the mere seducer of troops. He argued that he offered a more coherent
interpretation of the statute that unlike the majority's approach took its spirit into account.
"Alurralde," 54 Fallos at 275-76; "Lamarque," 54 Fallos at 306. He distinguished the
Supreme Court's prior rebellion cases on the very weak grounds that they were decided
prior to the 1888 Code of Criminal Procedure. "Alurralde," 54 Fallos at 276; "Lamarque,"
54 Fallos at 306. It may not be a coincidence that Bunge also had the least political experi-
ence of the five members of the Court, having neither served in Congress nor the Cabinet
like Judges Bazan, Paz, and Torrent, nor come from a family known for its political activity
like Luis Varela. He also makes no reference to what the Court calls Congressional con-
cerns of "high politics."
380. Jurisprudencia Federal, LA PRENSA, Nov. 1, 1893, at 5 (text of federal judge's deci-
sion granting bail in "Alurralde"); Tribunales, LA PRENSA, Nov. 5, 1893, at 5 (text of the
Procurador General's brief in "Alurralde"); Presos politicos de Tucu'ndn, LA PRENSA,
Nov. 15, 1893, at 4-5 (text of Supreme Court's decision in "Alurraldt"); Jurisprudencia
Federal, LA PRENSA, Nov. 15, 1893, at 5 (text of the Supreme Court's d acision in "Lamar-
que"); Presos politicos, LA NACI6N, Nov. 1, 1893, at 1 (text of the federal judge decision
granting bail in "Alurralde"); Presos polticos del Rosario, LA NACOrN, Nov. 5, 1893, at 1
(giving the text of the Chief of Police of Rosario's charges against the Radicals);
Tribunales, LA NAC16N, Nov. 10, 1893, at 3 (describing the previous day's oral argument in
the case of bail for the Tucumtn rebels); Junta revolucionaria de Tucumdn, LA NACI6N,
Nov. 15, 1893, at 1 (publishing the full text of the Supreme Court's decision in "Alur-
ralde"); Excarcelaci6n bajo fianza, LA NAC16N, Nov. 20, 1893, at 1 (noting that the case of
release on bail of the Radicals has been described as a conflict between the Judiciary and
the Executive, and publishing the text of the Supreme Court's precedent in "Nieva," 8
Fallos at 142).
381. See La soluci6n del orden, LA NAC06N, Oct. 7, 1893, at 1 (arguing that the Radicals
lacked the popular support enjoyed by the Revolution of 1890 and the country needed
change through proper enforcement of the law and maintenance of order); La Paz y el
estado de sitio, LA NAC16N, Oct. 18, 1893, at 1 (affirming the need to maintain order but
noting that the Radicals have been thoroughly defeated and discredited, hinting that the
time has come to loosen up on the restrictions of the state of siege).
382. See supra note 380 and accompanying text.
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erously on anything related to the Radicals, La Naci6n published the
Supreme Court's decision without comment,3- 3 and later indicated
that it did not wish to take sides in what was being described as a
confrontation between the Court and the Executive.2 The Executive
responded to the Court's decisions by informing the arrested individu-
als of their release on bail and then immediately detaining them once
again under its special powers during a state of siege."- This was irre-
proachable in constitutional terms, but politically less favorable to the
Executive than detention of the Radicals as criminals awaiting trial.
The most important effect of the decisions, however, was that they led
Leandro Alem, then under arrest in the City of Rosario, to trust the
courts enough to bring a similar petition for his own release on bail.-
Alem, unlike the Radicals granted bail earlier, could also assert argu-
ments of parliamentary immunity as Senator-elect from the Federal
Capital.
The Alem case consists of two parts: first, decisions on the issue of
whether Alem qualified for release on bail, and second, decisions on
the issue of whether once released Alem could invoke his Congres-
sional immunities to avoid detention under the Executive's powers
during a state of siege. The Sienz Pefia administration, while not ac-
cusing Alem of having planned assassinations as Pellegrini's govern-
ment did the year before, still did its best to demonize him and
emphasize the destruction caused by the Radical revolt.-S7 The fed-
eral prosecutor in Rosario responded to Alem's bail request by argu-
ing that the charges against Alem included much more than simple
rebellion. Alem's rebellion had led to battles in which innocent civil-
383. Junta revolucionaria de Tucumn, LA NACX16, Nov. 15, 1893, at I (publishing the
full text of the Supreme Court's decision in "Alurralde").
384. Excarcelaci6n bajo fianza, LA NAci6N, Nov. 20, 1S93, at 1.
385. Nueva prisi6n de los presos politicos en libertad, LA PRENsA, Nov. 18, 1893, at 4;
Excarcelaci6n de los presos de Tucumwdn, LA PRENSA, Nov. 19, 1S93, at 4; Excarcelacun
bajo filanza, supra note 384, at 1 (all three articles referring to the "release" and arrest of
the Tucumdn rebels). The last of the Tucumdn rebels was not released until February 7,
1894. Los presos de Tucumdn, LA PRENSA, Feb. S. 1894. at 5. The last of the Santa F6
rebels were released on March 7, 1894. Presos politicos cn libertad. LA PEXNSA, Mar. 8,
1894, at 4.
386. "Alem," 54 Fallos 432, 432-33 (1S93) (text of Alem and Candioti's Petition for
Release on Bail, and noting that they decided to present the petition in light of the
Supreme Court's decision to grant bail to the Thcumdin rebels).
387. See Manifiesto de Su Excelencia el sefor Presidente de la Repziblica alpueblo de Ia
Naci6n, Oct. 4, 1893, 1 B.O. 65, 66, Oct. 6, 1893 (written address by President Luis Slenz
Pefia to the Nation upon suppression of the Radical revolt, emphasizing the destruction to
government and private property caused by the rebellion, the civilian lives threatened, and
the harm to the economy).
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ians were threatened, guns were stolen from a naval ship and distrib-
uted to his followers, railroad lines and bridges were destroyed, and
the telegraph and mail offices were broken into and correspondence
seized.3 8 While the penalty for rebellion might well only be a fine
and exile, according to the prosecutor these additional acts could re-
sult in jail sentences, making this case different from the case of the
Tucumdn rebels just granted bail.38 9
The Federal Judge in Rosario rejected the government's argu-
ments, finding that most of the acts described were acts that one
would normally expect to occur in furtherance of a rebellion. The
judge held that the law, by penalizing rebellion, treated all acts nor-
mally constituting rebellion as falling within the charge of rebellion.390
Acts that normally occur during a rebellion cannot be charged sepa-
rately.391 Just as rebels who fight in a battle that results in deaths have
not committed homicide, the rebels cannot be charged for other acts
that while normally crimes are also normal to combat.3 52 Further, the
few acts that arguably did not fall within the charge of rebellion, such
as interfering with the mail, were relatively minor, and in the case of
the mail, all the correspondence was subsequently recovered intact.
393
Since all charges were either comparatively minor or araounted to re-
bellion, bail was appropriate.
The Executive responded to the granting of bail as it had in the
case of the other Radical revolutionaries, by allowing Alem released
as far as the door of the prison and then re-arresting him under its
state of siege authority.394 Alem then brought a motion accusing the
Executive of mocking the District Court's order,395 and for the first
time, raised the issue of his immunities as a National Senator." '
Alem's congressional immunities had not been an issue so long as his
detention was based on his arrest in flagranti in the act of rebellion,
since the Constitution permitted the arrest of members of Congress
when caught in the act of committing a crime.397
388. "Alem," 54 Fallos at 435 (prosecutor's response to bail petition).
389. Id
390. See "Alem," 54 Fallos at 438 (district court's decision on bail).
391. See id.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 439-40.
394. Id at 442 (Alem's motion protesting the Executive's failure to release him).
395. Id at 441-42.
396. Id at 442-43.
397. CONsr. ARG. art. 61 (1860) reads:
No Senator or Deputy, from the day of his election to the end of his functions,
can be arrested, except in the event that he is surprised in flagrante in the execu-
[Vol. 20:231
Courts and the Creation of a "Spirit of Moderation"
However with bail granted, the general rule of constitutional im-
munity from arrest "from the day of his election to the end of his
functions,"'39S once again became relevant. Now that Alem was de-
tained solely under the Executive's authority during a state of siege,
the case presented exactly the same issues litigated the previous year
before Judge Tedfn.
To Alem's advantage, however, the federal judge in Rosario de-
cided the state of siege issue against him.3 99 This decision actually
helped Alem, because it allowed him to appeal the district court's rul-
ing to the Supreme Court rather than risk a repetition of the events of
the year before when Judge Tedfn decided in his favor but the Presi-
dent refused to enforce the judge's order.400 A decision against him
offered Alem something to appeal, and obviously a decision from the
Supreme Court packed much more political authority than a decision
by the District Court. The basis of the district court's decision against
Alem is somewhat confusing. The district court first went to great
lengths to establish the President's wide-ranging authority to detain an
individual during a state of siege and offered frequent reference to
U.S. practice on suspension of habeas corpus. 4 1 However, on the
specific issue of Alem's senatorial immunities, the judge found that
these were lifted by a note sent by the Senate to the Executive. ' 2
The District Court judge does not transcribe the Senate's note,
but the Supreme Court does,40 3 and the ambiguity of the note is a
good reflection of the general confusion of Argentine politics in 1893.
The note is dated September 26, 1893, during the middle of the Radi-
cal uprising, and the Senate sent it in response to a message from the
Executive that began by stating that Leandro Alem had placed him-
self at the head of a revolt against the government, and then asked the
tion of some crime that merits a sentence of death, infamy, or other serious pn-
alty, with the respective House receiving notice, along with information giving the
facts of the occurrence.
398. CoNsr. ARG. art. 61 (1860). Id. The same provision appears in the present Argen-
tine Constitution art. 69.
399. "Alem," 54 Fallos at 449 (district court's decision on detention under state of
siege).
400. See infra Part VI.C.
401. "Alem," 54 Fallos at 446-48 (district court's decision on detention under state of
siege, citing NICOLAS ANTONIO CALVO, DECISIONES CONSTITUCIONALES DE LOS
TRIBUNALES FEDERALES DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS 9728-29,2521-22 (186), a book that is
essentially a translation of ORLANDO Bump, NOTES OF CONsTITUONAL DECISIONS
(1878)). The district court does not seem to have used U.S. cases in the original.
402. Id. at 449.
403. Id. at 462-63.
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Senate to address the question: "Should the immunities that the Con-
stitution provides to the Senators and Deputies serve, not only to pro-
tect them in the exercise of their functions, but to shield them from
the powers stemming from a constitutionally declared state of
siege?" 4"
The Executive's message then added that it had no doubt that the
Senate would provide an answer "in favor of the public peace" and
"in the sense of allowing unimpeded and expeditious action by the
Executive. 40 5 The Senate, after meeting in secret session, replied:
"The Senate of the Nation, in view of the message of Your Excellency
dated today, has resolved to indicate to you that in the present case
you may make use of your constitutional powers with respect to the
senator elect Doctor Leandro Alem.
' 40 6
It would appear that the Senate did not wish to provide a straight
answer and that the District Court's finding that Alem's immunities
were removed was not unavoidably dictated by the Senate's state-
ment. The Senate response neither explicitly lifts Alem's immunities
nor recognizes that the President enjoyed the discretionary authority
to detain a Senator during a state of siege.
The Supreme Court handed down a unanimous decision in favor
of Alem's release. Its decision is broadly similar to that of Judge
Tedin the year before, but with superior craftsmanship, demonstrating
both hermeneutics typical of civil code study and sophislicated invoca-
404. CONGRESO NACIONAL, CAMARA DE SENADORES, DIARIO DE SESIONES DE 1893,
Session of Sept. 26, 1893, at 461.
405. Id. The full note reads:
Buenos Aires, September 26, 1893
To the honorable Senate of the Nation.
The gentleman Senator elect Leandro N. Alem is the ostensive head of a
political party that proclaims revolution as its method, that resorts to violence
against the authorities, that seduces the front line troops of the National service
and that tries to violently disturb the entire Republic.
Should the immunities that the Constitution provides to the Senators and
Deputies serve, not only to protect them in the exercise of their functions, but to
shield them from the powers stemming from a constitutionally declared state of
siege?
To the honorable Senate belongs the reply, and the Executive Branch be-
lieves it would offend its well known preference in favor of the public peace if it
showed fear that this reply might not be in the sense of allowing unimpeded and
expeditious action by the Executive.




406. "Alem," 54 Fallos at 462-63.
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tion of the U.S. model. The Court begins with its hermeneutic argu-
ment, looking at the principles behind Articles 23, 61, and 62
respectively, and seeking to interpret them consistently with each
other. First, the Court notes, state of siege is an extraordinary tool
that exists for the protection of the Constitution and constitutional
authorities.4°7 Second, all public authorities are merely agents exer-
cising powers delegated by the people, with even a state of siege only
able to operate in accordance with the Constitution.4 s3 Third, the
Constitution goes to exceptional lengths to establish congressional im-
munities.4"9 Normally only Congress itself judges its own members,
removing a member's immunities with a two-thirds vote. Arrest with-
out such authorization is only allowed when a member is surprised in
flagranti in the commission of a crime, and that exception is made to
allow the judiciary, not the Executive, to try a member. Even during a
state of siege the Executive is not allowed to try an individual on its
own, merely detain him410 Fourth, the suspension of guarantees dur-
ing a state of siege affects only persons and their property, not the
authorities created by the Constitution.4 1 Fifth, if the Executive were
to have the power to arrest members of Congress during a state of
siege then it could conceivably use this power to influence Congres-
sional votes.412 Congressional immunities therefore obviously must
prevail.
Ironically, but not surprisingly, this very capable bit of civil law
style reasoning is immediately followed by a lengthy quotation from
an earlier case arguing that Argentine courts must follow U.S. prac-
tice, stating:
The system of government which governs us is not of our own crea-
tion. We found it in action, tested by long years of experience, and
we have appropriated it. And it has been correctly stated that one
of the great advantages of this adoption has been to find a vast body
of doctrine, practice and case law which illustrate and complete its
fundamental principles, and which we can and should use in every-
thing which we have not decided to change with specific constitu-
tional provisions.4
407. Id. at 454-55.
408. ld. at 455-56.
409. See Id. at 457-58.
410. Id. at 457-58.
411. Id. at 458.
412. Id. at 458-59.
413. Id at 459 (quoting "de la Torre," 19 Fallos at 231, 236 (1877)).
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The Argentine Court then noted that the U.S. Constitution of-
fered less protection to legislators than the Argentine Constitution,
since it allows arrests for treason, felonies, and breach of the peace
even when the legislator is not arrested in flagranti, and only protects
members during legislative sessions and travel to and from sessions.414
However, even under the U.S. Constitution members of Congress can
only be arrested as part of an ordinary judicial proceeding, not
through a political decision by the Executive during a state of siege
415
(which while not existing with such a name in the United States has its
functional equivalent in the suspension of habeas corpus due to rebel-
lion or invasion).416 The Argentine Court does not offer any citations
to support this assertion, merely states it as a matter of fact. (In fact,
the U.S. Supreme Court has never heard the issue of the detention of
a member of Congress during a suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus by the President and one can imagine numerous ways in which
a U.S. court might decide the matter in favor of the Executive. A U.S.
court might have held that suspension of habeas corpus suspends the
ability of the courts to hear habeas corpus actions, or it might have
held that the matter was a political question on grounds that a deten-
tion by the Executive when habeas corpus is suspended is a political,
not a judicial act, and that it is up to the House of Congress to demand
its member's release.) Obviously the Argentine Supreme Court felt
that in a case strongly challenging the Executive, and on an issue on
which the Executive had defied Judge Tedfn only the year before, it
needed all the sources of authority it could muster even if a precise
U.S. case was missing.
Had the Court wished an easy way out it might have focused on
the Senate's note to the President. While the note is ambiguous, the
Court could have found that the Senate never protested the detention
and at least tacitly accepted Alem's detention in its response to the
Executive's query. Instead, the Court quoted Luther Cushing, Ameri-
can Parliamentary Law, for the proposition that Congress has the obli-
gation to seek its members' release when they are illegally detained,
perhaps hinting that the Senate had been remiss. 4 17 The note had no
effect on the case. The Court held that since the note only stated that
414. Id. at 459-60 (quoting U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 [the Court's citation is incor-
rectly to art. I, § 1]).
415. let at 460.
416. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
417. Id. at 461 (citing LUTHER STEARNS CUSHING, AMERICAN PARLIAMENTARY LAW
224-38 (edition not identified, first published in 1856)).
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the President could make use of his constitutional powers to detain
Alem, and the decision of the Court was that the President did not
have the constitutional authority to detain a member of Congress, the
President had no constitutional power to invoke.
s
The Supreme Court also issued a simultaneous decision denying
an appeal by the government of the lower court's initial decision
granting Alem release on bail. The Supreme Court's decision here
emphasized two principal points. First, the Court insisted that its case
law had consistently held that acts such as blowing up bridges and
occupying national offices constituted part of the act of rebellion and
could not be separately charged.419 According to the Court, "in the
event of a state of war, these acts constitute permissible elements of
attack and defense under the law of nations."" Second, the Court
distinguished Alem's case from that of Urquiza's alleged murderer,
Ricardo L6pez Jorddn, where the accused allegedly committed crimes
outside the scope of a rebellion.42' L6pez Jorddin was accused of or-
dering ordinary homicides off the field of battle, shooting and knifing
his victims, and of ordering whippings and looting.4 The prosecutor
never accused Alem of such crimes.4
The Alem decision was clearly a tough decision for the Executive
to accept, particularly for Minister of the Interior Manuel Quintana,
given his public commitment to crack down on the Radicals' revolu-
tionary activities. While the decision did not go out of its way to be
politically provocative, it inevitably was.424 First, the decision vindi-
cated Judge Tedin's decision the year before and therefore discredited
President Pellegrini's refusal to enforce Judge Tedin's order. Since
Pellegrini was responsible for Sdenz Pefia's about face and his selec-
tion of Quintana as Minister of the Interior, the decision was a finding
not only that the Executive had violated the Constitution with its pres-
ent detention of Alem, but that Pellegrini, its primary backer, had
flouted the Constitution the year before. Second, the decision recog-
418. Id.
419. Id. at 464-65.
420. Id
421. Id "Ldpez Jordan," 21 Fallos at 121, is analyzed supra text accompanying notes
130-36.
422. "Alem," 54 Fallos at 464-65.
423. See id. at 464.
424. It is difficult to gauge the extent of the public reaction given the restrictions on the
press during the state of siege. La Naci6n noted that the amount of public attention fo-
cused on the case was "impressive" but that it could not comment on the case because of
the state of siege. La corte suprema, LA NAci6N, Dec. 17, 1S93, at 1.
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nized Alem as a rebel and not a criminal. Alem was not to be com-
pared with L6pez Jordin, and his detention by the Executive was a
purely political act. Third, as was the case with Alem's detention the
year before and Colonel Espina's defense, briefs before the courts and
court decisions were one of the few ways the opposition was able to
make itself heard in the Press during a state of siege. While the coun-
try was in the middle of a state of siege in which the Executive often
placed severe restrictions on the Press, apparently the Executive did
not feel it could censor reports on judicial proceedings.42
The Executive did not release Alem. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion was handed down on December 15; however, on December 18
the Supreme Court received a telegram from the federal judge in Ro-
sario indicating that the Executive had refused to comply with his or-
der to release Alem and asking the Supreme Court to take care of
compliance.42 6 The next day, the Supreme Court responded as it had
to such requests in the past, indicating that enforcement of court or-
ders was the responsibility of courts of first instance, not appellate
courts.427 The Supreme Court also went a step further, however. The
Code of Criminal Procedure contained specific enforcement mecha-
nisms for the judiciary when its habeas corpus orders were dis-
425. Early in the state of siege the Minister of the Interior issued an order to the Chief
of Police of the Federal Capital prohibiting:
(1) Giving news of a political nature without the permission of the Ministry of
the Interior.
(2) Giving news of a military nature without the permission of the Ministry of
War.
(3) Discussing official acts without moderation or attributing to them motives or
purposes contrary to the public service.
(4) Offering any opinion on governmental measures related to the state of siege.
Comunicaci6n al sefior Jefe de Policia, estableciendo limitaciones a la prensa de la Capital,
Aug. 26, 1893, 1 B.O. 615, 616, Aug. 29, 1893. Even La Prensa, the country's largest news-
paper, and which was initially very sympathetic to President Sdenz Peila, complained of
restrictions. Perfiles de la situaci6n, LA PRENSA, Sept. 12, 1893, at 3; Sin Estado de Sitio,
LA PRENSA, Feb. 28, 1894, at 4. Incredibly, La Prensa reported almost nothing on the
Radical uprising in Santa F6 until two days after it was put down, an omission that un-
doubtedly was due to government orders. The only information La Prensa was allowed to
slip in on the Radical revolt consisted of short official announcements such as a note on
September 30 that Colonel Mariano Espina had been sentenced to death by a military
tribunal, Coronel Mariano Espina - Orden General del Estado Mayor, LA PRENSA, Sept.
30, 1893, at 5, and the text of the decree placing General Roca in charge of repressing the
Santa F6 rebellion. El general Roca, general en jefe, LA PRENSA, Oct 1, 1893, at 4. La
Prensa often criticized the government during the state of siege, but criticism related to the
state of siege, such as discussion of government repression of the Radicals, was clearly off
limits.
426. "Alem," 54 Fallos at 481, 482 (telegram).
427. Id. at 482-83.
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obeyed-fines and even the arrest of the responsible public officials
until the order is complied with4 -- and the Court criticized the judge
for running to the Supreme Court rather than using these provi-
sions.429 This placed both the Executive and the apparently reluctant
judge in Rosario in a difficult position that the Executive partially re-
solved three days later, on December 23, when the Senate voted to
expel Alem.
430
The events of 1893 left President Sdenz Pefia politically ex-
hausted. Instead of ushering in free elections and rule of law, his
panic at del Valle's provincial revolutions left him hostage to the PAN
as Interior Minister Quintana engaged in a reenactment of Pellegrini's
1892 state of siege. Elections were held in February 1894 which Presi-
dent Sdenz Pefia ensured remained relatively clean in the Federal
Capital and the Province of Buenos Aires, but which his PAN allies
ensured were thoroughly corrupt in the rest of the country: 3 1 When
Leandro Alem was finally placed at liberty on March 7, 1894, La
Prensa made the comparison to Pellegrini explicit. According to La
Prensa, Alem's fellow prisoner Mariano Candioti (the Radical's short-
lived de facto governor of Santa F6) had asked the government to
allow him to leave the country-as was his right under Article 23 of
the Constitution-and his habeas corpus petition complaining of the
government's failure to let him leave was then pending before the
Supreme Court and likely to be decided that week.432 According to
La Prensa, this brinkmanship by the government was just as censura-
ble as the manner in which Pellegrini had shipped many Radicals off
to Montevideo the previous year4 33 La Prensa maintained that Sdienz
Pefia had decided to end the state of siege only because he did not
want to be embarrassed by a Supreme Court decision in favor of
Candioti, and rather than just releasing Candioti or sending him to
Montevideo, he decided he might as well release all remaining prison-
ers together.4 4 La Prensa's interpretation of events may or may not
have been true, the point is that Sienz Pefia's image had been indeli-
bly tarnished by his failure to end electoral fraud and live up to the
428. C6digo de Procedimientos en lo Criminal art. 631, then in effect through Law No.
2372, Oct. 17, 1888, [1881-188] A.D.L.A. 444, 485.
429. "Alem," 54 Fallos at 483.
430. CONGRiESO NACIONAL, CAMARA DE SENADORES, DIARIo DE SESIONES DE 1893,
Session of Dec. 22, 1893, at 902, 905.
431. GuiDo, supra note 138, at 300-03.
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Constitution. The Supreme Court never dealt with the issue of electo-
ral fraud (which is what the Santa F6 revolt and the Cullen case were
really all about even if the issue was not presented to the Court), but
the Court did decide issues more firmly within Argentira's established
constitutional rules. The Court did not allow the judiciary to keep the
Radicals in jail on rebellion charges without bail, and did not allow
Sienz Pefia to avoid the step of seeking Alem's expulsion from the
Senate if he was to be detained. Sdenz Pefia was forced to assume all
the responsibility for the repression himself.
Sdenz Pefia's end is tragic. He was forced from office in January
1894, and his fall was the outcome of his failure to establish his own
political base.435 Having failed in his platform of free elections and
constitutionalism, a program that might have given him a political
base, and having abandoned the Radicals with his turn to Quintana as
Interior Minister in 1893, he became completely dependent on Roca,
Pellegrini, and Mitre to stay in power, since those men did lead impor-
tant political groupings. Bernardo de Yrigoyen, chosen by the Radi-
cals for the Senate in 1894 when it was clear that Alem would not be
accepted by the Senate, severely embarrassed Quintana before the
Senate in September 1894 by carefully expounding on the PAN's
fraud during a three-day interpolation.436 However, once Quintana
subsequently resigned, Sienz Pefia was never able to put together an-
other cabinet. Sdenz Pefia himself then resigned, and with Sgienz
Pefia's resignation the PAN once again dominated the Argentine
political system with a near monopoly that continued until 1916.437
While it is impossible to maintain that Sienz Pefia's confrontations
with the judiciary were what brought him down, it is clear that his
failure to live up to his "rule of law" platform hastened his demise,
and confrontations with the judiciary hardly conferred a rule of law
image.
435. See El afto polftico, LA PRENSA, Jan. 1, 1895, at 9, esp. cols. 4-5 (offering a superb
political analysis of the events of the previous year and noting that by deciding to repress
the Radicals, Sdenz Pefia lost the ability to put his platform into effect); Polftica del Pur-
gatorio, LA PRENSA, Jan. 8, 1895, at 4 (indicating that Sdenz Pefia is completely dependent
on Mitre, Roca and Pellegrini for political support and only gets it grudgingly); Completa-
mente concluida, LA PRENSA, Jan. 19, 1895, at 4 (indicating that Sgenz Pefia was unable to
establish himself as a political force and depended on Roca, Pellegrini and Mitre for polit-
ical support, which leaves Sdenz Pefla with no choice but to resign).
436. Guino, supra note 138, at 302-04.
437. Alem's end was even more tragic than Sdenz Pefila's, with his sticide in July 1895.
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VII. The Fruits of Revolution
The Supreme Court's response to revolutions from the 1860s
through 1893 demonstrates that it was able to act with great indepen-
dence, arbitrating constitutional rules to deal with the instability of the
times. Political question doctrine hobbled the Court, but the rules
that the Court did enforce provided Argentines with dramatic im-
provement over the situation prior to 1853, and would seem to have
helped prevent relapses toward the old savagery. The list of rules ap-
plied is short, but significant:
1) Citizens have no obligation to resist revolutionary authorities;
2) Rebels have a right to bail and to the lenient treatment specified
in the governing legislation;
3) Civilian rebels have the right to trial by civilian courts;
4) Rebels may not be drafted into the armed forces unless as part
of a sentence imposed by a civilian court;
5) Declaration of a state of siege does not prevent the courts from
hearing habeas corpus petitions and granting them when the Presi-
dent has exceeded his constitutional powers, as might occur for ex-
ample if he deports an individual who does not opt for deportation
or refuses to permit a detainee to select deportation;
6) The President may not infringe on parliamentary immunities,
even when the protected party is a revolutionary leader. Revolu-
tionaries continue to participate in the political system.
Further, underlying these rules is a procedural principle that has
utility going beyond the doors of the courthouse:
7) The Courts will keep their doors open to revolutionaries and
give them the opportunity to present their case for the public
record.
The above list does not constitute a definitive list of rules relevant
to revolutions, merely the rules applied in cases that came before the
courts. Any attempt to return to pre-1853 abuses such as confiscating
the property of political opponents or cutting the throats of captured
rebel leaders would undoubtedly also have produced a sharp reaction
from the courts. Since courts alone are not enough to maintain polit-
ical rules-for the rules to work, the society at large must have a gen-
eral sense of the rules and the need to respect them-it is impossible
to assert definitively that in the absence of an independent federal
judiciary government repression and political violence would have es-
calated rather than declined. However, there is also no question that
when Presidents Carlos Pellegrini and Luis Sienz Pefia increased gov-
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ernment repression beyond that allowed under the rules, both the
lower federal courts and the Supreme Court responded. Moreover,
even intransigent figures like Leandro Alem, who thoroughly dis-
trusted the government, showed sufficient trust in the courts to turn to
them for protection, and Alem at least was not disappointed. The
Supreme Court in Alem demonstrated that it would interpret the Con-
stitution rationally, with reference to the structure and aims of the text
as a whole, and would disregard political pressures to do otherwise.
However, the Supreme Court's failure to consider "political ques-
tions" when these involved issues of governmental legitimacy also
shows the limits of the Supreme Court's authority. The Supreme
Court in Cullen cILlerena might have taken Luis Varela's approach of
falsifying U.S. law to create a false base of authority, freeing itself
from the limitations of U.S. law. But such an approach is risky, since
if there is truly an expectation in society that a particular source of
authority will be invoked, the court that acts fraudulently may face
discovery and suffer loss of legitimacy as an arbiter. Luis Varela,
whose many publications show him to have been one of Argentina's
most capable legal scholars,4 38 may also simply have been an unscru-
pulous individual who while talented, did not take his own reasoning
seriously. Varela was forced to resign from the Court in 1899 to avoid
impeachment for what at best were serious financial improprieties and
at worst may have been outright corruption.439 The Supreme Court in
438. Luis Varela was extremely prolific. His major works include an extensive study of
the sources of the Argentine Civil Code, CONCORDANCIAS Y FUNDAMENTOS DEL C6DIGO
CivrL ARGEMNNO, 16 vols. (1873-1875); a comparative study of electoral systems, LA
DEMOCRACIA PRACTICA: ESTUDIO SOBRE TODOS LOS SISTEMAS ELI CrORALES (Paris,
1876); two books in support of the Argentine position in border disputes with Chile, LA
REPOBLICA ARGENTINA Y CHILE: HISTORIA DE LA DEMARCACION DE SUS FRONTERAS, 2
vols. (1899); LA REPOBLiCA ARGENTINA V CHILE ANTE EL ARBITRo (1901); an administra-
tive procedure code that was adopted by the Province of Buenos Aires in 1905, extensive
proposals for the reform of the Buenos Aires provincial constitution, PLAN DE REFORMAS
A LA CONsTITUCION DE BUENOS AIRES, 2 vols. (1907); and an extensive political and insti-
tutional history from the late colonial period through the formation of the Argentine Con-
stitution of 1853-60, HisTroiA CONSTITuCIONAL DE LA REP(BLICA ARGENTINA, 4 vols.
(1810). Additional works are listed in 7 CUTOLO, supra note 53, at 502.
439. The Varela corruption scandal and resignation is an interestiig example of the
interaction between Argentina's traditional oligarchic politics and an increasingly aggres-
sive Press and public opinion. The government had sought to quietly reach a gentleman's
agreement for Varela's resignation, but a public uproar led to Varela's public disgrace. On
May 1, 1899, President Roca (in his second Presidency, 1898-1904), devoted a portion of
his address inaugurating the session of Congress with a strong criticism of the Argentine
judicial system and advising Congress that he would send it reform legislation shortly.
CONGRESO NACIONAL, CAMARA DE SENADORES, DIARIO DE SESIONES DE 1899, Session of
May 1, 1899, at 12 (Roca address). One of the responses to President Roca's criticisms was
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Alem vaguely cited the United States as authority even though it had
an investigation of judicial corruption by the House of Deputies Judiciary Committee,
which focused on Varela. CONGRESO NACIONAL, C ARA DE DIiprADos, DIARIO DE
SESIONES DE 1899, Session of May 17, 1S99, at 40 (statement of Gouchon); see Investigacifn
judicial, LA PRENSA, May 17, 1899, at 5; El Poder Ejecutivo, LA PRENSA, May IS, 1899, at
3; Congreso Nacional, LA PRENSA, May 1S, 1S99, at 3; El asunto del dia, Lx, PnPX-sA, May
18, 1899, at 5. It is likely that Varela was singled out because he had recently approached
the Executive seeking a several months advance on his salary and was involved in numer-
ous litigations with creditors. See CONcsn.so NACiONAL, C.AzLXM DE DiruTADos,
DLkuo DE SsiomNES DE 1S99, Session of May 19, 1899, at 54 (statement of Lobos) (noting
Varela's request for a salary advance and the existence of at least four different judicial
attachments on his property); see also Congreso Nacional, L% PP.ENs.., May 20, 1899, at 3
(describing the debate in the House of Deputies the previous day). There is no reason to
think that Varela had particularly poor relations with the Executive. What is clear is that
as soon as it became known that Varela was being investigated, the Committee received
numerous allegations of corruption and recommended impeachment. CoNGREso NA-
CIONAL, CAMAA DE D'utADos, DLauo DE SESIONES DE 1S99, Session of May 17, 1899,
at 41 (statement of Gouchon) (stating that the Committee of Judicial Investigation had
voted to recommend impeachment. Id., Session of May 19, 1899, at 56 (statement of Lo-
bos) (noting that the Committee had received many spontaneous accusations). The Execu-
tive initially offered Varela a facesaving departure from office. On May 16, 1S99 the
Executive issued a decree commissioning Varela to write a book for the Paris World's Fair
on Argentina's economic potential. Decreto encargando al Dr. Luis V. Varela de la redac-
ci6n de un libro sobre historia, instituciones, geografia, comercio, etc. de la Reptiblica Ar-
gentina, 24 B.O. 884, May 18, 1899. Varela resigned the next day, indicating that he was
resigning so as to have time to write the book, as well as to avoid a public debate on his
private life. El asunto del dia, LA PRENSA, May 18, 1899, at 5 (giving the text of Varela's
resignation). His resignation and the book commission created a furor, however. Law
professors and their students staged public protests against letting Varela off so easily and
rewarding him with further government service, and the Press agreed. El asunto del dia,
LA PRENSA, May 18, 1899, at 5 (law professors in protest refuse to give exams); El asunto
del din, LA PRENSA, May 19, 1899, at 5 (over 1000 law students staged a demonstration); El
Poder Ejecutivo, LA PRENSA, May 18, 1899, at 3 (lengthy editorial criticizing the Executive
for rewarding Varela with a new post and not requiring him to undergo the impeachment
process); La cuesti6n del dia, LA NACION, May 18, 1899, at 4 (arguing that public opinion is
shocked by the Executive's decision to let Varela escape impeachment and repard him
with a book commission, with the Law School particularly up in arms). Notes, BUENOS
An -Is HEAu , May 19, 1899, at 2 (criticizing the Executive). On May 19, the House of
Deputies responded with an extended interpolation of the Minister of Agriculture, as the
Minister responsible for Varela's book commission. CoNGREso NACIONAT. CA.srmA DE
DntrrADos, Dimuo DE sESIONEs DE 1899, Session of May 19, 1899, at 49-61; Congreso
Nacional, LA PRENSA, May 20, 1899, at 3. Later the same day, the Executive announced
that based on the information it had received from the House of Deputies on Varela's
conduct it had decided to derogate the decree commissioning him to write the book.
Decreto derogando el que encargaba al Dr. Luis Varela de la redaccidn de un libro sobre la
Repilblica Argentina, 24 B.O. 899, May 20, 1899; El asunto del dfa, LA. PRENSA, May 20,
1899, at 4. The impeachment proceedings were discontinued, however, on grounds that
they could not continue once Varela had left office. CoNGREso NACOoNAT, CA.APA DE
DipuTADos, Drxuo DE SEsioNES DE 1899, Session of May 19, 1S99, at 63-75, esp. 63-66
(statement of Barraquero); Congreso Nacional, LA PRENSA, May 23, 1899, at 4. The text
of the Judiciary Committee's report recommending impeachment was never made public.
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no U.S. cases to support its position, but in the 1890s it never seriously
distorted United States law like Varela.
In the decades after Cullen c/ Llerena the Supreme Court contin-
ued to hold that questions regarding the legitimacy of the acts of a
provincial government and federal interventions were nonjusticiable
political questions, and explicitly refused to review electoral results.
While this is similar to what the U.S. Supreme Court would have done
using the political question doctrine, it meant that the Court was will-
ing to operate in a system where it ignored questions of constitutional
legitimacy.
The most striking case is Compafiia Azucarera Tucumana d
Provincia de Tucumdn, decided in 1924, in which the plaintiff asked
the Court to invalidate a provincial law raising the tax paid for use of
irrigated water, on grounds that the law had not been passed in a con-
stitutional manner.44 Allegedly the Governor only had ten loyal dep-
uties in the twenty-five member provincial House of Deputies, and in
order to pass the provincial budget, which included the. tax increase,
the Governor called a special session of the Legislature that was at-
tended by his ten loyal deputies and six opposition deputies who were
brought into the legislative chamber by force.441 At the same time,
the Governor used force to bar all the remaining deputies from the
legislative chamber.44 This tactic allowed the Governor to both ob-
tain the quorum necessary for the House to meet, and to retain the
majority necessary to pass the budget. Moreover, two days later the
opposition majority met in the Chamber of Deputies, with the neces-
sary quorum, and declared that the budget law passed was null.443
The Governor treated the budget law as in force, however, and col-
lected the legislated tax increases. 4 " The plaintiff argued that this
conduct violated its right to a representative, republican form of gov-
ernment under the national Constitution.445
The Supreme Court ruled against justiciability, hardly surprising
given its precedent in Cullen cILlerena. The Court held first, that the
type of issues involved in the case-the use of force to manipulate the
legislature and the existence or not of a legislative quorum-were in-
herently political in nature and would improperly involve the Court in
440. "S.A. Compafiia Azucarera Tucumana," 141 Fallos 271, 276-81 (1924).
441. l& at 278-79.
442. ld.
443. Id. at 279-80.
444. Id. at 280.
445. Id. at 280-81, 286 (citing CONSr. ARo. arts. 1 & 5 (1860)).
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partisan politics." 6 Second, the Court argued that a decision against
the Province in this case would undercut the constitutional require-
ment that the provinces be governed by their own institutions." 7
Third, and most important, the Court noted that the plaintiffs were
essentially alleging that the republican form of government had been
violated in the Province, calling for the judiciary to assume the role
ordinarily assumed by Congress and the Executive in declaring a fed-
eral intervention; however, as the Argentine Court had held in Cullen
ciLlerena in accordance with U.S. practice, issues of federal interven-
tion and accordingly of the existence of the republican form of gov-
ernment in a province were for the Congress and the Executive to
decide, not the judiciary.44s
The reasoning of the Argentine Supreme Court in Compafiia
Azucarera Tucumana is probably little different from what the U.S.
Supreme Court would have held in the same period,449 but that does
not change its implications for judicial acceptance of what is essen-
tially a de facto provincial government. The nature of this compro-
mise is presented in particularly stark terms in an 1874 case in which
the Supreme Court adopted the decision of the lower court as its own.
In Lozano, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the federal
judge in the Province of Jujuy where the plaintiff questioned not the
legislative process, but the availability of an independent provincial
judiciary.4 50 The case concerned property that according to the plain-
tiff the Governor had illegally seized as belonging to the Provdnce.451
Most of the decision concerned itself with the plaintiff's argument that
the seizure violated his constitutional rights and that the federal courts
therefore had jurisdiction.4 2 The federal judge responded to this is-
sue by finding that the case was an ordinary property dispute and that
if every dispute involving property could be described as a constitu-
tional question then essentially all cases could be brought in federal
court.453 But the plaintiff also alleged that the provincial court system
446. a at 286-87.
447. Id. at 288.
448. I& at 289-90.
449. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 6S0 (1S92) (refusing to allow the validity of a law
to be questioned on the grounds that the law submitted to the President by Congress w~as
substantially different from the bill voted upon by the Houses of Congress).
450. "Lozano," 15 Fallos 65, 67 (1874). The Supreme Court affirms the lower court
decision "on the basis of its reasoning." Id. at 76.
451. Id. at 66, 6S-69.
452. Id. at 71-75.
453. Id. at 72-73.
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in Jujuy was incapable of giving him a fair hearing (which was proba-
bly true given the dominance of the governor in many small interior
provinces).4 54 This is the point on which the District Court's reply is
most striking. No attempt is made to defend the Jujuy court. Rather,
the Court describes the matter as one involving government legiti-
macy and therefore by definition outside its role:
Aside from the fact that it is not the function of the Federal Courts
to investigate whether justice is well or poorly constituted or admin-
istered in the states, it cannot be admitted as true that Argentines
will find the doors of justice shut in Jujuy. If that was the case in
this country, then the country would be outside the conditions of
Article 5 of the Constitution [republican form of government], with-
out guarantee of its institutions by the Nation, its Senators and Dep-
uties without [proper] seats in the Congress, and without proper
seat this very District Court before which the Plaintiff has
recurred....455
The judge took the position that the courts could not consider
whether the nation's institutions satisfy the constitutional requirement
of a "representative, republican, federal" form of gove:rnment 456 be-
cause then judges would then have to consider their own legitimacy,
since their legitimacy depended on that of the authorities who name
them.
Given that in the 1870s few provinces had capable and independ-
ent judiciaries, not to mention democratically elected governments,
the implications of the Lozano decision are enormous. If widespread
electoral fraud vitiates a government's legitimacy then no Argentine
federal government was legitimate until Hip6lito Yrigoyen assumed
office in 1916 in the country's first clean presidential elections. Seri-
ous institutional irregularities in small Argentine provinces are com-
mon even today.457 Courts, however, could not question legitimacy.
454. Id at 67, 70, 75.
455. Id. at 75.
456. CONSTr. ARG. art. 1 (1860).
457. For example, four provinces have undergone federal interventions during Presi-
dent Carlos Menem's first term (1989-1995), all presumably because the "republican form
of government" had been violated in the Province. Decree 103/91, Jan. 15, 1991, [1991-A]
A.D.L.A. 338 (intervening all three branches of government in Tucum6in); Decree 566/91,
Apr. 4, 1991, [1991-B] A.D.L.A. 1820 (intervening judiciary in Catamarca); Decree 712191,
Apr. 17, 1991, [1991-B] A.D.L.A. 1895 (intervening executive and legislative branches in
Catamarca); Decree 241/92, Feb. 4, 1992, [1992-A] A.D.L.A. 385 (intervening Executive
Branch in Corrientes); Decree 1447/92, Aug. 12,1992, [1992-C] A.D.L.A. 3104 (intervening
judiciary in Corrientes); Decree 53/93, Jan. 20, 1993, [1993-A] A.D.LA 166 (intervening
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Strangely, in spite of political question doctrine, the judiciary
played a central legitimizing role when electoral reform finally came,
but in what the Supreme Court would insist was a nonjudicial capac-
ity. The Radical Party slipped out of the limelight in the mid-1890s.
Alem's nephew, Hip6lito Yrigoyen, assumed leadership of the party
and generally refused to allow the party to compete in elections, as it
would be sanctioning fraud. Yrigoyen maintained good relations with
many younger military officers. However, in February 1905 he led a
new revolution. This revolution, even though it was put down within a
few days, served to revive the issue of electoral fraud.45 (As required
under the Supreme Court's case law, civilian participants in the rebel-
lion were released on bail459 and a general amnesty followed in June
the next year. 6 ) In 1907 and 1908, Yrigoyen held meetings with
President Figueroa Alcorta in which the President sought to establish
the Radical Party's requirements for participation in the electoral pro-
cess,46 1 and in 1910, Roque Sienz Pefia was elected President on a
platform of electoral reform.4 2 Unlike his father, Luis Sdenz Pefia,
legislative branch in Corrientes); Law No. 24306, Dec. 17, 1993, [1994-A] A.D.LA. 79
(intervening all three branches of government in Santiago del Estero).
458. RocK, supra note 10, at 185-S6; see generally EDUARDO Jost CAiRENAS & CAR.
LOS MANUEL PAYA, EN CANINO A LA DEMOCRACIA POLMt1CA. 1904-1910, at 69.15 (19So)
(on the Revolution of 1905); 1 DtL MAzo. supra note 138. at 109-31 (on the RadicaL and
their revolutionary activities during the 1900s).
459. Ldpez, Norberto et al., Court Dossier for 36 persons accused of rebellion in 1905,
on file in Legajo 18 with the Director of the Archivo General del Poder Judicial. The
dossier at 1 contains a bail request by L6pez made on February 11, 1905, invoking the
Supreme Court's case law from 1893. L6pez was released on a 5000 pesos bond on Febru-
ary 15,1905, dossier at 2, and the other rebels were likewise released. One case where pre-
trial release was initially denied made its way to the Argentine Supreme Court from the
small interior province of Santiago del Estero. In "Abregtii' 102 Fallos 219 (1905), the
Supreme Court required the release of one of the rebels in spite of an article in the Consti-
tution of Santiago del Estero read by the Province's Supreme Court as barring pre-trial
release of individuals accused of rebellion. Id. at 226. The Supreme Court declared that
release on bail was a constitutional right when the possible sentence did not include the
possibility of jail, merely exile. Id. at 227-30.
460. Law No. 4939, June 13, 1906, [1S59-1919] A.D.L.A. 703.
461. Informe elevado a la Convenci6n Nacional de la UniOn Civica Radical (Dec. 1909)
in 3(2) HIPOLITO YRIGOYEN, PUEBLO Y GOBIERNO 270,274-75 (2d ed. 19561 (report by
Yrigoyen of his two meetings with President Alcorta in 1907 and 1903); C.ARDEN,1S &
PAYA, supra note 458, at 131-35.
462. 3 ABAD DE SANm.LAN, supra note 134, at 6S4-45; 1 DEL MAzO, supra note 133, at
131-32. Remarkably, President Roque Slenz Pefla began his inaugural address by ques-
tioning the legitimacy of his own mandate given the lack of free suffrage, and naturally
indicating that free suffrage would be the first aim of his presidency. Co.or.so NA.
CIONAL, CAhLnRA DE SENADomEs, DJARIO DE sEsION _s DE 1910, Session of Oct. 12, 1910,
at 3, 3-4 (President's inaugural address).
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Roque Sdenz Pefia had the political base to put his platform into
effect.
The federal judiciary played the central role in supervising the
new electoral process that Roque Sienz Pefia established, and which
produced a Radical victory in the 1916 presidential election. Federal
judges had often had a role in supervising elections prior to the Sdenz
Pefia reforms, and likely were often guilty of at least looking the other
way when fraud occurred. 63 However, the role given them in the re-
forms would indicate that they still enjoyed credibility, and their new
role was so large that they could no longer escape direct implication in
the event of widespread fraud.
Federal judges intervened in three different ways. First, the fed-
eral judge in the capital of each province and the senior federal judge
in the Federal Capital were placed in complete charge of the voter
rolls within their jurisdictions, naming all subordinate employees and
using military conscription lists as the starting point for their work.4 "
Second, the new law on elections procedures465 also established elec-
tions commissions dominated by the federal judiciary. A three-person
elections commission was established in each province, with two of the
three places taken by members of the federal judiciary, and with the
third occupied by the president of the provincial supreme court or, in
the case of the Federal Capital, the president of the Court of Civil
463. For example, under the electoral laws in effect prior to the Sdenz Pefia reforms the
senior federal judge in each province sat on the elections commission in charge of counting
votes. E.g., Law No. 893 art. 3, Oct. 16, 1877, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 1154, 1154; Law No,
4161 art. 25, Jan. 7, 1903, [1889-1919] A.D.L.A. 580, 582. However the federal judge was
only one out of the three persons on the elections commission, id., and most of the fraud
and voter intimidation took place at the polling place. Further, the elections commission
did not have authority to reject votes that satisfied the formalities of the law, merely to
notify Congress of irregularities. Law No. 893 art. 40; Law No. 4161 art. 25; see also supra
note 184 and accompanying text (on the federal judiciary's role in hearing appeals from
voter registration boards). The very fact that so much attention was 'ocused on Judge
Tedfn when he aggressively combated electoral fraud implies that most of the federal judi-
ciary had been willing to treat its role in supervising elections mainly as, a formality. Id.
464. Law No. 8130 arts. 1 & 2, July 27, 1911, [1889-1919] A.D.L.A. 815, 815-17. The
system was modified in 1926 to provide for a permanent voter registration office managed
by a judicial secretary working under the supervision of the federal judge. Law No. 11.387
arts. 4-6, Dec. 14, 1926, [1920-1940] A.D.L.A. 212, 212.
465. Law No. 8871, Feb. 13, 1912, [1889-1919] A.D.L.A. 844. The law established obli-
gatory, universal male suffrage by secret ballot. Id. art. 1, at 844, art. 6 at 845, art. 41.42 at
848-49. The law also specially legislated against the worst abuses of the past such as round-
ups of voters to force them to vote in a group, id. art. 5 at 845 (prohibiting voting in
groups); and election day arrests of opposition voters, id. art. 3 at 845 (prohibiting all ar-
rests on election day unless by judicial order or the individual detained has been caught
during the commission of a crime).
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Appeals.466  These commissions were responsible for counting
votes,467 ruling on all voting irregularities, 4 " and most important,
naming the individuals responsible for manning each polling place. 6
Third, as had always been the case, the federal courts heard all crimi-
nal prosecutions for violation of the federal elections law
47 0
Strangely, however, the Supreme Court continued to treat most elec-
toral issues as political questions, ruling that elections commissions
were not judicial organs from which appeals could be made to the
Supreme Court.47' While the Supreme Court never questioned the
constitutionality of having judges supervise the electoral process, it in-
sisted that in doing so the judges functioned in a nonjudicial capacity.
Until the 1960s the only electoral issues heard by the Supreme Court
were appeals from criminal prosecutions for electoral misconduct.4
The lesson that emerges is a complex one. First, the federal judi-
ciary was clearly respected enough by all major political participants
to play the central role in supervising elections once enough members
of the Argentine elite finally wanted them. This respect was earned
by the judiciary because of its political neutrality and its successes
prior to the Sdenz Pefia elections law during crises like those of 1S90s.
Second, while according to the Supreme Court federal judges super-
vising elections did so in an extrajudicial capacity, it is clear that the
reason that federal judges were able to act was because a new polit-
ical/constitutional rule had emerged that required fair elections based
466. Id. art. 51, at S50 (in provinces with a federal court of appeals and in the Federal
Capital the elections commission is made up of the president of the federal court of ap-
peals, the federal judge responsible for the voter rolls, and the president of the provincial
supreme court, with the president of the federal court of appeals replaced by the federal
prosecutor in provinces lacking a federal court of appeals).
467. Id. arts. 59-65, at 851-52.
468. Id. arts. 60-62, at S51.
469. Id. art. 30, at 847.
470. Id. arts. 68-84 (establishing various criminal violations that as federal law must be
heard in the federal courts. Law No. 48 art. 2, § 1, Sept. 14, 1S63, [1852-18 91 A.D.L.A.
364, 366).
471. "Bavastro," 128 Fallos 314, 314-15 (1918): see also ALBrrTO B. BIANqCHI, CO.-
TROL DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD: EL PROCESO Y LA JURISDICCION CON VCIO.NMES § 42,
at 321-26 (1992); 1 H-CTOR A. MAIRAL, CONTROL .UDICL.L DE LA ADMINIST LACIO N PUD.
LiCA § 317 at 534-542 (1984) (both books describing the Supreme Court's extensive case
law, most of it developed after 1930, first finding that electoral issues and issues concerning
political parties constituted political questions, and gradually abandoning that approach).
472. See "Bavastro," 128 Fallos at 314-15; BIANCHI, supra note 471, at 53442 (but not
including examples of criminal appeals). On appeals in criminal prosecutions, see "Rfos,"
99 Fallos 383 (1904); "Alcntara," 99 Fallos 99 (1904) (both involving federal officials who
violated the law by making voting recommendations their employees); see also supra note
57.
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on a secret ballot and universal adult male suffrage. This rule had not
existed prior to the Sdenz Pefia reforms and explains why the Sienz
Pefia reforms heightened the judiciary's role. Third, the Supreme
Court's application of political question doctrine to elections indicates
a failure to incorporate a change in the political/constitutional rules
that it was responsible for protecting. The Supreme Court had a fos-
silized view of the Constitution on the most important issue in Argen-
tine politics.
VIII. Two Different Views of Legitimacy
While the Supreme Court's response to Argentine political unrest
through 1929 is interesting in its own right, showing the Court's ability
to act independently to restrain the level of political repression, it is
especially important for what comes afterwards, given the Court's de-
cision in 1930 to continue functioning and continue applying much of
the Constitution when a military coup overthrew the constitutional
government and established a de facto executive. 73 The Supreme
Court in 1930 announced that it would treat the government estab-
lished in that year's coup as a de facto government whose credentials
could not be judicially questioned.474 Two different approaches to-
ward explaining the Supreme Court's attitude toward government le-
gitimacy emerge from this Article, and both will help explain the
Court's conduct in 1930. First, the Supreme Court may be seen as a
timid body unwilling to consider issues of legitimacy because it recog-
nized that during most of Argentine history the entire political system
lacked legitimacy in democratic terms. Second, the Court may be
viewed as an independent organ invoking the talismanic authority of
the U.S. Constitution and rational authority, but with only an incom-
plete set of political/constitutional rules to arbitrate.
Taking the first approach, one can argue that there is little differ-
ence between political question doctrine applied to questions of gov-
ernment legitimacy and the de facto doctrine that the Supreme Court
was to adopt under which it simply refused to entertain actions ques-
tioning the constitutional legitimacy of the military authorities. A
Supreme Court already accustomed to living with continuing illegiti-
mate government on the provincial level is in a sense already trained
to accept it on the federal level. Moreover, if the Supreme Court had
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already determined that issues of provincial government legitimacy
were beyond its role because-according to Lozano-the Court's own
legitimacy might be called into question, then the Court had held that
questions concerning the legitimacy of the federal government were
outside its authority long before the 1930 coup. In fact, there are pre-
1930 examples of blatant illegality that could be said to affect govern-
ment legitimacy on the federal level. For example, when in January
1908, after having properly called an extraordinary session of Con-
gress, President Jos6 Figueroa Alcorta found Congress so hostile that
it refused to pass a budget, he merely signed a decree declaring the
previous year's budget in effect and declared the session of Congress
concluded.4 75 One can even argue that a Court that lived with wide-
spread electoral fraud in almost every presidential election until 1916
had long decided to put aside all issues of government legitimacy,
even if involving a de facto government.
The above approach is, however, overly simplistic. There may be
an element of truth in likening political question doctrine used to
avoid decisions on governmental legitimacy to acceptance of de facto
situations and the affirmation that the Court was therefore willing to
act under illegitimate military governments, but the approach fails to
explain exactly what is meant by "illegitimate" government. The
equation "political question doctrine" = "de facto doctrine" = "ac-
ceptance of illegitimate government" sees government legitimacy as
equal to constitutional compliance. However, such a definition is
probably erroneous in most societies and certainly so in the Argentine
context. A second, and more precise, analysis of the Supreme Court's
approach toward governmental legitimacy is possible with a better un-
derstanding of the term legitimacy.
Legitimacy cannot be described in absolute terms. Individual
members of society may be violently opposed to the government to
the point that they embark upon revolutionary activities, may con-
sider the government to have some legitimacy but not much-leading
them to neither support it nor oppose it in the event of a revolution -
or they may actively support a government because they consider it
legitimate. Different members of society will have differing views of a
government's legitimacy. Rule of law based on rational interpretation
of a text or its legislative history is one of the ways government may
increase its degree of legitimacy, others being the invocation of any
traditional or religious authority that might exist within the culture or
475. Decree dated Jan. 25, 1908, B.O. Jan. 27, 1908, at 279.
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simply the enjoyment of popular charisma conferred by elections or
rallies of support in the street.
476
Argentine government prior to 1916 clearly did not enjoy the
level of legitimacy enjoyed by government in countries like Great
Britain or the United States, where the political rules provided gener-
ally accepted mechanisms for the transfer of political power between
competing parties. The Radicals engaged in constant revolts precisely
because Argentina's political rules did not provide for the peaceful
transfer of power through a clean electoral process. Without free
elections or some other widely accepted method for transferring polit-
ical power, the scope of Argentina's system of politicallconstitutional
rules was incomplete and it lacked sufficient alternative sources of au-
thority to fill the gap.
If: (a) legitimacy is viewed as degree of acceptance of government
rather than degree of compliance by government with the constitu-
tional text, and (b) it is recognized that given the nineteenth century
elite's lack of interest in free elections, the scope of Argentina's polit-
ical/constitutional rules remained too incomplete for its government
to enjoy high levels of legitimacy among all political sectors, then (c) it
follows that the initial refusal of the Argentine Supreme Court to rule
on elections and the "republican form of government" in the prov-
inces simply recognized the incomplete nature of Argentina's polit-
ical/constitutional rules and governmental legitimacy. Argentina's
elite in the mid-nineteenth century never planned on universal suf-
frage or truly independent provincial governments.477 Aside from
what U.S. doctrine might have required, if Argentina's political/consti-
tutional rules are viewed in terms of what the Argentine elite truly
agreed upon in 1853 and 1860, then the Supreme Court lacked even
rational authority to explore issues of electoral fraud and the republi-
can form of government in the provinces. (Assuming of course that
rational authority is not understood as all textual authority, but as
those legal rules adopted with the understanding that they will carry
authority.) Questions of transfer of power on the national level and in
the provinces were not part of the early political rules, so the courts
could properly ignore those issues and the problem of governmental
legitimacy. No one had an expectation that the Court was defrauding.
476. See 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 215-16, 241-45 (4th ed. 1956,
Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds. & trans., 1968).
477. 3 ALBERDI, supra note 29, at 523; Miller, supra note 21.
[Vol, 20:231
Courts and the Creation of a "Spirit of Moderation"
If the above seems too abstract, the reader might consider asking
what the Argentine Supreme Court would have done had the Radicals
successfully taken power with a revolution in 1893. The Radicals in
the 1890s never questioned the distribution of property or the protec-
tion of civil liberties and had no qualms with the court system. Like-
wise, the Supreme Court had no particular qualms with the Radicals.
Alem only sought a revolution in order to truly realize the Constitu-
tion. In this context, there is no reason to think that in the event of a
successful Radical revolt the Court would have resigned, or that any-
one in 1893 would have expected it to resign. The Radicals never indi-
cated that they considered the Court corrupted by the other branches
of government either because it received its authority from them or
because it approved of their practices.
Now one can ask whether there is any real difference between
what the Court probably would have done in 1893 to usher in a revo-
lutionary government dedicated to clean elections and what it did do
in 1930 in continuing to act under a military government. Assuming
that no political rule exists requiring the democratic transfer of gov-
ernmental authority, a court dependent on rational authority should
be able to continue to operate in the event of a revolutionary change
of government. If the court's own authority does not stem from the
democratic origins of the authorities appointing it-and until the
Sdenz Pefia reforms this certainly was not the case-and if the revolu-
tionary government accepts the rules that the Supreme Court has ap-
plied in the past, then the change in authorities may be regarded as an
irregularity little different from common past events such as a federal
intervention to be sure of a province's votes on election day.
There is one important difference between what might have hap-
pened in 1893 and what did happen in 1930, however. In 1893 free
elections were only an aspiration, whereas by 1930 eighteen years had
gone by since the Sienz Pefia reforms. The Radical Party had become
the ruling party by virtue of the reforms, electing Hip6lito Yrigoyen
President in 1916, Marcelo T. de Alvear in 1922, and Hip6lito
Yrigoyen once again in 1930, in clean elections supervised by elections
commissions made up mainly of the federal judiciary, and with power
transferring peacefully each time. While President Yrigoyen engaged
in various politically motivated federal interventions,4 78 and one can
argue that portions of the Argentine oligarchy still had not incorpo-
478. RocK, supra note 10, at 199-200.
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rated free elections as a political rule,4 79 much of Argentine society
undoubtedly had. Although the Radicals had spent years in armed
conspiracies, they came to power through free elections and traced
their origins to Alem and his original platform of free suffrage. Fur-
ther, the development of free suffrage in Argentina was not the result
of a single moment of inspiration, but the result of a long campaign
that ended with the ruling conservatives themselves finally electing
Roque Sdenz Pefia as President, the political figure from their ranks
most identified with free suffrage. The Supreme Cou:t's acceptance
of revolutionary authorities in 1930, unlike what might have occurred
in 1893, also implied acceptance of what many Argentines would have
considered a breach of a rule requiring that political power only be
transferred as a result of free elections.
IX. Final Observations
The nineteenth century Argentine Supreme Court developed as a
superb instrument for moderating political struggles aniong members
of the economic and political elite, but never moved beyond that to
become a vehicle for incorporating new classes into the political pro-
cess. The Argentine Court's failure to begin hearing appeals in electo-
ral cases and other situations characterized as political questions was
in some ways an error that it shared with those members of the polit-
ical elite who delayed, or in many cases never accepted, the need for
democratic political institutions. Because the Court only exercised
authority to enforce a restricted set of rules, it was never able to be-
come a progressive force for political reform and provide the stability
needed for political competition that went beyond the confines of a
small elite.
However, the Argentine Supreme Court and the federal judiciary
did function as a force of moderation in Argentine politics. The Court
helped enforce a set of rules protecting political dissidents in a system
where until the 1860s political enemies-even when from within the
economic elite-ended up with their throats cut and their property
confiscated. Given the constant revolutions because of the lack of
democratic mechanisms for transferring power, the instability of the
past could have easily returned. With the Court protecting individual
liberties, the old spirals of violence gradually ended and revolutionary
uprisings could be classed as mere minor distractions in Argentina's
rapid growth. Clearly the Alberdian vision of Argentina as a land of
479. WAISMAN, supra note 12, at 83, 114.
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economic opportunity required receptive world markets for Argentine
products and foreign investors and immigrants able to put Argentina's
natural agricultural endowments to work. But the Supreme Court's
role in ending the repressions of the past offers the other side of the
coin for scholars seeking to explain Argentina's nineteenth century
success. The Argentine elite wanted stability and the Supreme Court
became a tool to help provide it. Without the Supreme Court avail-
able to engage in judicial review, it is questionable whether political
opponents would have treated each other so graciously.

